Woods v Woods
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 25 July 1846 |
| Date | 25 July 1846 |
| Court | High Court of Chancery |
English Reports Citation: 67 E.R. 441
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
[411] woodall v. white. Feb. 19, 1844. The pendency of proceedings before the Judge at Chambers to settle the pleas to the action is no ground for varying the form of the order for extending the common injunction to stay trial. The common injunction was obtained in this case, and extended to stay trial after the Defendant at law had obtained leave to plead several matters, and after the Court of Queen's Bench had directed a reference to the Judge at Chambers to settle the pleas. Mr. Eomilly and Mr. Anderson moved that the order for the injunction might be varied by inserting the direction that it should be without prejudice to the Plaintiff at law proceeding to complete the issue ; but His honor [Sir James Wigram] refused to vary the common order.
[411] woodall v. white. Feb. 19, 1844. The pendency of proceedings before the Judge at Chambers to settle the pleas to the action is no ground for varying the form of the order for extending the common injunction to stay trial. The common injunction was obtained in this case, and extended to stay trial after the Defendant at law had obtained leave to plead several matters, and after the Court of Queen's Bench had directed a reference to the Judge at Chambers to settle the pleas. Mr. Eomilly and Mr. Anderson moved that the order for the injunction might be varied by inserting the direction that it should be without prejudice to the Plaintiff at law proceeding to complete the issue ; but His honor [Sir James Wigram] refused to vary the common order.
[411] woodall v. white. Feb. 19, 1844. The pendency of proceedings before the Judge at Chambers to settle the pleas to the action is no ground for varying the form of the order for extending the common injunction to stay trial. The common injunction was obtained in this case, and extended to stay trial after the Defendant at law had obtained leave to plead several matters, and after the Court of Queen's Bench had directed a reference to the Judge at Chambers to settle the pleas. Mr. Eomilly and Mr. Anderson moved that the order for the injunction might be varied by inserting the direction that it should be without prejudice to the Plaintiff at law proceeding to complete the issue ; but His honor [Sir James Wigram] refused to vary the common order.
English Reports Citation: 67 E.R. 442
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
442 WOODS V. WOODS 3 HARE, 411. [411] woods v. woods. Feb. 10, 1844. Leave to amend the bill without prejudice to exceptions to the answer which had been overruled. The circumstances of this case resembled those in Drake v. Drake. (2 Hare, 647). In the prayer of process on a cross-bill, for discovery only, the words " and decree " had been introduced by mistake, and the Defendant had protected himself against exceptions for the insufficiency of his answer by insisting that the bill was open to a general demurrer. Mr. Miller, for the Plaintiff, moved for leave to amend the bill without prejudice-to the exceptions, by striking out of the prayer the words which made it a prayer for relief : Delatorre v. Bernales (4 Madd. 396). [412] Mr. Shebbeare opposed the motion. His honor [Sir James Wigram] gave leave to amend without prejudice to the exceptions, the Plaintiff paying the costs relating to the exceptions up to the date of the order, and also the costs of the motion.(1)
442 WOODS V. WOODS 3 HARE, 411. [411] woods v. woods. Feb. 10, 1844. Leave to amend the bill without prejudice to exceptions to the answer which had been overruled. The circumstances of this case resembled those in Drake v. Drake. (2 Hare, 647). In the prayer of process on a cross-bill, for discovery only, the words " and decree " had been introduced by mistake, and the Defendant had protected himself against exceptions for the insufficiency of his answer by insisting that the bill was open to a general demurrer. Mr. Miller, for the Plaintiff, moved for leave to amend the bill without prejudice-to the exceptions, by striking out of the prayer the words which made it a prayer for relief : Delatorre v. Bernales (4 Madd. 396). [412] Mr. Shebbeare opposed the motion. His honor [Sir James Wigram] gave leave to amend without prejudice to the exceptions, the Plaintiff paying the costs relating to the exceptions up to the date of the order, and also the costs of the motion.(1)
442 WOODS V. WOODS 3 HARE, 411. [411] woods v. woods. Feb. 10, 1844. Leave to amend the bill without prejudice to exceptions to the answer which had been overruled. The circumstances of this case resembled those in Drake v. Drake. (2 Hare, 647). In the prayer of process on a cross-bill, for discovery only, the words " and decree " had been introduced by mistake, and the Defendant had protected himself against exceptions for the insufficiency of his answer by insisting that the bill was open to a general demurrer. Mr. Miller, for the Plaintiff, moved for leave to amend the bill without prejudice-to the exceptions, by striking out of the prayer the words which made it a prayer for relief : Delatorre v. Bernales (4 Madd. 396). [412] Mr. Shebbeare opposed the motion. His honor [Sir James Wigram] gave leave to amend without prejudice to the exceptions, the Plaintiff paying the costs relating to the exceptions up to the date of the order, and also the costs of the motion.(1)
English Reports Citation: 67 E.R. 570
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
[83] woods v. woods. Nov. 2, 6, 1844. In a suit by a cestui que. trust to set aside a purchase of the trust property, made thirty years before by the trustee, the trustee insisted on the knowledge of the transaction and long acquiescence therein by the cestui que trust; and in this answer to a cross-bill the cestui que trust admitted that he had an opinion of counsel on his right, which he had taken many years before. The Court held the opinion to be a privileged communication, and refused to order its production. Bill, by a cestui que trust against his trustee, to set aside a purchase of the trust property by the trustee nearly thirty years before. The Defendant, the trustee, alleged, by way of defence, that the cestui que trust had known the circumstances of the purchase, and his rights in respect thereof, and had acquiesced in it for fifteen years prior to the filing of the bill. The trustee, by his cross-bill against the cestui que trust, in proof that the cestui que trust had long known his situation with reference to the property, alleged that he had, fifteen years previously, taken the opinion of counsel thereupon. The Defendant, the cestui que trust, by his answer to the crossbill, admitted that he had taken the opinion of Mr. Bell on the subject, about the time alleged, and that the case and opinion were then in his possession. He submitted, however, that they were privileged communications. On a motion for the production of the documents admitted in the answer to the cross-bill, . . . Mr. Shebbeare, for the Defendant, the cestui que trust, submitted to produce the case, but objected to the production of the opinion: Preston v. Carr (1 Y. & J. 175), Eadcliffe v. Fursman (2 Bro. P. C. 514, Tom. ed.). He suggested also that the document was protected on the additional ground of being a communication which 4 HAKE, 84. WOODS V. WOODS 571 had taken place in contemplation of the present proceedings, or at least of that assertion of right which had been made in the original suit: Hughes v. Biddulph (4 Euss. 190), Vent v. Pacey (Id. 193), Nias v. The Northern [84] and Eastern Cmmties Railway Company (2 Keen, 76), Greenlaw v. King (1 Beav. 137), Lord Walswgham v. Goodricke (3 Hare, 122). Mr. Miller, for the trustees, insisted that he was entitled to the production of the opinion, first, on the ground that it was taken during the existence of the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, with reference to the trust property; secondly, on its materiality, as evidence for the trustee of the knowledge and acquiescence of the other party : Flight v, Robinson (M.E. 31st July 1844); and, thirdly, on the fact that, when the opinion was taken, no proceedings in equity were in contemplation, and therefore that it was not within the rule as to privileged communications : Richards v. Jackson (18 Ves. 472), Newton v. Beresford (1 You. 377). Nov. 6. the vice-chancellor [Sir James Wigram]. This was a motion by the Plaintiff in a cross-suit, for the production of documents contained in the schedule to the Defendant's answer, and admitted by him to be relevant to the matters mentioned in the bill. Amongst other documents is a case which has been submitted by the Defendant to his counsel, and the opinion thereupon. The Defendant has submitted to produce the case, but has resisted the production of the opinion. The only question upon which I was called upon to exercise my...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Beadon v King
...Herring v. Clobery (1 Phill. 91) and Beece t. Trye (9 Beav. 316). They referred also to Holmes v. Badddey (1 Phill. 476), Woods v. Woods (4 Hare, 83), Pearse v. Pearse (1 De Gex & Smale, 12), and Peile v. Stoddart (1 Hall & Twells, 207 ; and 1 Macnaght. & Gordon, 192). Mr. Bethell replied. ......
-
Kelly v Jackson, Graham and Trocke
...98. Lord Walsingham v. GoodrickeENR 3 Hare, 122. Desborough v. Rawlins 3 M. & Cr. 515. Herring v. CloberyENR 1 Phil. 91. Woods v. WoodsENR 4 Hare, 83. Blenkinsopp v. BlenkinsoppENRENR 10 Beav. 143; S. C. on Appeal, 2 Phil. 607. Harris v. HarrisENR 3 Hare, 450. Foley v. Hill 3 M. & Cr. 475. ......