“WRONG” IN THE M'NAUGHTEN RULES
| Author | Norval Morris |
| Date | 01 October 1953 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1953.tb02133.x |
| Published date | 01 October 1953 |
"
WRONG
"
I"
THE
M'NAUGHTEN
RULES
THE
High Court of Australia in
Stapleton
v.
The
Queen (1952)
86
Commonwealth Law Reports
858,
refused to follow the recent decision
of
the English
Court
of
Criminal Appeal in
R.
v,
Windle
[1952]
2
Q.B.
826
on
the meaning
of
the word
"
wrong
')
in the M'Naughten
rules.
If
one charged with murder had
a
"
disease
of
the mind
')
at
the time of the killing and knew the
"
nature and quality
of
his
act," the question whether he
"
knew that what he was doing was
wrong
"
becomes the phrase on which his life may hang
:
its
meaning is not therefore of merely academic interest.
In delivering the unreserved judgment of the Court
of
Criminal
Appeal (Lord Goddard
C.J.,
Jones and Parker
JJ.)
in
Wkdle's
Case,
Lord Goddard both posed the problem raised by the word
"wrong" in the context of the defence of insanity and gave
an
answer
to
it. He said:
"
A
man
may be suffering irom
a
defect
of reason, but, if he knows that what he is doing is wrong--and by
'wrong' is meant contrary to law--he
is
responsible. Counsel
for
the appellant suggested that the word 'wrong' as it is used
in the M'Naughten rules did not mean contrary to law, but had
some qualified meaning-morally wrong-and that, if
a
person
was
in
a
state
of
mind through
a
defect of reason that he thought that
what he was doing, although he knew it was
wrong
in law, was
really beneficial,
or
kind,
or
praiseworthy, that would excuse him."
Confirming this interpretation, Lord Goddard concluded
:
"
In
the opinion
of
the court, there is no doubt that the word
'
wrong
'
in the M'Naughten rules means contrary to law and does not have
some vague meaning which may vary according to the opinion of
different persons whether
a
particular act might
or
might not be
justified." This is
a
clear acceptance of the
"
illegaiity
"
test first
stated, and even more forcibly, by Lord Brougham in the debates
in the House
of
Lords following the acquittal of Daniel
M'Naughten:
"
there is only one kind
of
right and wrong; the
right is when you act according to law, and the
wrong
is when you
break it."
In their joint judgment in
StapZeton9s
Case,
Dixor:
C.J.,
Webb
and Kitto
JJ.
dealt at length with their reawns
for
refusing to
follow
Windle's
Ccise.
Their analysis is the only reserved and
careful and judicial interpretation that this limb of tlle M'Naughten
rules has
so
far received; and their conclusion,
that
the accused's
criminal liability here depends on his ability to reason about the
wrongness
of
his act with
a
moderate degree of sense and composure,
is
in sharp conflict with the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Such a disagreement, concerning rules propounded in
1843
and
applied very frequently throughout the Anglo-American legal
435
To continue reading
Request your trial