Young v Higgon
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Year | 1840 |
| Court | Exchequer |
| Date | 1840 |
English Reports Citation: 151 E.R. 317
EXCH. OF PLEAS.
S. C. 8 Dowl. P. C. 212; L. J. M. C. 29; 4 Jur. 125. Applied, In re Railway Sleepers Supply Company, 1885, 29 Ch. D. 204; Radcliffe v. Bartholomew, [1892] 1 Q. B. 161-2 Referred to, Goldsmiths' Company v. West Metropolitan Railway, [1904] 1 K. B. 5; English v. Cliff, [1914] 2 Ch. 384. And see In re Knox's Trust, [1895] 1 Ch. 538.
6M.&W.N. YOUNG V. HIGGON 317 YOUNG v. higgon, esq. Exch. of Pleas. 1840.-In the computation of the calendar month's notice of action to a justice, required by the 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, a. I, the day of giving the notice, and the day of suing out the writ, are both to be excluded. [S. C. ti Dowl. P. C. 212; 9 L. J. M. C. 29; 4 Jur. 125. Applied, In re Railwuy Sleepers Supply Company, 1885, 29 Ch. D. 204; Raddi/e, v. Bartholomew, [18921 I Q. B. 161-2 Referred to, Goldmnithn' Company v. West Metropolitan Railway, [190-4] 1 K. B. 5 ; English v. Cliff', [1914] 2 Ch. 384. And see In re kium's Trust*, [1895] 1 Ch. 538.] Trespass against the defendant, a magistrate of the county of Pembroke, for breaking and entering the plaintiff's dwelling-house, and seizing his goods. Plea, (by statute), not guilty. At the trial before Gurney, B., at the last Pembrokeshire Assizes, it appeared that the plaintiff, having been convicted before the defendant of an offence under the Malicious Trespass Act, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, was afterwards also charged before him, under the stat. 3 Jac. 1, o. 10, with having refused to bear the charges of his conveyance to gaol under the former conviction, and the defendant thereupon issued his warrant to the constable of the parish wherein the plaintiff resided, to sell the plaintiffs goods for the purpose of satisfying such charges. The constable accordingly seized and sold certain of the plaintiff's goods for that purpose, which was the trespass complained of. It was objected for the defendant, (amongst other things), that no sufficient notice of action had been given to satisfy the stat. 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 1. The notice was served ou the 26th of March, 1838; the writ was sued out on the 26th of April, The learned Judge reserved the point, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff, damages 101,; leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a non-[50]-suit, if the Court should think the action was brought too soon. Evans, in Michaelmas Term, obtained a rule accordingly ; against which, Chilton and J. Wilson new shewed cause. The notice was sufficient. The enactment of the 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 1, is, that " no writ shall be sued out against, uor any copy of any process at the suit of a subject shall be served on, any Justice of the peace for anything done in the execution of his office, until notice in writing of such intended writ or process shall have been delivered to him, &c., at least one calendar month before the suing out or serving the same." The true construction of the statute is, that the day of giving the notice and the day of suing out the writ are to be reckoned, the one inclusive, and the other exclusive: if so, the action was not brought too soon. The rule for computing the time in cases like the present, where it dates from an act done, is to include in the computation the day on which the act was done. There are many authorities to that effect: Clayton's case (5 Rep. 1), fforris v. Hundred of Gawtry (Hob. 189; 1 Brownl. 156), Oshournv. Rider (Cro. Jac. 135), Clark's case (Sty. 3H2), R. v. Adderley (2 Dougl. 463), Morley v. Vauglum (4 Burr. 2525), Bellasis v. Hester (1 Lord Raym. 280; Lutw. 1591). [Parke, B. The cases which refer to bills payable at sight have been long overruled.] Castle v. Burditt (3 T, R. 623) is a direct authority to the same effect, decided upon a similar statute to the present. Lester v. Garland (15 Ves. 248) may be referred to as a decision qualifying the former cases; but that was the case of a will, in which a liberal construction ought to be allowed. Sir William Grant also, in his judgment, assigns some weight to the circumstance of the party interested being privy to the act done, [611 which does not apply to this case. It has always been laid down that the Court will apply a liberal rule in favour of the right of the subject to sue for a wrong to his liberty or property. In Zouch v. Empsey (4 B. & Aid. 522), the Court certainly held that the " fourteen days at least," mentioned in the Lords' Act, 32 Geo. 2, c. 28, meant fourteen...
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