Your space or mine? Competition, control, and the spatial profile of militant violence against civilians
| Published date | 01 July 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221091597 |
| Date | 01 July 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Regular Articles
Your space or mine? Competition, control,
and the spatial profile of militant violence
against civilians
Blair Welsh
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester
Abstract
While some militant groups consistently target civilians, others only resort to violence in specific locations and points
in time. Existing research typically treats civilian targeting as a static feature of conflict systems at either the country
or group level. This offers little explanation for variation in the patterns of violence across time and space. I develop
an explanation for why militant groups target civilians at specific places and times based on how groups are likely to
respond to local political and security conditions. I argue that violence against civilians serves as a function of
response for militant groups – violence depends on both the control of territory and subnational competition from
other non-state actors. The likelihood of civilian targeting is higher in locations where groups control territory and
face competition, as groups seek to display dominance and punish defectors. The likelihood of civilian targeting is
high in locations where groups face competition. However, this violence is unlikely to be as high as where groups also
control territory, accounting for the need to reach out to civilians for support. The analysis of georeferenced event
data on civilian targeting by militant groups across sub-Saharan Africa (1997–2013) and an illustrative case study on
Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon find robust support for my argument.
Keywords
civilian targeting, intergroup competition, militant groups, sub-Saharan Africa, territorial control
Introduction
Where and when do militants target civilians? Popular
accounts of militarism often portray groups’ violence as
both brutal and indiscriminate. In reality, however, there
remains large variation in civilian targeting across and
within militant groups.
1
Figure 1 displays the spatiotem-
poral distribution of attacks on civilians for al-Shabaab in
Somalia. It is clear violence is concentrated in particular
spaces and points in time. Between 2019 and 2021, al-
Shabaab launched extensive attacks against civilians in
Ceelbuur, with civilian targeting amounting to 85% of
their violent strategy in the town.
2
Conversely, al-
Shabaab committed few attacks on civilians in Jamaame,
with such violence accounting for only 10% of violent
events for the organization in the town. Aside from its
spatial profile, civilian targeting is temporally concen-
trated. Between 2018 and 2020, al-Shabaab’s violence
against civilians accounted for approximately 17% of the
total attacks attributed to the organization. By 2021, this
share decreased to 7%. This raises an important empiri-
cal question: what explains spatiotemporal variation in
militant groups’ violence against civilians at the subna-
tional level? Put differently, why does militant violence
occur in some locations, at certain points in time, and
not others?
Scholarly attention to this question is limited. A
related literature on the frequency and intensity of
Corresponding author:
blair.welsh@essex.ac.uk
1
I use the following terms interchangeably: civilian targeting and
violence against civi lians, civilian and no n-combatant, and grou p
and organization.
2
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) is
the source for all percentages (Raleigh et al., 2010).
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(4) 557–572
ªThe Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221091597
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civilian targeting is extensive (e.g. Asal et al., 2019; Bal-
cells, 2010; Stanton, 2013). While providing substantial
insights, quantitative research largely treats civilian tar-
geting as a static feature of conflict systems at either the
country or group level (e.g. Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein,
2006; Polo & Gleditsch, 2016). This offers little expla-
nation for variation in the patterns of violence across
time and space. Other work has examined how violence
occurs within specific environments (e.g. Cunningham,
Bakke & Seymour, 2012), but does not examine how
such environment defines the characteristics of violence
at certain points in time.
This article develops a framework to explain spatio-
temporal variation in militants’ targeting of civilians and
tests its predictions empirically with data on militant
violence at the subnational level. In what follows, I first
review existing studies on civilian targeting. Next, I build
on existing theories about the dynamics of civilian tar-
geting to develop a framework that can explain its varia-
tion. I look to the behavioural contours of the locations
within which militants operate to explain this variation.
3
I argue civilian targeting serves as a function of response
for militant groups in the conflict marketplace – violence
depends on both the control of territory and competition
from other non-state actors. The likelihood of violence is
high where groups face competition. The likelihood of
violence is higher where groups control territory and face
competition. Higher levels of civilian targeting are there-
fore reliant on an interaction between territorial control
and competition at the subnational level.
After developing these arguments in more detail, I test
them using georeferenced event data across sub-Saharan
Africa (1997–2013). Sub-Saharan Africa offers a rigor-
ous test of the theory given the availability of fine-
grained data on militant violence and diversity in the
activity of organizations across the region. I utilize data
from ACLED to provide subnational measures of terri-
torial control and competition. In compiling them, I
assessed the acquisition of territory by militant groups
and the number of non-state actors in specific locations.
I complement the quantitative analysis with a case study
on civilian targeting by Boko Haram in Nigeria and
Cameroon (2015–16). This allows for an illustration
of the mechanisms at play. The analysis provides robust
support for the theory. I conclude with a discussion on
the implications of my findings and directions for future
research.
This research contributes to existing research on civil-
ian targeting in several ways. First, I illustrate the
Figure 1. Distribution of al-Shabaab violence
a. Spatial distribution of al-Shabaab violence
b. Temporal distribution of al-Shabaab violence
3
‘Location’ refers to a geographical unit over physical space. While
some locations may be more favourable or accessible than others, I
give equal weight to all locations, provided the specific location hosts
a population.
558 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 60(4)
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