Youth, Parties, and Democracy in West Germany
| Author | Eva Kolinsky |
| Published date | 01 February 1986 |
| Date | 01 February 1986 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.1986.tb00161.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
YOUTH,
PARTIES,
AND
DEMOCRACY
WEST
GEWY
EVA
KOLINSKY
In West Germany as in other advanced industrial societies, a new mobility
has altered party preferences and electoral alignments. Social cleavages have
been modified in their bearing on political behaviour by new values, new
orientations, a new social environment (Flanagan and Dalton,
1984).
Social
and economic mobility have loosened established class ties; a new proximity of
life-styles, increased access to higher and further education and above all, the
proliferation of new white collar occupations which do not, by themselves, imply
political affiliations to one party or another, helped to create the new political
mobility. Traditional party affiliations which were associated with the social
environment, with family background or the work place are weakening. Party
preferences increasingly depend on individual expectations as to party policies
or on assumptions as to the effectiveness of one party against another (Kolinsky,
1984).
This new political mobility has been most apparent among the post-war
generation, those born after World War
I1
who reached voting age since the late
sixties. Research into the impact of socio-economic conditions
on
political
culture has suggested that in affluent societies new political expectations
were generated among the young by post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977) or by
a critique of democratic everyday life in the light
of
democratic principles and
ideals (Burklin,
1984).
In West Germany, the new political mobility of the
younger generation has been instrumental in the changes of government in
1969
and in 1982; in the seventies,
it
generated the Greens as a parliamentary
contestant. Today, the electoral responses of young voters to unemployment are
again poised
to
alter the party political equilibrium.
It
can be argued that
the 'young voteN1 has been decisive in changing the party balance in German
pol
i
tics.
Changing
Party
Preferences
of
the Young
For nearly two decades, the governing party of the first hour was also the
electoral party for the young. Between
1949
and
1969,
the majority of young
voters opted for the. Christian Democrats. During the sixties, the Social
Democrats could gain ground among the 21-29 year olds, the young voters at the
time. In
1969,
once the post-war generation had reached voting age, the
SPD
overtook the
CDU/CSU
(Table
1).
After the voting age had been lowered to
18,
the dominant position of the
SPD
among the youngest voters seemed unassailable. Yet in
1983,
more young
voters again endorsed the
CDU/CSU
than the
SPD,
a reversal of party preferences
which had been apparent in opinion polls since May
1981
(Der Arbeitgeber,
18/33,
1983). While the Christian Democrats recovered some ground compared with the
early seventies, the new political balance was above all due to the appeal of
the Greens to young voters. In
1983,
13.6%
of the
18-25
year olds voted Green;
the
SPD
lost 10% of its electorate in this age bracket compared with the 1980
federal elections. The position of the Greens as a political youth movement
-
two in three Green voters are under
35
years of age
-
has robbed the
SPD
in
particular
of
some
of
its young voters.
Changes away from the
SPD
date back to the mid-seventies and were apparent
initially as an inability of young people
to
express any party preference.
Between
1974
and
1979,
up to 60%
of
young people between the ages of
14
and
35
stated in various surveys of political opinions and attitudes that they had
no
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