Yvonne Ameyaw v Christina McGoldrick
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice Steyn DBE,Mrs Justice Steyn |
| Judgment Date | 09 July 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] EWHC 1924 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: QB-2020-000089 |
| Date | 09 July 2020 |
[2020] EWHC 1924 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
THE HONOURABLE Mrs Justice Steyn DBE
Case No: QB-2020-000089
The Claimant represented herself
Rupert Paines (instructed by Fladgate LLP) for the Defendants
Judgment without a hearing pursuant to CPR 23.8(b)
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
THE HONOURABLE Mrs Justice Steyn DBE
A. Introduction
This judgment addresses an application notice filed by the Claimant on 6 July 2020. No draft order was attached to the application. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the Claimant's submissions that:
i) The Claimant makes an application to set aside certain paragraphs of an order I made on 3 July 2020 (“the 3 July Order”) in which I directed that various matters would be determined on the papers. In particular, the Claimant asks for an oral hearing to determine the Defendants' application to strike out the claim and/or for summary judgment.
ii) The Claimant applies for an order that there be an oral hearing of the Defendants' application within the next 21 days;
iii) The Claimant applies under the Barrell jurisdiction for amendments to be made to the judgment I delivered on 2 July 2020: Ameyaw v PwC [2020] EWHC 1741 (QB) (“the Judgment”), or for it to be “expunged” in its entirety; and
iv) The Claimant applies for a stay of proceedings pending determination of the recusal application she made on 2 July 2020 – albeit I delivered judgment on that application on 6 July: Ameyaw v PwC [2020] EWHC 1787 (QB) (“the Recusal Judgment”) – and pending an intended appeal against that judgment.
B. Procedural history
The procedural history leading up to the hearing on Wednesday 1 July 2020 is addressed in paragraphs 4 to 26 of the Judgment.
The hearing on 1 July 2020 was listed to determine the Defendants' application dated 30 March 2020 (“the Defendants' application”) seeking:
i) the determination of preliminary issues on (a) the meaning of certain statements of which the Claimant complains; (b) whether those statements are defamatory of the Claimant at common law or under s.1 of the Defamation Act 2013; and whether the statements complained of are statements of fact or opinion;
ii) an order striking out the Claimant's claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or (b); and
iii) an order for summary judgment under CPR part 24 and/or s.8 Defamation Act 1996 against the Claimant on the whole of her claim, because she has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue and there is no other compelling reason why the claim or issue should be disposed of at a trial.
At the outset of the hearing on 1 July 2020:
i) The Claimant applied for the application for an interim injunction which she had filed the day before, 30 June 2020, to be heard on 1 July;
ii) The Claimant made oral submissions in support of her application dated 29 June 2020, seeking to have parts of the Defendants' hearing bundle struck out; and
iii) The Claimant made an oral application for Mr Ogilvy to be permitted to make oral submissions on her behalf.
I made an order on 1 July 2020 (“the 1 July Order”) in the following terms:
“1. The Claimant's application for her interim injunction application dated 30 June 2020 to be heard at the hearing on 1 July 2020 is refused.
2. The Claimant's application for parts of the Defendants' hearing bundle to be struck out and ruled inadmissible is refused.
3. The Claimant's application for her McKenzie friend, Mr Ogilvy, to be permitted to make oral submissions on her behalf is refused.”
I gave brief ex tempore reasons for my decisions on these applications and, having been asked by the Claimant at the hearing on 1 July 2020 to provide my reasons in writing, and to do so speedily because she wished to appeal, I handed down the Judgment at 10am on 2 July 2020.
I adjourned the hearing on 1 July 2020 without hearing any submissions on the Defendants' application. In short, I adjourned the hearing until Friday 3 July 2020 in circumstances where the Claimant was absent (following an adjournment) and I was informed that an ambulance had been called for her. The circumstances, and my reasons for adjourning, are more fully explained in the Judgment and the Recusal Judgment.
At 3.28pm on 2 July 2020 an email was sent to the Court from the Claimant's email account, but from her mother on her behalf, stating that her daughter “ is unwell” and “ unable to attend court whilst sick” and attaching a letter dated 2 July 2020 from the Claimant's GP. Although I had not received an application to adjourn the hearing, on receipt of this email and medical evidence I indicated to the parties that I intended to consider of my own motion whether to adjourn the hearing and I invited any further submissions the parties wished to make.
Having considered the parties' submissions, I directed that the hearing listed for 3 July 2020 should be vacated. The reasons for this order are attached to the 3 July Order. Paragraph 12 of those reasons states:
“In my judgment, in circumstances where the Claimant appears to have collapsed or fainted on Wednesday and was assessed by her GP on Thursday as having a current viral illness, it would be contrary to the interests of justice to press on with the oral hearing on Friday 3 July. Although the medical evidence is rather thin, that is understandable in the time available and given (as I say), the Claimant's reported symptoms and the current pandemic. Accordingly, on 2 July I directed that the hearing should be vacated, informing the parties that my order/directions and reasons would follow.”
The 3 July Order is in the following terms:
“1. The hearing on 3 July 2020 is vacated.
2. The Claimant's recusal application will be determined on the papers, without an oral hearing.
3. The Defendants' application for the determination of preliminary issues as to (i) the meaning of certain statements of which the Claimant complains; (ii) whether those statements are defamatory of the Claimant either at common law or under s.1 of the Defamation Act 2013; and (iii) whether the statements complained of are statements of fact or opinion, will be determined on the papers, without an oral hearing.
4. The Defendants' application for an order striking out the Claimant's claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or (b) and/or for an order for summary judgment under CPR Part 24 and/or s.8 of the Defamation Act 1996 against the Claimant on the whole of her claim, will be determined on the papers, without an oral hearing.
5. The parties may file further written submissions in respect of the applications referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above and any such submissions must be filed and served by no later than Friday 17 July 2020.
6. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this order are made without notice and of the court's own motion, and the parties or either/any of them may apply within 7 days of service of this Order upon them, to set aside or vary paragraphs 4 and/or 5 of this order. Any such application must be served on all other parties.
7. Costs in the case.”
At paragraphs 13 and 14 of the reasons attached to the 3 July Order I stated:
“13. Although the Defendants' primary position was that the hearing should proceed, in the alternative, if I determined that the hearing should be adjourned, they have sought a direction that the applications should be determined without a hearing.
14. The Claimant had asked for her recusal application to be dealt with on the papers. The only reason not to do so had been because the Defendants had not had an opportunity to respond, a hearing was listed for the following morning and there had been no application to adjourn it. The position has now changed. Both parties have made written submissions on the recusal application and both parties ask for it to be determined on the papers. Accordingly, I direct that it should be determined without a hearing pursuant to CPR 23.8(b) and (c). I have received submissions from both parties on this application and so I will proceed directly to determine the application.”
On Monday 6 July 2020, I gave judgment dismissing the Claimant's application to recuse myself: see the Recusal Judgment.
In respect of paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the 3 July Order, I stated my reasons as follows:
“15. The Claimant also applied for the preliminary issues to be dealt with on the papers. I had refused that application because there was considerable overlap between the preliminary issues and the strike out/summary judgment application, the application had been listed for a hearing and there was no good reason not to hear oral submissions in respect of the preliminary issues in those circumstances. However, the position has now changed. I have adjourned the hearing. In these circumstances, the position of both parties is that the preliminary issues should be determined without a hearing, with the parties being given an opportunity to provide further written submissions. I consider that it is appropriate in the circumstances to direct that this part of the application be determined on the papers pursuant to CPR 23.8(b) and (c).
16. As regards the Defendants' application to strike out the claim and/or for summary judgment, the Defendants' position is (again) that if – contrary...
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