Housing Tenure in UK Law

Clearly, however, what is regarded as suitable for discharging the interim duty may be rather different from what is regarded as suitable for discharging the more open-ended duty in section 193(2); but what is suitable for discharging the "full" duty in section 193(2) does not have to be long life accommodation with security of tenure such as would arise if the family were allocated the tenancy of a council house under the council's allocation policy determined in accordance with Part 6 of the 1996 Act.

This does not mean that Birmingham were entitled to leave these families where they were indefinitely. What is suitable for occupation in the short term may not be suitable for occupation in the medium term, and what is suitable for occupation in the medium term may not be suitable for occupation in the longer term. Suitability for the purpose of section 193(2) does not imply permanence or security of tenure.

First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter—in which case a prima facie duty of care arises.

The letting in each case was of a house comprising more dwellings than one. But I agree with the county court judge in thinking that Parliament when it enacted Section 1 (1) used the singular diliberately, and in this instance did not intend the singular to include the plural. The policy of the Rent Acts was and is to protect the tenant in his home, whether the threat be to extorta premium for the grant or renewal of his tenancy, to increase his rent, or to evict him.

It will always be for the decision-maker to judge, in the particular circumstances of the case in hand, how much weight should be given to conflict with policies for the supply of housing that are out-of-date.

) The Council must consider whether Mr Pereira is a person who is vulnerable as a result of mental illness or handicap or for other special reason. Thus, the Council must ask itself whether Mr Pereira is, when homeless, less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person so that injury or detriment to him will result when a less vulnerable man would be able to cope without harmful effects.

Whereas the statutory tenancy is unassignable, not an estate in land but a mere "personal right of occupation" (see Lord Greene MR in Carter v SU Carburetter Co [1942] 2 KB 288, 291), a secure tenancy is an orthodox estate in land which, subject to specific restrictions in the 1980 Act, can be assigned, held in joint names, pass by survivorship and be disposed of by will on death.