Professional Malpractice in UK Law

I venture to think that still remains a fundamental principle of our law. But it is today true to say that in English law an assignee who can show that he has a genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of the claim of another and to that extent takes an assignment of that claim to himself, is entitled to enforce that assignment unless by the terms of that assignment he falls foul of our law of champerty, which as has often been said, is a branch of our law of maintenance.

Maintenanco may, I think, nowadays be defined as improperly stirring up litigation and strife by giving aid to one party to bring or defend a claim without just cause or excuse. The reason why the common law condemns champerty is because of the abuses to which it may give rise. The common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be tempted, for his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses.

Much maintenance is considered justifiable today which would in 1914 have been considered obnoxious. Most claims by workmen against their employers are paid for by a trade union. Most defences of motorists are paid for by insurance companies. This is perfectly justifiable and is accepted by everyone as lawful, provided always that the one who supports the litigation, if it fails, pays the costs of the other side.

Except as there provided, therefore, it is unprofessional conduct for a solicitor to enter into any agreement even for his normal fee where this is dependent on achieving a successful result in litigation. But the fact that a professional rule prohibits a particular practice does not of itself make the practice contrary to law: see Picton Jones & Co. v Arcadia Developments Ltd. [1989] 1 EGLR 42.

But it is a subject upon which there are sharply divergent opinions and where I should hesitate to suppose that my opinion, or that of any individual judge, could readily or convincingly be regarded as representing a consensus sufficient to sustain a public policy. But it is a subject upon which there are sharply divergent opinions and where I should hesitate to suppose that my opinion, or that of any individual judge, could readily or convincingly be regarded as representing a consensus sufficient to sustain a public policy.

An assignment of a debt is not invalid even if the necessity for litigation to recover it is contemplated. Suing on an assigned debt is not contrary to public policy even if the assignor retains an interest. What is contrary to public policy and ineffective is an agreement which has maintenance or champerty as its object; such a consequence will not be avoided by dressing up a transaction which has that character and intent as an assignment of a debt.

This decision demonstrates a proposition that Mr Hillier has not sought to challenge. Funding alone will not justify an Order against the funder under Section 51. I do not consider that an Order under Section 51 will normally be appropriate where a disinterested relative has, out of natural affection, funded costs of a claim or a defence that is reasonably advanced.