Specific Performance in UK Law

If the only real redress is damages, how can its measure or scope be affected according to whether the contract is regarded as still subsisting or as at an end? To preserve the bare contractual relationship is an empty formality. The difference is fundamental, for there is no legal substitute for voluntary performance.

Since the statutory fusion of law and equity in 1875 it has been enacted (Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, Section 25 (7) now re-enacted in slightly different language in the Law of Property Act 1925, Section 41) that stipulations of a contract, as to time or otherwise, which according to rules of equity are not deemed to be orto have become of the essence of the contract are also to be construed and have effect at law in accordance with the same rules, The third parties rely on Section 41 on the point of construction.

Specific performance is traditionally regarded in English law as an exceptional remedy, as opposed to the common law damages to which a successful plaintiff is entitled as of right.

But the purpose of the law of contract is not to punish wrongdoing but to satisfy the expectations of the party entitled to performance. From a wider perspective, it cannot be in the public interest for the courts to require someone to carry on business at a loss if there is any plausible alternative by which the other party can be given compensation. It is not only a waste of resources but yokes the parties together in a continuing hostile relationship.

Suppose, however, that the master insists on the employment terminating on the named day? In the ordinary course of things, the relationship of master and servant thereupon comes to an end: for it is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship that it should continue contrary to the will of one of the parties thereto As Lord Kilmuir said in Vine v. National Dock Labour Board (1957) A. C., referring at page 500 to the ordinary master and servant case:

The equitable doctrine of laches, to which I shall turn in a moment, provides the court with ample power to refuse relief when delay on the claimant's part would make it inequitable to grant it and I should be surprised if there were many cases in which, in the absence of fraud, the court would be willing to grant relief by way of specific performance if the claim had not been made within six years after the contract was due to be performed.

Chancery courts had further regularly awarded interest, including not only simple interest but also compound interest, when they thought that justice so demanded, that is to say in cases where money had been obtained and retained by fraud, or where it had been withheld or misapplied by a trustee or anyone else in a fiduciary position.