Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship
| Published date | 01 October 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819875515 |
| Author | Anne Meng |
| Date | 01 October 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2019, Vol.31(4) 568–599
ÓThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875515
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Accessing the state:
Executive constraints and
credible commitment in
dictatorship
Anne Meng
University of Virginia, USA
Abstract
When do executive constraints provide credible commitment power in dictatorships, and under
what conditions do leaders establishsuch constraints? This article argues that institutions success-
fully constrain autocrats only when elites are given real access to state power, such as appoint-
ments to key governmental positions. I present a game theoretic model in which an autocratic
leader decides whether to establish bindingconstraints at the start of her rule. Doing so shifts the
future distribution of power in favor of elites, alleviating commitment problems in bargaining. I
show that leaders are likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power
especially weak, and these initial decisions shape the rest of their rule. Even if a leader enters
power in a uniquely weak position vis-a
´-vis other elites, and is on average, quite strong, the need
to alleviate commitment problems in the first period swampsexpectations about the future distri-
bution of power. I illustrate the model’s findings through case studies of Cameroon and Co
ˆte
d’Ivoire.
Keywords
Africa; authoritarian regimes; credible commitment; executive constraints; formal theory
1. Introduction
Montesquieu observed that, at the birthof new polities, leaders mold institutions, whereas
afterwards institutions mold leaders.(Putnam, 1993:. 26)
Corresponding author:
Anne Meng, Department of Politics, Universityof Virginia, 1540 Jefferson Park Avenue, Charlottesville, VA
22903, USA.
Email: ameng@virginia.edu
A central finding from recent research on authoritarian regimes is that nominally
democratic institutions, such as parties or legislatures, are a key source of authori-
tarian stability. Parties help dictators to facilitate cooperation within the ruling
coalition by solving commitment and monitoring problems (Boix and Svolik, 2013;
Brownlee, 2007; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011; Magaloni, 2008; Reuter, 2017; Svolik,
2012) and channel benefits of state power to elites (Greene, 2007, 2010; Slater,
2010). Legislatures and elections serve leaders’ strategic interests by providing con-
trolled outlets for bargaining, cooptation, and dissent (Blaydes, 2010; Gandhi,
2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009 ; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Lust-Okar,
2006; Malesky and Schuler, 2010; Truex, 2016; Wright, 2008). Constitutions create
publicly observable signals that help solve elite coordination problems in dictator-
ships (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Ginsburg and Simpser, 2013).
The appearance of these formal institutions, however, often obscures the true lack
of constraints on the executive. In fact, nominally democratic institutions are found in
the vast majority of dictatorships in the post-World War II era. From 1946 to 2008,
autocratic leaders maintained a ruling party 87 percent of the time. During that same
period, authoritarian regimes had legislatures 85 percent of the time (Cheibub et al.,
2010) and constitutions 93 percent of the time (Elkins et al., 2008).
Despite the wide inclusion of institutions that are theorized to provide authori-
tarian stability, many dictatorships have remained unstable. From 1946 to 2008,
44 percent of all leadership transitions did not occur peacefully (Goemans et al.,
2009). From 1950 to 2014, a total of 471 coup attempts were carried out, of which,
50 percent were successful in deposing the leader (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Given
that regime instability has persisted in dictatorships, even despite the wide adop-
tion of nominally democratic institutions, the existence of formal institutions can-
not adequately explain variation in autocratic stability.
Furthermore, most ruling parties are actually quite weak and likely incapable of
solving autocrats’ commitment problems. In fact, 61 percent of all ruling parties that
were in power from 1946 to 2010 failed to outlive the death or departure of the found-
ing leader (Meng (forthcoming)).
1
This suggests that most ruling parties rely heavily
on the influence of a single leader and are not truly autonomous organizations that
are capable of enforcing inter-temporal commitments. In fact, many empirical studies
have found weak or no evidence of a systematic relationship between ruling parties
and regime durability (Gandhi, 2008; Lucardi, 2017; Smith, 2005).
If nominally democratic institutions do not constitute real constraints on regime
executives, what types of constraints provide credible commitment power in dicta-
torships? This article addresses a fundamental question in the study of political
economy and authoritarian rule: When do leaders adopt institutions that share
power with elites, and how do these institutions become self-enforcing?
I argue that effective institutional constraints on regime executives derive from
providing elites with access to state resources. This access can take the form of
appointments to key government positions, such as the Vice President, Minister of
Defense, or Minister of Finance. Credible executive constraints can also be estab-
lished through the creation of rules that regularize and codify elite access to
Meng 569
government offices, such as meritocratic promotion rules or constitutional provi-
sions regulating leadership succession.
I argue that institutions credibly constrain leaders only when they change the
underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites. When elites are
appointed to high-level positions within government, they gain access to material
resources, power, and prestige, allowing them to consolidate their own bases of
support. Over time, state access allows these elites to become viable challengers to
the incumbent, shifting the distribution of power away from the leader. Institutions
that empower specific challengers create credible threats of rebellion, which sustains
long-term power sharing. This mechanism demonstrates how institutions can
become self-enforcing in dictatorships.
I formalize the argument in a game theoretic model in which an autocrat decides
whether to extend access to the state to a representative elite at the start of a two-period
bargaining game. In the model, the extension of state access shifts the future distribu-
tion of power away from the leader, alleviating commitment problems in bargaining by
enhancing the elite’s de facto ability to overthrow the leader in the second period.
A main finding from the model is that autocratic leaders are likely to place con-
straints on their own authority when they enter power weak and are susceptible to
being deposed early on in their tenure. Because per-period transfers are insufficient
to buy quiescence from exceptionally strong elites, initially weak leaders remain in
power by enhancing the de facto power of elites, therefore credibly guaranteeing
future rent distribution. Even if the leader enters power in a uniquely weak position
vis-a-vis other elites, and expects to be strong in the future, the need to alleviate
commitment problems in the first period swamps future expectations about the dis-
tribution of power, the need to alleviate commitment problems in the first period
swamps future expectations about the distribution of power. As Montesquieu
observed, leaders make decisions about institutions at the start of their tenure, and
these institutional decisions shape the rest of their rule.
This article illuminates a counter-intuitive argument for power sharing. The
model shows how initially weak autocrats can better secure their hold on power by
giving it away to the very elites who are most capable of unseating them. By build-
ing institutions that empower potential challengers, the leader hands the (figura-
tive) sword to someone else while pointing it at herself.
The theory underscores the point that the existence of a democratic facxade is not of
primary importance. Rather, institutions constrain when they change the underlying dis-
tribution of power within the ruling coalition. This helps to explain why the presence of
nominally democratic institutions cannot necessarily explain why some regimes are insti-
tutionalized systems while others remain personalist dictatorships. Institutions matter,
not because they establish de jure rules, but when they affect de facto political power.
2. Institutions as commitment devices
2.1. The fundamental problem of autocratic rule
Autocratic regimes are plagued by a fundamental paradox: extremely powerful
governments cannot credibly commit to share power or distribute rents with elites,
570 Journal of Theoretical Politics 31(4)
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