Adverse political incentives and obstinate behavioural norms: a study of social safety nets in Bangladesh
| Published date | 01 March 2021 |
| Author | Abu Elias Sarker,Faraha Nawaz |
| Date | 01 March 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852319829206 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Adverse political
incentives and obstinate
behavioural norms:
a study of social safety
nets in Bangladesh
Abu Elias Sarker
University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
Faraha Nawaz
University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh
Abstract
Despite the relative success of poverty alleviation over the last two decades, the issue
of social safety nets remains an intriguing issue in the area of the strategic intervention
of the government of Bangladesh. This article aims at exploring two sets of challenges:
adverse political incentives and obstinate behavioural norms. In doing so, the current
article proposes a conceptual framework that highlights the effects of clientelism,
institutional frameworks and their enforcements, and social, human and technological
factors on social safety nets. Further, it also shows how social safety nets influence the
reduction of poverty, vulnerabilities and risks, leading towards the capacity building and
empowerment of vulnerable people. The case of Bangladesh is discussed in the light of
the proposed conceptual framework.
Points for practitioners
State decision-makers and implementers may take cognizance of the importance of the
participation of pro-poor civic forums at different stages of social safety net interven-
tion, the allocation of adequate resources, and addressing numerous management
deficits confronting social safety nets. International development organizations also
Corresponding author:
Abu Elias Sarker, Department of Management, University of Sharjah, PO Box 27272, Sharjah, United Arab
Emirates.
Email: elias@sharjah.ac.ae
International Review of Administrative
Sciences
2021, Vol. 87(1) 60–77
!The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852319829206
journals.sagepub.com/home/ras
need to consider the contextual variables while providing assistance to developing
countries in general and Bangladesh in particular. Political actors and administrators
also need to take into account major contradictions in the formulation and
implementation of social safety net programmes in Bangladesh.
Keywords
Bangladesh, political economy, poverty alleviation, social safety nets
Introduction
Bangladesh, once known as a ‘bottomless basket’, has emerged as one of the
countries on the world map making considerable progress in economic and
social development (Hossain, 2017). For many, the Bangladesh case is a ‘develop-
ment paradox’ in that despite a very poor governance record, the country has
made remarkable headway in all probable indicators of economic growth and
social development (Ahmed et al., 2014a; Asadullah et al., 2014; Hulme et al.,
2014; Mahmud et al., 2008). The gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate has
consistently been 6% and above over a long period of time. Progress in human
development indicators has been very impressive compared to many countries with
similar income levels. One set of estimates reveals that the percentage of poverty-
stricken people (using figures for consumption below the official upper poverty
line) decreased from 48.4% in 2000 to 31.5% in 2010. On the other hand, the
numbers of extremely poor people (consumption below the lower poverty line)
declined from 34.3% in 2000 to 17.6% in 2010 (BBS, 2011).
Contemporary literature has identified, increased interventions by both govern-
ment and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), massive urban construction,
increased remittance flows from overseas Bangladeshis, and the thriving ready-
made garment (RMG) sector’s labour absorption and export earnings as critical
factors for consistent economic growth rate (Hulme et al., 2014; Mahmud et al.,
2008). There is no denying the fact that social safety net programmes (SSNPs) have
played considerable roles in achieving all these. However, despite the relative suc-
cess of SSNPs, some key challenges remain omnipresent. The purpose of this
article is to explore two sets of challenges: adverse political incentives and obstinate
behavioural norms associated with the formulation and implementation of social
safety nets (SSNs). While adverse political incentives are reflected in the contents of
the institutional frameworks of SSNs, obstinate behavioural norms are gauged
through the indices of mal-coordination, overlapping, corruption, pilferage and
patronage distribution (World Bank, 2016). In the context of Bangladesh, most
evaluation studies of SSNs have mainly focused on obstinate behavioural norms
(Ahmed et al., 2014b; Hossain, 2007; Paul and Islam, 2015; Rahman and
Kappestein, 2014). This article will employ a comprehensive political-economy
Sarker and Nawaz 61
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