Agendas, alternatives, and collective labour law. A case study of local collective bargaining legislation in South China
| Published date | 05 June 2017 |
| Date | 05 June 2017 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/ER-08-2016-0167 |
| Pages | 541-560 |
| Author | Siqi Luo |
| Subject Matter | HR & organizational behaviour,Industrial/labour relations,Employment law |
Agendas, alternatives, and
collective labour law
A case study of local collective
bargaining legislation in South China
Siqi Luo
Center for Chinese Public Administration Research/School of Government,
Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China
Abstract
Purpose –The purpose of this paper is to explore how different actors interacted to influence local
labour legislation in the case of the collective bargaining regulations in Guangdong Province, China, using
long-term observation and in-depth interviews.
Design/methodology/approach –This paper uses the case study method to investigate the process of
local labour law-making in China. First, the primary data focus on a series of in-depth interviews conducted in
2014. In Guangdong Province, the author collected the thoughts of three well-informed provincial and
municipal-level trade union officials, one government official, five scholars and lawyers, four enterprise union
chairs and three labour activists. Second, these interviews are triangulated with legislative documents and the
author’s observation of three public meetings. Held at various times from 2011 to 2014, these meetings were
organized to discuss different legislative drafts on collective bargaining.
Findings –The six-year process of adopting collective bargaining legislation in Guangdong presents a
complex picture as different actors joined the process at different times and engaged in different ways.
Labour strikes were a crucial force in drawing the attention of both the local and central governments and
functioned as a means to repeatedly make collective labour relations a policy “issue”for the government,
particularly in 2010. Another actor –the local official trade unions –played a decisive role by not only putting
the “issue”into the decision-making agenda, but by also providing policy alternatives based on workers’
bargaining practices. At the same time, business associations, using slow economic growth as an excuse,
exerted their economic leverage to pressure for suspension of the first two rounds of legislation. Nevertheless,
the new political leadership assuming office in 2013, using an adoptive but restrained logic, pushed for the
enactment of the compromise regulation.
Research limitations/implications –Guangdong Province and its emerging collective labour regimes are
not representatives of China, but they are at the frontier of the labour field. Thus, this case study was
an example of the “most dynamic”interaction with the “most participative”actors and perhaps the “most
pro-labour”of China’s official trade unions.
Originality/value –This paper is original and draws special attention to the dynamic process of the local
law-making and the rationales of different actors in China.
Keywords China, Trade unions, Collective bargaining, Policy process, Labour legislation
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Local government regulations on collective bargaining (集体谈判) or collective negotiation/
consultation (集体协商)[1] are slowly becoming common practice in China. As early as the
1990s, a few local regulations specifically on collective contract were promulgated, such as
the Regulations of Enterprise Collective Contract of Fujian Province (1996) (People’s Forum,
1996) and of Guangdong Province –1996 (People’s Voice, 1996). In every case, they followed
the Collective Contract Regulation (2004) issued by the former Ministry of Labour[2].
It has been only since 2008 that many provinces have started to amend these collective
contract regulations or to discuss legislation of collective wage negotiation (工资集体协商).
Employee Relations
Vol. 39 No. 4, 2017
pp. 541-560
© Emerald PublishingLimited
0142-5455
DOI 10.1108/ER-08-2016-0167
Received 31 August 2016
Revised 28 November 2016
13 December 2016
Accepted 21 December 2016
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0142-5455.htm
This research received funding from the “Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities”
under the title of “Confrontation, Subordination and Consensus: Exploring the Paths to Harmonious
Labor Relations”(No. 1409027).
541
Local collective
bargaining
legislation
The years 2011 and 2012 witnessed the most intensive local legislations. By July 2012, 25 of
China’s 34 provinces and municipal cities had promulgated regulations on collective
contract and another 13 issued or were about to issue documents on wage negotiation[3]. In
addition, new clauses on collective bargaining were also added to legislations about
democratic management or harmonious labour relations, with the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone on the Promotion of the Harmonious Labour Relations –2008 (Government
Online, 2008) being a typical example.
The new local regulations attempted to adjust labour relations “collectively”instead of
individually. China’s central government, partly because of lobbying by the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), had been promoting labour laws particularly in the new
century (Lee, 2009). However, Chinese labour laws still focussed on individual labour
standards, such as working hours and individual contracts, but widely neglected collective
labour disputes, especially interest-based ones (e.g. Lee, 2007;Chang, 2013). Although collective
contract was mentioned in the Collective Contract Provisions (1994; amended in 2004) and a
chapter in the Labour Contract Law (2008) stipulated collective negotiation and collective
contract, details like the bargaining procedures were missing (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004; Luo, 2011).
Though a series of local regulations on collective contract and on wage negotiations were
promulgated after 2008, some questions remain. Since there never has been a law allowing
collective bargaining in China, why did the local governments start drafting these new
regulations? Why was collective bargaining seen as more important than other labour issues?
What were the driving forces that put it on the legislative agenda? And what combination of
politicalforces and circumstances shapedthe final legislation?Instead of merelylooking at the
starting point and the finish line, examining the entire policy process reveals the real battles
over collective bargaining. Policy-making is a process that often involves the interactions of
multiple actors and thus the outcome may not be completely under the control of any one party.
In order to examine the dynamics of the local collective labour legislation process in China, this
paper selects the Guangdong Collective Contract Regulation of Enterpr ises(CCR)[4], wh ich was
known for its lengthy and hotly debated process.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. The first section provides a
literature review of Chinese labour law and the main actors in the labour field. The theoretical
framework of this paper is then introduced. The second section elaborates the legislative process
of the CCR. Based on long-term observation and interviews with “insiders”, the paper explores
the actors, both inside and outside of the government, and their interactions, which explains how
the legislation was successfully put onto the decision-making agenda again and again and why
certain clauses were revised from one draft to the next. Finally, the paper concludes that the
enacted CCR is the result of compromises, with a new dynamic on the labour side. As expected,
political trends greatly shaped the legislative process. The local governments were beset by
pressures from both the top and from labour strikes, and both the local and central governments
were involved in the outcome. Nevertheless, not a single force completely decided the final
version of the law. Instead, many actors with varied purposes and powers got involved; their
actual impacts also relied on the specific timing and circumstances. Besides the great public
attention and widely known opposition from employers, experienced official trade unionists
acted as policy entrepreneurs to mobilize political networks and seized the opportunities created
by workers’strikes. Scholars, researchers and labour activists openly engaged in the process,
although their influence tended to appear over the long term.
2. Literature review
In previous studies, some scholars analyzed China’s purpose in promoting labour laws as
well as the actual impact of such laws (e.g. Gallagher, 2005, Lee, 2007; Chan, 2011). Other
scholars compared the legal text in specific laws and regulations (e.g. Chang, 2005; Brown,
2006, 2015; Zhai, 2015). A few explored the different roles of workers, employers and the
542
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