‘Alert not alarm’: The UK experience of public counter-terrorism awareness and training, with explicit reference to Project ARGUS
| Author | Marian Brooke Rogers,Dylan Aplin |
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X19851537 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
‘Alert not alarm’: The
UK experience of public
counter-terrorism
awareness and training,
with explicit reference
to Project ARGUS
Dylan Aplin and Marian Brooke Rogers
Kings College London, London, UK
Abstract
This study evaluates the contribution of a UK counter-terrorism training tool, the
Project ARGUS simulation exercise format, designed to increase preparedness by
‘alerting not alarming’ the populace to the prevailing ‘severe’ international terrorist
threat. The paper draws upon the theoretical basis for preparedness in order to contend
that, despite exceeding expectations in terms of quantity of events delivered and evi-
dence of immediate post-event learning, Project ARGUS does not wholly live up to its
promise to change the behaviour of individuals and organisations by embedding long-
term learning. The researchers designed and analysed pre- and post-event ques-
tionnaires (N ¼120) in order to explore the impact of attendance at an ARGUS Retail
event within a shopping centre. This information was then augmented with a follow-up
survey (N ¼44) and semi-structured interviews (N ¼9) of key facilitators and parti-
cipants. The authors recommend the immediate adoption of an appropriate evaluation
and certification scheme to mandate participation and embed organisational learning.
They argue that adoption of these approaches would better enable ARGUS to fulfil its
potential and make a significant contribution to improving the resilience of busy crowded
places to terrorism in the UK.
Keywords
Counter-terrorism, project ARGUS, crowded places, preparedness
Corresponding author:
Dylan Aplin, Kings College London, London WC2R 2LS, UK.
Email: dylan.aplin@kcl.ac.uk
The Police Journal:
Theory, Practice and Principles
2020, Vol. 93(3) 167–182
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0032258X19851537
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Introduction
Governments around the world have greatly increased their funding and focus on the
development of effective counter-terrorism (CT) measures over the past decade. The UK
civil defence budget was doubled to £38 million in 2004 in the wake of the four
co-ordinated ‘9/11’ attacks in America in 2001, and shortly before the 7/7 London
bombings in 2005. More recently, following the spate of terrorist attacks in the UK in
the first half of 2017, the Home Secretary announced a further £24 million was to be
‘pumped’ into CT policing in addition to £707 million already announced for 2017/18
(HM Government, 2017a). In spite of these significant injections of funding, the effec-
tiveness of many of these programmes has yet to be assessed.
‘Alert not alarm’
Research following 7/7 has a direct bearing on the drive to ‘alert not alarm’ the public
(Rubin et al., 2005). He undertook a large telephone-based follow-up study assessing the
levels of post-event stress, and suggested that Londoners who had previously experi-
enced terrorism or false alarms related to terrorism (witnessed with the long-standing
IRA campaign in the capital) were less likely to be distressed by the attacks. Current CT
awareness activities in the UK focus on enhancing the preparedness of staff working in
crowded places. This enables them to cope and take control of the event, then help the
public caught up in the incident, leading to less of a need for post-incident clinical
interventions (Page et al., 2008).
Evidence suggests that members of the public exhibit increased resilience to risks
when information about them is provided by trusted sources in a consistent manner
(Rogers et al., 2007; Wessely, 2005). This is significant for CT communication
strategies because the risks associated with terrorism are often perceived to be unfa-
miliar, poorly understood and falling outside public control. This increases the like-
lihood of terrorism-related risks undergoing a process of ‘social amplification,’ where
the consequences of an event can be seen as catastrophic, resulting in a loss of
confidence in institutions (Slovic, 2002; Ursano et al., 2007). An example of this in
the UK would be the reduction in the terrorist threat level from ‘severe’, to ‘substan-
tial’ in May 2005, just before the 7/7 bombing (HM Government, 2017b). The sub-
sequent parliamentary enquiry concluded that the threat and alert states were
confusing, appeared to have little practical effect and risked being easily confused
and misunderstood (HMSO, 2006). The recommendations resulted in a systemic
review of the system to restore confidence.
The ‘new normality’ of a ‘highly likely’ UK threat level evolved following the ‘liquid
bomb plot’ of early 2006. The five UK attacks on busy crowded places in 2017 utilised
such diverse methods as Improvised Explosive Devices (Manchester and Parsons Green)
to Vehicles being used as A Weapon of attack (VAW) at Finsbury Park, coupled with
knives and potentially arson (Westminster Bridge and Borough Market). However, the
need to provide frank and credible messaging to business can sometimes be frustrated by
the commercial constraints of ‘time being money’, conflicting operating practices, pre-
vailing risk appetite and some element of denial.
168 The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 93(3)
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