Alfred Nelson Laughton v Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judgment Date | 16 November 1872 |
| Date | 16 November 1872 |
| Court | Privy Council |
English Reports Citation: 17 E.R. 534
ON APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE COURT OF COMMON LAW OF THE ISLE OF MAN.
Mews' Dig. tit. Defamation, B. Privilege, 2. Qualified, a. iii. d. ii.; tit. Ecclesiastical Law, II. Church of England, 2. Bishops. S.C. L.R. 4 P.C. 495; 42 L.J. P.C. 11; 28 L.T. 377; 21 W.R. 204. See Hart v. Gumpach, 1873, 9 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 270. On point as to onus of proof, see Clark v. Molyneux, 1877, 3 Q.B.D. 237. See also cases collected, Odger's Libel and Slander (3rd Ed), pp. 254, 261.
ON APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE COURT OF COMMON LAW OF THE ISLE OF MAN. ALFRED NELSON LAUGHTON, Appellant; THE HON. AND RIGHT REVEREND THE LORD BISHOP OF SODOR AND MAN,-Respondent * [Nov. 15, 16, 1872]. The charge of a Bishop to his Clergy in Convocation is, in the ordinary sense of the term, a privileged communication; on the well-known principle that a communication made bona fide upon any subjectanatter in which the party has an interest, or in reference to which he has, or honestly believes he has, a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter which, without that privilege, would be defamatory and actionable; provided that, the occasion on which the communication is made rebuts the prima facie inference of malice, in fact, arising from a statement prejudicial to the character of the Plaintiff, and the onus is upon him to prove that there was actual malice, that the Defendant wan actuated by motives of personal spite or ill-will, independent of the occasion on which the communication was made [9 Moo. P.C. (N.S.), 331, 332, 337, 338]. So held, where the Bishop of Sodor and Man, in a charge to his Clergy in Convocation, commented on a speech made by a Barrister in his character of an Advocate instructed to oppose a Bill before the House of Keys, promoted by the Government, vesting additional Ecclesiastical patronage in the Bishop, in which he impugned the conduct of the Bishop, and attributed to him motives and conduct unworthy of his character and position. Held, also, that the circumstances of the case warranted the Bishop in sending such charge to a Newspaper for publication, and that such course being in self-defence, rebutted any presumption of malice on the part of the Bishop. Somermlle v. Hawkins (10 C.B. 583), and Spill v. Maule (Law Rep. 4 Ex. 232) followed [9 Moo. P.C. (N.S.), 337, 338]. The cases of Whiteley v. Adams (15 C.B. (N.S.), 392), and Wright v. Wood-gate (2 C. M. and R. 573), recognized and affirmed [9 Moo. P.C. (N.S.), 331, 332]. The Appellant, in this case, brought an action for libel against the Respondent in the Common Law Court of the Isle of Man. [319] The declaration contained three counts. In the first count, the libel was stated to have been published by the Respondent at a general Convocation of all the Clergy of the Island, and in the second the libel was stated to have been published by the Respondent in a Newspaper called the Manx Sim. The third count was immaterial, and was abandoned at the Trial by the Appellant's Counsel. The Defendant did not plead, and by the Law of the Isle of Man, where there is no plea entered it is equivalent to a plea of not guilty. The action was tried before his Honor, John Clowes Stephen, Esquire, Deemster, and a special jury, at the Common Law Court, at Ramsay, in the Island, on the 15th, and five following days of February, and the 1st and five following days of March, 1870. The Deemster directed the jury, in effect, that both the reading the charge by the Respondent, and also the publication of it in the Manx Sun, which was admitted at the Trial to have been done at the re-[320]-quest and by the direction of the Re- * Present: Sir James William Colvile, Sir Barnes Peacock, Sir Montague Edward Smith, and Sir Robert Porrett Collier. 534 LAUGHTON V. SODOR AND MAN (BISHOP of) [l 872] IX MOORE N.S., 321 spoudeiit, were privileged, and that the jury could ouly find for the Appellant in case they thought that the Kespondent had been actuated by malicious motives against the Appellant, and had exceeded his privilege; but if they thought there was such excess, then that they should give such damages as were commensurate with the excess. The jury returned a verdict for the Appellant for 400 damages. The Respondent being dissatisfied with the verdict, entered a traverse of appeal, and a case was stated for the appellate Court, pursuant to sect. 5, of the Island appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1867 (a). The traverse, or appeal, was heard by the Common Law Court, in June, 1870. The Judges who heard the case being the Lieutenant-Governor, the President of the Court, Deemsters Drinkwater and Stephen (the Judge who had presided at the Trial), and the Clerk of the Eolls of the Island, and that Court, after argument, on the 29th of June, 1870, gave judgment to the effect that, whereas at the trial of the cause " the presiding Judge, the Deemster, charged the jury that if there was actual malice in the alleged libel-not malice in law, but actual ill-will against the Plaintiff, they ought to find damages for the amount of the excess; " " the Court is of opinion, that such [321] charge is wrong in law, that the document complained of was an answer to a charge previously made by the Plaintiff in the action against the Defendant, that the p-rima facie inference of malice was, therefore, rebutted, and that the burthen of showing express malice lay upon the Plaintiff. The Court is further of opinion, that there was no evidence of express malice, and that the Deemster ought to have charged the jury to that effect, and to have told them, that it was their duty to find a verdict for the Defendant. It appears further to the Court, that no new trial can be ordered under the Act of Tynwald, the Island appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1867, there being no question of fact nor any question as to amount of damages remaining between the parties. The Court, therefore, hereby Order that judgment be entered for the Defendant, and that the Plaintiff do pay the costs of the action incurred up to and including the costs at the trial of the cause before the jury." The appeal was from this judgment. The material facts, as they appeared in evidence, were these: - The Appellant was a Barrister, practising in the Isle of Man, and a Bill having been introduced into the House of Keys, intituled " An Act for the division of the Parish of Braddon," he was instructed to oppose the Bill, at the Bar of the House of Keys, on behalf of certain inhabitants of the Parish who had presented a petition against it. The Bill had been introduced into the House of Keys by the Attorney-General of the Island, and would, if it had become law, have vested additional Ecclesiastical patronage in the Respondent. The Appellant appeared at the Bar of the House of Keys to support [322] the petition, and, among other matters, animadverted upon the objects with which the Bill had been introduced by the Respondent; upon the effect of the Bill and upon the manner in which the Respondent had exercised his Ecclesiastical patronage; and otherwise upon the Respondent's management of his Diocese. The Bill was thrown out by the House of Keys. The Respondent afterwards in his charge, in which the alleged libels were contained, read the same at a Convocation of Clergy, held in the Bishop's Court, on Whit Thursday, 1868 (6), and wrote to the Editor of the Manx Sun a Letter enclosing the charge for publication. In the charge (amongst other things), the Appellant was represented as employing arguments and language not ordinarily used by any man of high professional (a) Section 5 enacts, that " The Court shall not on hearing a traverse consider any questions as to any determination...
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