Allegations of the Discriminatory Use of Stop and Search Powers before the Courts: Some Recent English and American Experiences
| Author | Neil Parpworth |
| Date | 01 June 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1350/pojo.2014.87.2.665 |
| Published date | 01 June 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles Volume 87(2) (2014)
92
Introduction
Where an officer of the rank of inspector or above reasonably believes that incidents involving serious violence may
take place in any locality in his area, or that such an incident has taken place and that a dangerous instrument
or offensive weapon used in the incident is being carried in any locality, or that persons are carrying dangerous
instruments or offensive weapons in any locality in his area, s. 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
empowers him to give an authorisation, if it is expedient to do so, for up to 24 hours. An authorisation is therefore
subject to territorial and temporal limits although in the case of the latter, it may be extended for a further 24 hours
(s. 60(3)).
Whilst an authorisation is extant, a constable in uniform may stop and search any pedestrian in the locality, or
any vehicle, driver of the vehicle or any passenger, for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments, regardless of
whether he reasonably suspects the person to be in possession of such things (Zander, 2013). A s. 60 search may
therefore be entirely random (Lustgarten, 2002). Where the power is exercised, a constable must comply with the
information requirements set down in s. 2(2) and (3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Thus
he must inform the person to be searched of his name and the name of the police station to which he is attached.
Additionally, he must indicate the purpose of the search and his reasons for making it.1 A failure to do so will render
the search unlawful. A record of a stop and search encounter must also be kept (s. 3 of PACE).
Allegations of the Discriminatory Use of Stop and
Search Powers before the Courts: Some Recent
English and American Experiences
Neil Parpworth*
Leicester De Montfort Law School, UK
Keywords: stop and search; discrimination; official statistics; legal challenge; accountability
Abstract: Statutory stop and search powers constitute an important weapon in the police’s armoury in the
battle to prevent or detect the commission of criminal offences. Many such powers are only capable of being
exercised where a police officer reasonably suspects that a person is in possession of an item or article that
they ought not to have, e.g. a stolen or prohibited article, a firearm, a controlled drug etc. The ‘reasonable
suspicion’ requirement is therefore intended to be a safeguard to prevent the arbitrary use of a stop and
search power, even though it is not defined in any of the relevant enactments. However, not all stop and search
powers require reasonable suspicion as a condition precedent for their exercise. Section 60 of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, as amended, is one such power. A recent Court of Appeal judgment merits
consideration for the light which it shines on the s. 60 power and its compatibility with the ECHR. It is of
further interest in that it may be contrasted with a recent American case, concerning the New York Police
Department’s ‘Stop and Frisk’ policy, where an American judge was required to consider the constitutionality
of the exercise of this important police power.
* njp@dmu.ac.uk
DOI: 10.1350/pojo.2014.87.2.665
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