American hesitations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: an institutional interpretation
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852306061629 |
| Author | Jean Mercier |
| Published date | 01 March 2006 |
| Date | 01 March 2006 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
American hesitations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions:
an institutional interpretation1
Jean Mercier
The only historical role of Canada and of Canadians is to understand the United
States, then to explain it to the rest of the world. (Marshall McLuhan)
Abstract
In 2005, the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol appear somewhat out of reach, even
if Russia gave life to the protocol by signing it in 2004. Even if implemented, the
protocol entails huge operational problems. Will the United States prove to be the
first country to realize the difficulties in implementing Kyoto, or did they refuse to
ratify it for reasons that are very particular to their own institutions? This article is
an attempt at supporting the latter proposition. In March 2001, the US govern-
ment announced that it was withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on the reduc-
tion of greenhouse gases (GHG) and it has not replaced this participation with a
credible program of greenhouse gas reduction. This decision could be analyzed
through different angles. In this article, we would like to look at these hesitations
through an institutional angle, through the American institutions themselves. Few
elements from their institutional and historical past prepare the United States to
initiate a vigorous program of GHG reduction, other than through technological
innovation or voluntary actions. Even though the institutional concept of path
dependency is identified as the concept most helpful in explaining, from an
institutional point of view, these hesitations, other institutional explanations are
called upon to explain and understand these decisions.
Jean Mercier is a professor at the Department of Political Science of Université Laval (Quebec City,
Canada). His interests centre on environmental policies and public administration. He is currently
working on environmental governance within the framework of a research project funded by the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
The author would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its
support, the anonymous evaluators of IRAS for their contribution to the evolution of this article, as
well as Sébastien Angers for his contribution to the documentary research and his research on the
EPA.
Copyright © 2006 IIAS, SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
Vol 72(1):101–121 [DOI:10.1177/0020852306061629]
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Introduction
In March 2001, the US government announced that it was withdrawing from the
Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG). The withdrawal of the
United States was the culmination of the growing disaffection of the American
authorities in the face of the demands imposed by any vigorous program of green-
house gas reduction. At the time of writing, it would be wrong to say that the United
States is doing nothing to try to reduce greenhouse gases, as several individual States,
as well as several companies, are taking steps in this direction, but, except for the
half-hearted Global Climate Change Policy Initiative, based on economic incentives
and voluntary measures, no truly credible action program exists at the national, i.e.
federal, level.
The Kyoto Protocol itself had been drawn up in 1997 within the framework of
one of the ‘conferences of the parties’ that set out to implement the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, proposed during the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) — the ‘Earth Summit’ — in Rio
de Janeiro on 4 June 1992. Up until March 2001, the United States helped to give
shape to what was to become the world GHG reduction program, but unlike the
program on the preservation of the ozone layer, the American government was
always hesitant to make a firm commitment to this effort, especially as the date on
which the treaty would come into effect came closer.
The negotiations on GHG reduction had started back in 1991, and strong diver-
gences in opinion became apparent from the outset. First of all, as far as the nature
of the agreement itself was concerned, the advocates of an agreement that would
not be too restrictive carried the day against those who wanted to see an agreement
that would lay down precise deadlines from the beginning. Indeed, several European
countries had hoped for stricter limits, but the United States objected to this, arguing
that our knowledge was too patchy and that excessively strict limits would call for
substantial changes to our lifestyles and industrial structures.
The differences in opinion on various issues relating to GHG were to continue to
characterize future debates on climate change within the framework of the ‘confer-
ences of the parties’, between the signing of the Framework Agreement on Climate
Change (150 countries signed in 1992, including the United States) and the middle
of the current decade (2000–10) — over a period of at least ten years. As from March
2001, however, the United States’ chair remained empty following their withdrawal
from the Kyoto agreements in the spring of 2001, as already mentioned above.
Paradoxically, between the Conference of the Parties 6 at the end of 2000 and that
of Bonn (Conference of the Parties 6, 2nd part) in July 2001, the American proposals
made considerable headway, to the extent that they were essentially accepted a few
months after the American withdrawal.
It was at the Kyoto conference (Conference of the Parties 3), in 1997, that the
main bones of contention made their appearance, especially between Europe and
the United States. These differences naturally related to fundamental issues, such as
the matter of the demands to be made of developing countries and their contribu-
tion to the effort to reduce GHG. According to the Kyoto agreement, responsibility for
reducing the production of greenhouse gases falls mainly on developed countries,
102 International Review of Administrative Sciences 72(1)
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