An unbreakable path? A comparative study of decentralization and local government development trajectories in Ghana and Uganda
| Author | Nicholas Awortwi |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852311399844 |
| Published date | 01 June 2011 |
| Date | 01 June 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
77(2) 347–377
!The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020852311399844
ras.sagepub.com
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Article
An unbreakable path?
A comparative study of
decentralization and local
government development
trajectories in Ghana and Uganda
Nicholas Awortwi
Erasmus University, The Hague
Abstract
The evolutionary theory of path dependency suggests that the longer an institution has
been in place, the more resilient it is to change. Given enough time and self-reinforcing
mechanisms, an organizational and institutional path develops and becomes highly resis-
tant to change and likely to endure for a long time. Since the path benefits those who
created it, the same actors cannot unlock it. Only an ‘exogenous shock’ (an event
outside the path) can radically change the incentives or constraints facing the actors
and enable a country to break free of the path. This article applies these propositions to
explain the past, present and future trajectories of decentralization and local govern-
ment (LG) institutional development in Ghana and Uganda. The article shows that
Uganda pursued a sequence of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization
whereas in Ghana the order was administrative, political and fiscal. As a result,
Uganda has made a little progress, more than Ghana, in strengthening LG institutions.
However, given that neither Uganda nor Ghana followed an ideal sequence of decen-
tralization reforms that would have strengthened LGs against unbridled central govern-
ment (CG) interference, currently CGs in both countries are retaking much of what
was initially decentralized. The article concludes that recentralization and further weak-
ening of LGs are likely to continue in both countries because the initial path that was
created benefited CG politicians and bureaucrats and they are committed to staying on
that course.
Points for practitioners
Many countries have developed a decentralization policy that aims at streamlining the
relationship between central and local governments. However, professionals working in
the field of public management and administration need to bear in mind that recentra-
lization is possible even in the midst of a decentralization policy. This is because while
Corresponding author:
Nicholas Awortwi, Institute of Social Studies, PO Box 29776, Erasmus University, The Hague 2502 LT,
The Netherlands
Email: awortwi@iss.nl
central government leadership finds it expedient to appear to support a decentraliza-
tion policy they do not wish to see the growth of powerful local institutions that might
challenge their monopoly over power and resources that are needed for local devel-
opment. Sustained donor pressure as a condition for budgetary support is a plausible
exogenous factor that can force central government leadership in developing countries
to commit to the tenets of decentralization.
Keywords
intergovernmental relations, public administration, regional and local government
Introduction: decentralization as evolving paradigm shift
A survey conducted more than a decade ago in 75 developing and transitional
nations with populations greater than five million found that only 12 had not
embarked on some form of decentralization (Dillinger, 1994: 8). The theoretical
rationale for undertaking decentralization is that transfer of some central govern-
ment (CG) authority, resources, responsibilities and accountability to sub-national
governments empowers local institutions and organizations to undertake more
effective self-governance and development appropriate to local conditions
(Balagun, 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Oyugi, 2000). However, in reality
African countries that are implementing decentralization have diverse rationales –
political, economic, ethnic, and territorial – that may have a tangential relationship
at best to the theoretical rationale stated above. For instance, according to Shah
and Thompson (2004: 3), ethnic-based political conflicts set off the type of decen-
tralization found in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa; while territorial conflicts
lent weight in Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal. Improving service delivery was the
impetus for decentralization in Cote D’Ivoire. Nevertheless, as decentralization
progresses in a country other intentions are added, sparking a new form of decen-
tralization that may shift the emphasis from the previous ones.
Currently more than two-thirds of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
have implemented one or more decentralization policy reforms. According to
Olowu (2003), the current decentralization policy focus in Africa is devolution,
in which the power to deliberate, make decisions, plan and execute development
programmes for localities is transferred from CG politicians to locally elected pol-
iticians, thereby promoting local self-governance. Many analysts argue that the
current process differs from the efforts of the 1960s and 1970s because it is
taking place alongside broad economic and political reforms and with the support
of donors that have made democratic reforms a condition for maintaining support
(Abrahamsen, 2000; Romeo, 1996; Mkandawire, 1999). Despite the shift in focus, a
typical conclusion that often emerges from studies on African decentralization is
that, on the whole, CGs have been reluctant to decentralize sufficient powers and
resources to LGs and so the potential benefits of building and deepening institu-
tions for local self-governance have not been realized from the current round of
348 International Review of Administrative Sciences 77(2)
To continue reading
Request your trial