Assessing the influence of the Responsibility to Protect on the UN Security Council during the Arab Spring
| Author | Aidan Hehir |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836715612849 |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(2) 166 –183
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836715612849
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Assessing the influence of
the Responsibility to Protect
on the UN Security Council
during the Arab Spring
Aidan Hehir
Abstract
This article challenges those perspectives which assert first, that the Security Council’s engagement
with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) during the Arab Spring evidences a generally positive
trend, and second, that the response to the Arab Spring, particularly Syria, highlights the need
for veto restraint. With respect to the first point, the evidence presented in this article suggests
that the manner in which R2P has been employed by the Security Council during this period
evidences three key trends: first, a willingness to invoke R2P only in the context of Pillar I; second,
a pronounced lack of consensus surrounding Pillar III; and third, the persistent prioritisation of
national interests over humanitarian concerns. With respect to veto restraint, this article argues
that there is no evidence that this idea will have any significant impact on decision-making at
the Security Council; the Council’s response to the Arab Spring suggests that national interests
continue to trump humanitarian need.
Keywords
Libya, non-governmental organisations, Responsibility to Protect, Security Council, Syria
Introduction
This article challenges two perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which
have emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. First, the view that the Security Council’s
engagement with R2P during the Arab Spring evidences a positive trend; these argu-
ments – discussed in detail later – assert that the Security Council – though at times
falling short of the ideal – has passed an increasing number of Resolutions which
include references to R2P. This is held to constitute evidence that the R2P 'norm' has
influenced the Council and ‘begun to change the world’ (Bellamy, 2015: 111). As Jess
Corresponding author:
Aidan Hehir, University of Westminster, 32–38 Wells St, London, W1T3UW, UK.
Email: a.hehir@wmin.ac.uk
612849CAC0010.1177/0010836715612849Cooperation and ConflictHehir
research-article2015
Article
Hehir 167
Gifkins argues in her article in this special issue, there is a perception that increased
references to R2P by the Security Council during the Arab Spring demonstrates that,
‘Language on R2P has become less contentious in the Security Council over time’
(Gifkins, forthcoming). This is presented as an axiomatically positive development
with long-term implications. The second perspective holds that the Arab Spring, and
the response to Syria in particular, demonstrates the need for veto restraint; this has
manifested in the 'Restrain the Veto' campaign which is vaunted as a means by which
R2P can exercise greater leverage against the permanent five members of the Security
Council (P5) and mitigate the influence of national interests on decision-making at the
Council.
After initially outlining the centrality of the Security Council to the application of
R2P, this article argues first, that references to R2P by the Security Council have been
comparatively rare and, more importantly, that these references evidence a definite
trend; the manner in which the Security Council has employed R2P demonstrates a
willingness only to refer to the host state’s responsibility and a marked reluctance to
engage with Pillar III of R2P.1 Thus, the increased use of R2P does not necessarily con-
stitute a positive development. Second, I analyse the strategy behind the 'Restrain the
Veto' campaign and argue that the Security Council’s response to Libya, Bahrain and
especially Syria, demonstrates that national interests continue to determine the P5’s
response to intra-state crises.
The Security Council’s powers and R2P
In their 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect, the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) recognised the primacy of the Security
Council and, cautioning against seeking alternatives, suggested that the key task was ‘to
make the Security Council work better’ (ICISS, 2001: xii). The 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document also stated that action to halt or prevent the four crimes under R2P’s
purview – genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – was
permissible only if sanctioned ‘through the Security Council in accordance with the
Charter’. The centrality of the Security Council has also been reiterated during subse-
quent key junctures in the evolution of R2P, such as the 2009 General Assembly debate
on R2P (Hehir, 2013b), and the six reports published by UN Secretary General (UNSG)
Ban Ki-moon since 2009. R2P, therefore, has not altered the laws governing the use of
force or the powers of those – namely the Security Council – with the authority to sanc-
tion remedial action (Bellamy, 2015: 13; Focarelli, 2008; Stahn, 2007); as Jennifer
Welsh, UN Special Adviser on R2P, notes, ‘No new legal obligations were created when
R2P was endorsed in 2005’ (Welsh, 2013).
Despite the lack of legal or institutional reform, R2P constituted, according to Gareth
Evans, ‘… a brand new international norm of really quite fundamental importance and
novelty…that is unquestionably a major breakthrough’ (Evans, 2009: 16). The efficacy
of R2P stems from the fact, supporters claim, that it acts as a means by which pressure is
coordinated, focused and exerted on states, and the P5 in particular, by those concerned
with the fate of people overseas (Evans, 2008: 241; Glanville, 2011: 471; Luck, 2010;
Power, 2009: x). By virtue of R2P’s official recognition in 2005 – and subsequently by
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