Assessment of asset forfeiture in targeting Somali piracy ransoms
Published date | 01 October 2018 |
Date | 01 October 2018 |
Pages | 534-544 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-09-2017-0053 |
Author | Constance Gikonyo |
Subject Matter | Accounting & Finance,Financial risk/company failure,Financial compliance/regulation,Financial crime |
Assessment of asset forfeiture in
targeting Somali piracy ransoms
Constance Gikonyo
University of Nairobi School of Law, Nairobi, Kenya
Abstract
Purpose –The purpose of this paperis to consider the applicability and challenges of usingasset forfeiture
mechanismsin taking away the illicit gains of Somalipiracy for ransoms.
Design/methodology/approach –The paper presents a desk research on the issue. It is based on
analysisof the key principlesin the area and relevant literature on the subject.
Findings –Asset forfeiture mechanismscan be used to facilitate the seizure of Somali piracy proceeds. It is
applicable to those who directly or indirectly benefited from piracy: the foot soldiers, financiers and other
beneficiaries. This would enable withdrawal of piracy re-investment capital and hence may act as a
disincentivefor current and prospective offenders.
Research limitations/implications –For the initiativeto work, various states and other actors need to
cooperate. However, incentivessuch as corruption, the personal interests of individuals and states that have
benefited from Somali piracy, may make them unwilling to collaborate. This would definitely hinder the
implementationand effectiveness of using asset forfeiture.
Originality/value –Much of the literature on Somali piracy for ransoms has focussed on maritime
solutions. Further, authors and organisations have advocated for following the money trail. As a result,
considerationof the benefits and challenges of doing so needs to be done. Thispaper seeks to fill this gap.
Keywords Piracy, Asset forfeiture, Somali
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The period 2008-2012 witnessed an escalation in piracy for ransoms (PFR), occasioned by
Somali pirates along the Gulf of Aden. PFR precipitated diverse negative effects (Bowden
and Basnet, 2012;Odeke, 2011). From these consequences, most striking was the high
amount of ransoms paid to the pirates. An estimated US$367.37m was paid between 2010
and 2012, when PFR was at its peak (Bellish, 2013). The problemsoccasioned by this piracy
menace led to an outcry from governments and the shipping industry, for urgent remedial
action (Rengelink, 2012). Ultimately, the United Nations Security Council declared Somali
piracy a “threat to international peace and security in the region[1]”. Subsequently, the
United Nations, together with other nations combined efforts in addressing the threat. At
sea, the methods employed included stepping up naval operations, creation of an
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, use of armed guards on vessels and law
implementation mechanisms (World Bank, 2013;Collins, 2014). On land, measures to
establish a stable government have been followed and socio-economic initiatives such as
dealing with unemployment, put in place. These aim to address the underlying causes of
Somali piracy and hence deter individuals from joining or continuing with piracy (World
Bank, 2013;Collins,2014).
However, since the peak piracy period, the global response to Somali piracy remains
focussed on maritime andnaval operations, rather than on the financial flows related to PFR
(FATF, 2011;Affiet al., 2015). Undoubtedly, the naval operations have contributed to a
JMLC
21,4
534
Journalof Money Laundering
Control
Vol.21 No. 4, 2018
pp. 534-544
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1368-5201
DOI 10.1108/JMLC-09-2017-0053
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