Asylum Provision: A Review of Economic Theories
| Published date | 01 August 2016 |
| Author | Anjali Suriyakumaran,Yuji Tamura |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12228 |
| Date | 01 August 2016 |
Asylum Provision: A Review of
Economic Theories
Anjali Suriyakumaran* and Yuji Tamura**
ABSTRACT
In recent years, economic theories have been used to examine asylum provision by non-
persecutor countries. Unfortunately, the nature of the analyses makes the results inaccessible to
many who are interested in understanding the topic from multidisciplinary perspectives but are
unfamiliar with mathematical methods in economics. We communicate the findings of those
analyses in a non-mathematical fashion, thereby contributing to a facilitation of interdisci-
plinary research on asylum policy.
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to facilitate interdisciplinary research on asylum policy by describing the current
state of the economic literature on asylum provision by non-persecutor countries. We concentrate
on the theoretical studies that construct and analyse mathematical models. The nature of their anal-
yses makes the results inaccessible to many who are unfamiliar with mathematical methods in eco-
nomics. Yet the studies offer much insight into the free riding problem of asylum provision when
there is more than one potential host country. To convey the insight to a wide audience, we
describe the theories non-mathematically.
In the reviewed models, it is assumed that the government of each potential host country derives
a benefit from the protection of persecuted people because it cares about the welfare of its humani-
tarian citizens who in turn care about the welfare of the persecuted. This benefit, however, accrues
to the government whether the protection is provided within its own territories or in other safe
countries. Since hosting asylum seekers is costly, each non-persecutor government has an incentive
to rely on asylum provision by other safe countries. As a result, the provision of asylum remains
low.
This type of incentive problem in asylum provision was first articulated non-mathematically, e.g.
Suhrke (1998). In fact, the problem is not specific to asylum provision but is common to the provi-
sion of various public goods. Public goods are distinguished from private goods by the degree of
non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption. In our context, the “consumption”of refugee
protection is not rivalrous because when the humanitarian citizens of one country gain from the
protection of persecuted people their gain does not reduce the benefit that accrues to the humanitar-
ian citizens of another country. On the other hand, the consumption of private goods, such as a
cake, is rivalrous because if someone has already eaten the cake another person can no longer
eat it. The “consumption”of asylum is not excludable either. The provider cannot prevent
* Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
** La Trobe University
doi: 10.1111/imig.12228
©2015 The Authors
International Migration ©2015 IOM
International Migration Vol. 54 (4) 2016
ISS N 00 20- 7985 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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