B (Application for leave to revoke Placement Order)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | The Honourable Mr Justice Cobb |
| Judgment Date | 10 May 2017 |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] EWFC 26 |
| Court | Family Court |
| Docket Number | Case No: LS17C00125 |
| Date | 10 May 2017 |
[2017] EWFC 26
IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING IN LEEDS
Coverdale House
East Parade
Leeds
The Honourable Mr Justice Cobb
Case No: LS17C00125
The parents in person
Ms Sara Anning (instructed by City Solicitor) for the Local Authority
Ms Philippa Wordsworth (instructed by Eaton Smith) for the child
Hearing date: 10 May 2017
Judgment Approved
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
The applications before the court concern a child ('B') who was born in August 2016, and is therefore 9 months old. She is the fourth child of M (who I shall refer to as "the mother"), the third child of F (who I shall refer to as "the father"). All of B's siblings and her half-sibling have been removed from the care of the parents in circumstances which I shall briefly describe below.
There are three cross-applications for determination, as follows:
i) By the parents for leave to revoke the placement order made by HHJ Lynch on 11 November 2016; this is a 'deemed' application in fact, having been indicated in substance by the submissions made by the parents at an earlier hearing; this application is to be determined by reference to the provisions of section 24(2)(a) / (3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (" ACA 2002");
ii) By the parents for increased contact with B, pursuant to section 26 ACA 2002; (they currently see B once per month);
iii) By the Local Authority (in this instance acting as adoption agency) for permission to place the child, B, for adoption under section 24(5) of ACA2002; this application is not strictly necessary, but has been made in order that the parents understand the local authority's intentions in the event that the application outlined in [2(i)] above fails, and in an endeavour to be transparent about the forthcoming processes.
This hearing was set up by HHJ Lynch, in a case management order made on 24 March 2017. I note that the parents made an application on that date for HHJ Lynch to recuse herself. She did not in fact do so; but having refused their application, she nonetheless allocated the case to me in order that it could be progressed without delay.
The parents appear before the court in person; they have both addressed me orally at the hearing, with courtesy and respect. However, their sense of grievance and anger at the court processes concerning their children is thinly disguised in their presentation. B was joined to the proceedings by HHJ Lynch at an earlier case management stage, and appears through her Children's Guardian, Miss J. I have a helpful report from Miss J. The Guardian is represented by counsel, as is the Local Authority. I am particularly grateful to Ms Anning (for the Local Authority) for the careful and scrupulously fair way in which she has prepared and presented the case for the Local Authority.
I deliver this ex tempore judgment at the conclusion of the hearing, and have explained that a typed note of it will be available to the parties within 24 hours.
Background facts
The case has a long and complicated litigation history which needs to be summarily reviewed in order to place these current applications in context. B is the mother's fourth child. Her first child, who I shall refer to as S, was born in December 2002. She was the subject of public law process in December 2013 (when she was 11 years old), having made allegations that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather (the father of B). She was interviewed under ABE Guidelines shortly before Christmas 2013, and in light of the contents of that interview, she was removed into care under Emergency Protection procedures. The proceedings concerning S were complicated to some extent by the fact that neither the mother nor the father (i.e. the step-father of S) chose to have legal representation – a decision they have maintained for most of all subsequent litigation concerning their children. Although the mother and father were advised in correspondence, and at interim hearings, that the issues they faced were serious, and the findings sought against them of such gravity that if made they would have profound consequences for them, the parents chose (so it appears) not to co-operate with or participate in the proceedings, and continued unrepresented. The mother at least would have been automatically entitled to public funds. The father chose not to intervene in those proceedings and in the end the mother failed to attend the fact-finding hearing. In February 2014, HHJ Anderson conducted that fact-finding hearing, delivering a judgment on 3 March 2014. She made a range of findings against the father. The judgment is lengthy running to over 70 paragraphs.
Notably, the judgment contains this passage at [9/10]:
"…there is a four-page chronology of some of the efforts which have been made by the court, by the local authority and by the Guardian to keep the mother and her husband informed of what is happening in the case and to encourage the mother and the husband to take part in the proceedings.
I do not consider that more could have been done to secure the mother's engagement or to secure a response from the prospective intervener. The parents cannot be compelled to take part in care proceedings. An intervener is invited to intervene but it is a matter for him whether he accepted that invitation."
I do not propose to rehearse the schedule of findings made by HHJ Anderson in its entirety but note that she concluded that:
i) S had suffered significant physical and emotional harm as a result of sexual assaults;
ii) S had made complaints to a number of people about the sexual assaults;
iii) The assaults were perpetrated by S's step-father (the father of B);
iv) The mother failed to protect S from these assaults;
v) S was at risk of significant harm as a result of the parents' conduct.
A care order was made in relation to S.
In July 2014, a second girl, K, was born; the first child of both parents. The local authority applied for a care order, and initially the mother indicated her willingness to participate in assessment of her capacity to parent the baby. That early promise was soon supplanted with a reluctance, indeed an opposition, to engage with the social workers; the parents indicated a wish to appeal against HHJ Anderson's findings and resolved not to work with the authority until that had happened. The parents made repeated application for HHJ Anderson to recuse herself; those applications failed. Although initially represented in these proceedings, within three months the parents' solicitors both came off the record. An independent social worker (from outside the area) was appointed by the court to assess the parents; her work did not get off the ground given the parents stance. In February 2015, a final care order and placement order was made in relation to K.
The parents applied for permission to appeal those final orders. King LJ refused permission certifying the application as totally without merit.
In July 2015 H was born following a concealed pregnancy. She remained in the parents' care for approximately two weeks before the local authority became aware of her existence and sought protective legal orders, and her removal. These proceedings were once again, it seems, characterised by obstruction on the part of the parents, or the very least an unwillingness to engage; to accept service of documents; to participate in assessments; or attend court hearings. In November 2015, a final care order and placement order was made in relation to H.
In December 2015, the father stood trial in the criminal court in relation to the allegations made by S. He was acquitted. The parents issued an application for permission to oppose the adoption order in respect of K; they issued an application in the Queen's Bench Division for injunctive relief to restrain the local authority from taking further steps in relation to the adoption. They further issued an application for permission to apply to revoke the placement order in respect of H. All of these applications failed. The dismissal of the applications in the Family Court by HHJ Lynch was the subject of an application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal; Black LJ adjourned the consideration of permission to an oral hearing which was conducted by McFarlane LJ; on 1 September 2016, he refused the parents' permission.
In August 2016, B was born and was removed shortly thereafter into foster care. Three days later she was made the subject of an interim care order.
On 11 November 2016, following a full hearing at which the mother attended but the father did not, HHJ Lynch made a final care order and placement order in respect of B. The judge essentially relied on the factual findings from 2014, explained and illustrated by the newly available transcript of the 2014 judgment. Significantly, the parents' case is described by HHJ Lynch thus:
"… the focus for the parents remains the injustice of the findings made by HHJ Anderson back in March 2014. The parents say they do not accept as valid the findings that the father was found to have sexually assaulted [S] and that the mother had been found to have failed to protect her daughter…"
In December 2016, the parents filed an application for permission to appeal those orders. That application was refused by King LJ on 16 March 2017. In the...
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