Back-To-Back Review: Living with Hume's Problem: Reply to Patrick Jackson
| Author | Colin Wight |
| Date | 01 September 2008 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836708097038 |
| Published date | 01 September 2008 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
JACKSON & WIGHT:BACK-TO-BACK REVIEW 357
of agency? Are human beings uniquely endowed — perhaps by their Creator —
with certain inalienable capacities? I am too little of a humanist to think so.
16. Of course, this is part of what makes for a good theoretical framework,since
I (following Weber) would argue that value-commitments are not rationally recon-
cilable or empirically testable, and as such part of the appeal of any particular the-
oretical framework or scientific ontology (and its empirical results) will necessarily
involve its consistency with broader cultural values. But unless we want to com-
pletely collapse the distinction between science and politics,or between science and
theology,this can be only a part of its appeal.
17. Wittgenstein’s comments on ‘beetles in boxes’ seem entirely relevant here.
Living with Hume’s Problem:
Reply to Patrick Jackson
COLIN WIGHT
I thank Patrick for his generous review of my book. Although deeply
critical on some issues it is fair and raises genuine questions. I accept that
the book does not develop detailed empirical support for the positions I
endorse. Doubtless this needs doing.But that was not the intention. I aimed
to explore the ontological universes at the heart of dominant approaches to
IR. I was not trying to get at what agency and structure are outside of any
theoretical specification; such a thing is not possible.Indeed, the core argu-
ment of the book was that conceptual inquiry is logically prior to empirical
research. By way of response I’d like to deal with two issues Patrick raises
in his response and then with some issues he raised in his review.
First is his attempt to present my position as dogmatic. According to
Patrick, I think I’m right (supposedly absolutely); hence, my position can-
not be one among others; whereas he does not think ‘right’ is an appropri-
ate term in a social scientific context.This way of framing the issue is to mis-
understand the epistemological basis of my claims, and demonstrates a
dualistic mode of thought that Patrick claims to eschew. At some level we
all think we are right. It is inconceivable that we would consider publishing
arguments we think are wrong. Patrick admits that he too points out what
seem to be logical inconsistencies and philosophical sleights of hand; pre-
sumably he believes that these inconsistencies are real and that his account
of them is right. Since we all think we are right, the question now becomes
one of degree. The attempt to portray philosophical realism in a dogmatic
light is a common tactic.The poor old deluded realist, so the argument goes,
thinks we can grasp reality in a pristine manner unencumbered by social
conditions, language and other complicating factors. No realist advocates
this naïve position and it is the anti-realist (Patrick) that endorses dogma-
tism. For although I think my arguments are sound, I know they can be
wrong. The realism underpinning my position requires this. No matter how
convinced I am of the soundness of my arguments, I can always be wrong.
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