Between cheap talk and epistocracy: The logic of interest group access in the European Parliament's committee hearings
| Author | David Coen,Alexander Katsaitis |
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12406 |
SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE
Between cheap talk and epistocracy: The logic of
interest group access in the European Parliament's
committee hearings
David Coen
1
| Alexander Katsaitis
2
1
School of Public Policy, University College
London, London, UK
2
ARENA Centre for European Studies,
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Correspondence
Alexander Katsaitis, ARENA Centre for
European Studies, University of Oslo, P.O. Box
1143, Blindern, Oslo 0318, Norway.
Email: alexander.katsaitis@arena.uio.no
Improving policy deliberation is a central objective for the
European Union's institutions. Focusing on the European Parlia-
ment's committee hearings as an understudied area of European
governance, we aim to understand their role, and their capacity to
improve its procedural legitimacy. Building on theoretical work on
interest group access and deliberation we argue that hearings can
serve three purposes: (i) coordinative; (ii) epistemic; (iii) enhancing
public participation. We construct a set of measures and assess an
entire population of participants in hearings (2009–14), concentrat-
ing on three committees. Our analyses show that hearings serve a
hybrid purpose between coordinative and epistemic. At the top
end, we observe a core group of gatekeepers representing the
dominant constituencies. Simultaneously, research organizations
are granted unique access as experts that de-politicize debates.
Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on interest group access
while providing an innovative set of tools for its measurement, and
the first dataset of its kind.
1|INTRODUCTION
In its White Paper on European governance reform, the European Commission made interest group participation in
policy deliberation a central objective under its aim for ‘Better involvement, more openness' (Commission of the
European Communities 2001 p. 5). Increasing distrust towards politics in Brussels led the European Union (EU) to
adopt a series of measures to boost its democratic credentials and improve its decision-making procedures. Over the
past 10 years the EU has expanded its use of policy deliberation mechanisms as a standard practice, and has pro-
vided financial support for civil society mobilization. Beyond its inputs and outputs these actions are targeted at
increasing its throughput legitimacy, the quality of governance processes; addressing concerns over issues such
as biased interest group access, institutional capture by insiders, and lack of transparency (Eriksen 2005;
Schmidt 2013).
Despite its popularity within institutional circles, the remedy has been contested. Conceptually, scholars ques-
tion whether such procedures can expand participation beyond established insiders (Broscheid and Coen 2003).
Received: 29 September 2017 Revised: 27 February 2018 Accepted: 3 March 2018
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12406
754 © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm Public Administration. 2019;97:754–769.
Significantly, notwithstanding work on the Commission (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Pollack 2003; Bunea 2017), the lit-
erature misses systematic analyses normatively testing such mechanisms in other EU institutions (however, see Fas-
one and Lupo 2015). In particular, the European Parliament (EP) faces growing alarm over business access to such
procedures, giving it an upper hand to impact legislative proposals in areas of public interest (Euractiv 2017). By con-
centrating discussions on Brussels' procedural (il-)legitimacy to the usual suspect in Berlaymont, we treat such mech-
anisms in other institutions as a black box and limit the scope of the debate.
In this article, we assess which interest groups access the EP's deliberative processes, focusing on its hearings as
an understudied area of European governance. Committee hearings are one of the few forums where the Parliament
invites organizations to provide information and deliberate on policy issues. Two connected questions emerge: How
open are hearings to interest groups? Do they include some interest groups more than others?
We answer these questions by arguing that hearings can serve three ideal-type purposes which in turn impact
on the interest group participants. First, hearings can be used as a coordinative procedure that allows policy stake-
holders and policy-makers to frame the broader discussion over an issue, in line with information exchange models
and pluralist approaches to EU lobbying (Farrel and Rabin 1996; Richardson 2000). This will lead to the same repre-
sentative organizations participating, creating insiders that are primarily business groups and associations. Second,
hearings can be used as epistemic procedures inviting research organizations whose expertise plays a de-politicizing
role, allowing MEPs to pivot their views towards a common majority (Egeberg et al. 2003; Estlund 2009). Third, hear-
ings are used to maximize the institution's democratic credentials as a public participatory procedure that links the
EP with citizens by elevating public issues into a political arena (Adams 2004; Wood 2015). They will give access to
diverse public interest groups, such as civil society, to discuss citizens' perspectives over various issues.
We test our argument in the context of the EP, the institution charged with improving the EU's democratic legiti-
macy, focusing on three committees: the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), the Committee on
the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs (LIBE). We assess which were the specific organizations represented by speakers participating in committees'
hearings across the 7th legislature (2009–14). We map the entire population of groups participating, and examine
them using a set of empirical measurements we develop to assess how open the committees are to different types of
interest groups relative to the participants, and relative to the population of active lobbyists each committee faces
(accredited lobbyists). We also examine to what extent specific organizations participate in different hearings, and
conduct a network analysis which tests whether they participate in hearings across committees.
This research is relevant in a number of ways. Interest group theories are widely used in assessing actors' access
across the Commission's formal deliberation processes, yet the EP's processes are sidelined. This is in part due to the
challenge of data availability and the difficulty it poses in testing normative criteriaof access. By looking into hearings
we gain valuable insight into the EP's committees, and appreciate the role of hearings from a conceptual perspective.
Furthermore, we can understand how the EP uses hearings as a procedure, that is, whether they are used as a top-
down tool to broaden the pool of participants or if they are used to reduce information costs in the policy-making
process.
The results paint an intricate image where hearings serve a purpose between coordination and epistemic justifi-
cation, rather than enhancing public participation. While the primary participants reflect the main groups mobilized
around specific committees, in relative terms research organizations such as think tanks and universities are granted
unique access. Interestingly, public interest groups such as non-governmental organizations are more likely to have
insider status with specific organizations repeatedly participating in committee hearings.
We contribute to a growing literature assessing interest group access to parliamentary hearings (see Pedersen
et al. 2015; Chaqués-Bonafont and Muñoz Márquez 2016); and indirectly contribute to broader discussions linked to
deliberation in representative institutions (Eriksen and Fossum 2012; Weale 2007). Theoretically, we contribute to
criteria of access by elaborating on analytic measures of openness and inclusiveness. Empirically, we provide the first
systematic study identifying and mapping the entire population of participants invited to committee hearings, creat-
ing an original dataset of 357 participants across 74 events. Methodologically, we innovate through meticulous
COEN AND KATSAITIS 755
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