Beyond the High‐Performance Paradigm? An Analysis of Variation in Canadian Managerial Perceptions of Reform Programme Effectiveness
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8543.00188 |
| Date | 01 March 2001 |
| Published date | 01 March 2001 |
| Author | John Godard |
Beyond the High-Performance
Paradigm ? An Analysis of Variation in
Canadian Managerial Perceptions of
Reform Programme Effectiveness
John Godard
Abstract
Proponents of the high-performance paradigm often argue that the variable
success of new forms of work organization is explained primarily by a failure
to implement them comprehensively and to adopt complementary HRM practices.
This paper argues that these explanations are inadequate and develops an
alternative, political economy approach which accounts more fully for how
conflicts embedded in the employment relation limit the effectiveness of
reforms. It draws on a unique longitudinal data set representing 78 Canadian
workplaces to analyse the extent to which reform programme content, pre-
existing HRM conditions and workplace context variables are associated with
reform programme effectiveness.
1. Introduction
Considerable attention has been paid to alternative work practices or
workplace reforms associated with high-performance work systems. These
reforms can include a variety of elements, but they generally encompass
any changes believed to introduce more flexible workplace practices and to
enhance task discretion and responsibility, and usually revolve around the
use of teamwork organization. According to proponents, such reforms give
rise to a high-commitment workplace and yield a number of performance
advantages for employers provided the necessary conditions are in place.
Available evidence suggests, however, that their actual effects can vary con-
siderably (Godard 1998a: 27; Wood 1999a), and many have a limited life-
span (Drago 1988; Osterman 2000: 186±7). Two related explanations have
been most identified by proponents. First, reform programme effectiveness
requires that complementary human resource management (HRM) practices,
John Godard is in the Faculty of Management at the University of Manitoba, Canada.
British Journal of Industrial Relations
39:1 March 2001 0007±1080 pp. 25±52
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2001. Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd,
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such as training, performance pay and job security, a re in place (e.g. Holm-
strom and Milgrom 1994). Second, reforms themselves are often of limited
effectiveness because they have not been fully or comprehensively implemented
(e.g. Ichniowski et al. 1996: 325). For the present, these may be referred to as,
respectively, the complementarities thesis and the comprehensiveness thesis.
The extent to which these explanations account for the varied effective-
ness of reform programmes has implications not only for getting these
programmes right, but also for whether these programmes represent a
desirable or realizable trajectory for the future. Proponents have tended to
assume that these reforms have virtually universal applicability and that
they benefit employees as well as employers (e.g. Pfeffer 1998: 56±8;
Ichniowski et al. 1996; see Godard and Delaney 2000: 491±3). If these
assumptions hold, it may be possible to create a high-skill, high-performance
economy through which both employees and employers benefit. But if not,
attempts to encourage the universal diffusion of these programmes may be
misdirected. This may be especially so if reforms are advocated at the
expense of legal rights and protections for workers, or if they can have
negative implications for workers, as some studies suggest (see Godard and
Delaney 2000: 492; Godard 2001).
Despite the importance of these issues, multivariate research to date has
focused either on whether high-performance practices have positive impli-
cations for organizational performance in general (Arthur 1994; MacDuffie
1995; Huselid 1995; Huselid and Becker 1997; Ichniowski et al. 1997), or on
the conditions that appear most conducive to their diffusion (Osterman
1994; Pil and MacDuffie 1996; Gittleman et al. 1998). While both strands of
research do shed some light on why reform programme effectiveness varies,
addressing this question has typically been tangential to establishing the
overall effects of high-performance practices or why their adoption varies.
1
Moreover, even where researchers have addressed these issues (e.g. Delery
and Doty 1996), they have typically relied on indices or typologies of em-
ployer practices which include supportive HRM practices such as training
and compensation as well as reforms to the work process itself.
2
There do
not appear to have been any multivariate studies to date that specifically
explore variation in the effectiveness of workplace reforms alone Ð even
though it is these reforms that have been at the heart of debates over the
changing nature of work and its implications for labour relations.
In this paper, I argue that the high-performance paradigm does not
adequately account for how conflicts embedded in the employment relation
limit the effectiveness and sustainability of reforms. In so doing, I advocate
an alternative, `political economy', approach (see Godard 1998b), arguing
that, because of these conflicts: (1) there are diminishing returns to reform
adoption, and (2) whether and how reform programmes work may be con-
tingent on context variables such as workplace size, technology and product
market characteristics. I then develop hypotheses and draw on a unique
longitudinal data set representing 78 Canadian workplaces reporting a
workplace reform programme to explore the associations between key
26 British Journal of Industrial Relations
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2001.
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