Book Review: International Norms and War between States: Three Studies in International Politics
| Author | Thomas G. Hart |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677100600306 |
| Published date | 01 November 1971 |
| Date | 01 November 1971 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
Book Review
THOMAS G.
HART
Kjell Goldmann: International Norms and
War
Between States: Three Studies in International
Politics.
Swedish
Studies
in International Re-
lations 1. Utrikespolitiska Institutet and Laro-
medelsforlagen,
Stockholm
1971.
Kjell Goldmann, known to readers as a
frequent contributor to this journal, has
published an imposing - 278 tightly-
printed pages, 59 pages of methodological
appendices, 42 tables, notes and biblio-
graphy - and impressive account of his
research into a central but, at least for the
more 'scientific' school of international re-
lationists, hitherto relatively neglected as-
pect of the field, namely the effects of
international norms on the behavior of
States, especially with respect to inter-
State warfare. Despite its title, Goldmann's
book is both more and less than 'three
studies' of this question: it is 'less' because
the three parts or sections of the study
actually represent the conceptualization,
data
gathering and description, and hypo-
thesization/application stages, respectively,
of essentially the same major research
endeavor. At the same time
it
is in a
sense considerably more than three studies
since Goldmann has been forced by the
paucity of modern work on this subject to
solve, or at least to deal with, a truly for-
midable number of theoretical, methodo-
logical, analytical and other problems. In
view of the importance of these problems
to all social scientists, both in and out of
Goldmann's special field, and the almost
compulsive manner in which they are
treated (a point to which I shall be return-
ing presently), it seems justifiable to re-
frain from writing apurely 'critical' re-
view and instead to attempt to convey to
the reader some idea of the range of the
contributions Goldmann has made, as well
as to describe and comment upon some of
his solutions and findings. First a short
presentation of the contents of the various
sections.
I
Part
I is entitled 'International Norms and
Governmental Behavior: A model of Social
Control, Applied to the International Sys-
tem'. Goldmann bases his model-building
on three well-known concepts, Herbert
Simon's 'bounded rationality' (as a basis
for understanding how decision-makers act
'rationally' despite imperfect information),
O. R. Holsti's formulation of the concept
of 'belief system' which acts as a perceptual
and normative filter through which infor-
mation is ordered in relation to decision
needs, and the general sociological concept
of social norms as standards against which
behavior is measured, and sanctioned,
either positively or negatively. Establishing
these concepts as a base, he proceeds to
construct a model relating such norms as
exist in the international system to the
authoritative behavior of States in deci-
sion-requiring situations. Fortunately yet
convincingly, Goldmann arrives at some
mildly surprising conclusions concerning
the relationships of the most important
variables in this model: Norms, he finds,
may be formalized, or verbalized, or
merely customary, or combinations of these
-furthermore there is no requirement that
they be internalized.
The
'central relation-
ships' in the post-decisional behavioral
output of States are those obtaining be-
tween and among norms, acts, and justi-
fying statements, the latter being the es-
sential bit of information supplied by the
actor in order to demonstrate to would-be
sanctioners that his act is compatible with
existing norms.
Thus the phenomenon of the 'justifying
statement', long regarded by observers as
probably the least reliable sort of infor-
mation conceivable in ascertaining 'real
motives', etc., becomes the key tp identi-
fying existing international norms (or what
the actor assumes will carry normative
weight with potential sanctioners of his
actions, which is the same thing), and
norms in turn are seen as important con-
straints on decisions to act, since it can
safely be assumed that no actor willingly
To continue reading
Request your trial