Book review: Lévy R, Dumoulin L, Kensey A and Licoppe C (eds), Le bracelet électronique: action publique, pénalité et connectivité
| Author | Eric Maes |
| DOI | 10.1177/2066220320977226 |
| Published date | 01 December 2020 |
| Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Book review |
977226EJP0010.1177/2066220320977226European Journal of ProbationBook review
2020
Book review
European Journal of Probation
2020, Vol. 12(3) 282 –289
Book review
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DOI: 10.1177/2066220320977226
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Lévy R, Dumoulin L, Kensey A and Licoppe C (eds). Le bracelet électronique: action publique,
pénalité et connectivité (Collection Déviance et Société). Chêne-Bourg (Switzerland): RMS
Éditions/Médecine & Hygiène, 2019; pp. ISBN (paperback) 9782880494520 (15,- CHF),
ISBN (e-book) 9782880494551 (9,- CHF).
Reviewed by: Eric Maes, National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology, Belgium
In 2019, RMS Éditions/Médicine & Hygiène published the book entitled Le bracelet élec-
tronique: action publique, pénalité et connectivité [The electronic bracelet: public action,
penality and connectivity] as part of the book series of Déviance et Société, one of the
leading French-language journals in criminology. This book offers a kaleidoscopic over-
view of themes around electronic monitoring (EM) that were researched and/or published
in other languages (e.g. English, Dutch) during the recent decades. After an extensive
chapter explaining the purpose of the book and the choice of selected themes, 11 different
contributions are provided by a select international group of authors, from the United
States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and Germany. These contributions are
divided into three main parts, namely, (1) Le bracelet électronique comme solution
d’action publique et comme marché [The electronic bracelet as a solution for public action
and as a market]; (2) Le bracelet électronique comme peine et instrument de surveillance
[The electronic bracelet as punishment and monitoring instrument]; and (3) La surveil-
lance électronique comme dispositif sociotechnique de surveillance [Electronic surveil-
lance as a sociotechnical surveillance device].
In the first part of the book, Lilly & Thomas analyze the emergence and evolution of
the Electronic Monitoring (EM) market in the United States (1. Prendre la mesure du
marché de la surveillance électronique aux États-Unis [Taking on the issues of the elec-
tronic monitoring market in the United States]). They see great similarities with the
“prison-industrial complex” (or “penal-commercial complex”) and the characteristic
interdependence between the public sector and the private market. In the United States,
EM experienced a strong advance (in frequency of use) in the mid-1980s. Whereas it was
applied in 21 states in 1987, it became used in 44 states 2 years later. It is however difficult
to estimate the size and value of the EM-market. Moreover, the figures for this market,
and by extension the whole correctional market, are very different (due, among other
things, to a lack of clarity regarding the field of application (State and/or federal level),
different definitions of correctional costs, etc.). Nevertheless, it appears that EM repre-
sents only a fraction of the overall “correctional cake.” Indeed less than 1% of the total
number of persons under judicial supervision are monitored electronically. The globaliza-
tion of the economy and the development of (international) networks, as well as the
Book review
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absorption of electronic monitoring within companies with a broader range of activities in
the domain of “track and trace,” means that the market is dominated by a few major play-
ers. Only a limited number of (private) players are active in this (EM) market; 75% of the
American market is dominated by only three companies. Contrary to the value of the
EM-market, data on the number of monitored persons are more reliable and coherent;
recent figures (from 2015) show that more than 125,000 people in the United States were
under EM-supervision on a daily basis.
After the United States, EM was also implemented and had a (strong) spread in the
United Kingdom and in (large parts of) continental Europe. In the second contribution (2.
La formation des marchés des marchés de la surveillance électronique [The formation of
electronic monitoring markets]), Paterson points to the increasing private interference in
the domain of crime control and to differences in the development of EM between England
& Wales on the one hand and other European countries in the other hand. Whereas
England & Wales was characterized by a very strong privatization of a large part of the
probation sector (including EM), EM in other European states has followed different
routes, either becoming part of the public prison sector, becoming anchored in the proba-
tion sector, or was simply rejected by policy makers (see infra, Haverkamp’s contribu-
tion). In contrast to convergence on a global level, that is, in the use of technology itself—a
technology which, according to Paterson, can/must also be understood as a kind of “police
technology” that appeals to the psychological imagination of offenders, victims or wit-
nesses (i.e. the idea of the chance or threat of intervention)—there is (within Europe)
rather local divergence. Or, as he puts it, disparity within a “communauté pluraliste” (plu-
ralistic community; cf. implementation in various European states vs initial resistance to
EM in Germany). These changes in methods of punishment (with the introduction of
EM), law enforcement and “electronic governance,” and the associated hybrid models of
public–private partnerships also led to new forms of regulation at the European level.
For example, from a human rights perspective, the Council of Europe’s Recommendation
on electronic monitoring (as well as other recommendations referring to electronic moni-
toring) provides guidelines in this respect. The main guiding principles of the recommen-
dations on community-based sanctions and measures (CSM) in general, and electronic
monitoring in particular, are explained in a separate chapter by Slingeneyer (3. La sur-
veillance électronique selon le Conseil de l’Europe: entre un contrôle de la réinsertion et
une réinsertion par le du contrôle [Electronic monitoring according to the...
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