Book Reviews
| Date | 01 March 1991 |
| Published date | 01 March 1991 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1991.tb00233.x |
British Journal
of
Industrial Relations
29:l
March
1991 0007-1080 $3.00
BOOK
REVIEWS
Management Control and Union Power:
A
Study
of
Labour Relations in Coal Mining
by Christine Edwards and Edmund Heery with Margaret Bird. Clarendon
Press, Oxford,
1989,276
pp.,
f32.50.
Employment contracts may take one of three forms:
(1)
wage;
(2)
salaried; and
(3)
profit-sharing. Under a wage contract a worker is offered a guaranteed income but
no
guarantee
of
employment. With a salaried contract a worker is offered a
guarantee
of
both employment and income. Finally, a profit-sharing contract gives a
guarantee
of
employment but
no
guarantee of income. Which type of contract is
acceptable to both employers and workers depends upon a variety
of
factors, such as
(a) the degree
of
risk aversion of employers and workers; (b) the ease
of
access to
information
of
employers and workers; (c) the preferences for work and leisure; (d)
the effects
of
unemployment benefits; (e) the methods and costs of enforcing
contracts; and (f) the costs associated with hiring, training and dismissing workers.
Such is the background to this study
of
the coal industry by Christine Edwards and
her colleagues. The book is ambitious. Part
I
examines management strategies from
the
1960s
onwards. Part
I1
considers the Area Incentive Schemes which were
introduced in
1978
and the Coal Board’s attempts to prevent incentive schemes
disintegrating as they did in the
1950s.
Part
I11
deals with the work-place
organisation and the extent to which management can treat the union organisation as
an adjunct
of
decision-making. Part
IV
looks at union power in the coalfields. Part
V
explores the dynamics
of
employment contracts in terms
of
the interactions
of
the
Coal Board, the NUM, the UDM and government. Underpinning each
of
these
sections
is
a comparative analysis
of
the literature
of
an appropriate discipline. Thus,
the discussion of managerial strategies is viewed from the perspective of the labour
process literature. The analysis
of
incentives is set against the background
of
the
criticisms of piece rates in the
1950s
and the advocacy of measured daywork. The
exploration
of
control at pit level is appraised from the standpoint
of
the literature
which emphasised the bureaucratisation of unions. Finally, union power is viewed in
terms
of
conflict models, and management strategies are considered in terms
of
contingency models.
Such an ambitious exercise defies the satisfactory review that seems warranted but
which space precludes. Critical comments will therefore be brief. What seems to be
missing is any adequate examination of the factors informing union power. Like
much of the literature that has flowed from Flander’s critique of the Webbs for not
analysing the behaviour
of
employers, Edwards and her colleagues are strong on
employers but somewhat weak on unions. The history
of
contracts in the coal
industry begins with the prevalence
of
profit-sharing contracts in the nineteenth
century. First, there was the sliding scale
of
varying basic wage rates according to the
130
British Journul
of
Industrid Relutions
selling price of coal. Second, there was the method of payment by results. Sliding
scales began to break down in the late nineteenth century because in recessions the
fall
in
basic rates was not offset by rising productivity. In fact, productivity-stagnated
piece rates were modified to cover ‘abnormal places’. The result was a move towards
some form
of
guaranteed minimum income which began to be established nationally
in
order to reduce inter-coalfield competition through wage-cutting. This system was
then modified in the interwar years when there was a movement towards
decentralisation.
The effect
of
nationalisation and coal shortages in the
1940s
and the
1950s
was to
reduce the pressure at pit level by face workers for wage reforms. But among
full-
time officials there was a desire to centralise wage determination in order to unify the
NUM and reduce what they thought were weaknesses in its federal structure. It was
this desire by full-time officials (especially
in
the low-wage, former export coalfields
of South Wales and Scotland) that combined with a view among some managers to
produce the National Power Loading Agreement, which provided for a uniform
national time rate for
all
face workers. Edwards
et
al.
note that the NPLA led to a fall
in productivity which outweighed all the benefits from removing disputes about piece
rates. However, they overlook the fact that the big disputes of
1969-74
were brought
about by the NPLA. What the NPLA did was to redistribute income from the high-
wage coalfields (such as Yorkshire) to the low-wage coalfields (such as South Wales
and Scotland); and that reduction in real earnings was intensified by the reduction
in
real earnings created by the Heath government’s attempts
to
combat inflation
through a wage freeze. But as a general observation on the period before the
introduction
of
incentive schemes in
1978,
it has to be noted that there were diverse
strands within both the NCB and the NUM which had been reconciled by
nationalisation and coal shortages. Thus, in Yorkshire both the union and the Board
were reluctant to accept time rates
in
1966.
What tipped the balance were the beliefs
that increased mechanisation would reduce the need for incentives and that
incentives were disruptive, and the quest for greater control of the union by the full-
time officials. What later tipped the balance against NPLA was the realisation by
miners at high-wage pits that incentives would enable them to boost their earnings.
Incidentally, Edwards and her colleagues ‘miss a trick’ when discussing NPLA. A
great deal of the discussion about the effects
of
mechanisation on the need for
incentives anticipated the later Bradford discussions
of
the effectsof ROLF
in
1980s.
On
the latter, Edwards
et
al.
provide a good critique.
The chapters on the work-place and union power were based upon interviews and
questionnaires circulated at pit, area and national level. However, it should be noted
that
in
both
1976
and
1980
the authors were denied complete access to Yorkshire
pits. On this score they were not alone, because the Prices and Incomes Board
encountered the same barrier
in
1969.
Not even government was given free access to
Yorkshire. But accepting this caveat, the authors do seem successful in arguing
against a bureaucratisation
of
the rank and file, and that at pit level the rank and file
did exercise considerable control over their leadership. Likewise, they have been
able to demonstrate that the NUM was able to exert considerable control over many
aspects of the employment contract such as work organisation, discipline and the use
of
contracts.
The later chapters of the book deal with the strike
of
1984-5
and the post-strike
settlement. These are well informed, although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions
in
what is a continuing saga. But my overall impressions are of a book that has been
well researched and which will provide a fund of useful ideas for industrial relations
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