Book Reviews : Holst, Johan Jorgen (ed.). Security, Order, and the Bomb. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1972, 208 pp. Stockholm International Peace Research In stitute. Nuclear Proliferation Problems. Alm qvist and Wiksell, Stockholm 1974, 312 pp
| Author | George H. Quester |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677400900129 |
| Published date | 01 March 1974 |
| Date | 01 March 1974 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
313
Book
Reviews
GEORGE
H.
QUESTER
Cornell
University
Nuclear
Proliferation
Holst,
Johan
Jorgen
(ed.).
Security,
Order,
and
the
Bomb.
Universitetsforlaget,
Oslo
1972,
208
pp.
Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
In-
stitute.
Nuclear
Proliferation
Problems.
Alm-
qvist
and
Wiksell,
Stockholm
1974,
312
pp.
What
kind
of
an
issue
is
nuclear
proliferation:’
Is
it
of
concern
to
all
of
mankind,
to
all
the
voters
of
the
countries
involved,
a
question
of
life
and
death
for
the
future?
Or
is
it
the
esoteric
concern
of
only
a
few
specialists
in
government
and
business
and
academia,
an
issue
where
the
opinions
of
fifteen
or
thirty
men
in
each
nation
can
make
all
the
dif-
ference,
even
in
the
most
democratic
of
coun-
tries ?
Now
that
India
has
detonated
its
’peace-
ful
nuclear
device’,
all
the
world
should
be
alarmed
that
the
nuclear
club
in
a
most
meaningful
sense
has
grown
from
five
mem-
bers
to
six,
with
no
clear
line
as
to
where
it
will
stop.
Yet
the
world’s
press
reaction
re-
flects
the
priorities
of
public
attention
by
not
devoting
very
much
of
its
coverage
to
the
In-
dian
’peaceful
bomb’;
in
the
United
States.
the
travails
of
Patty
Hearst
received
far
greater
attention
on
the
weekend
of
the
detonation.
The
two
books
to
be
reviewed
here
each
re-
flect
collections
of
papers
prepared
for
con-
ferences
before
the
Indian
detonation,
con-
ferences
convened
in
Oslo
in
March
of
1971
and
in
Stockholm
in
June
of
1973,
and
each
book
reflects
some
of
the
fundamental
am-
biguities
cited
above.
One
could
almost
de-
monstrate
this
by
comparing
the
authors
listed
in
the
tables
of
contents,
showing
a
remarkable
overlap
with
Ryukichi
Imai,
K.
Subrahmanyam
and
Jan
Prawitz
each
having
chapters
in
both
volumes.
Is
this
a
kind
of
subject
which
na-
turally
produces
one
or
two
’nuclear
Swedes’
and
’nuclear
Japanese’?
Before
the
Indian
de-
tonation,
at
least,
was
there
some
natural
reason
to
turn
to Subrahmanyam
as
the
’nuclear
In-
dian’ ?
How
much
do
the
decisions
involved
reflect
anything
sensible
to
500
million
Indians.
and
how
much
rather
to
small
groups
of
men
in
the
Indian
Atomic
Energv
Commission
and
Ministry
of
Defence?
One
should
not
be
too
quick
to
leap
to
the
latter
conclusion,
for
New
Delhi’s
detonation
seems
to
have
been
enor-
mously
well-received
by
the
Indian
public
at
large.
Both
the
books
here
are
first-rate,
and
these
remarks
are
not
in
any
sense
meant
to
suggest
a
lack
of
imagination
among
editors.
The
nu-
clear
question
is
indeed
the
kind
of
question
that
individuals
or
small
groups
of
specialists
grab
hold
of,
’hold
the
action
on’
in
the
Ame-
rican
bureaucratic
jargon.
In
part
this
is
be-
cause
the
issues
may
be
extremely
technical,
or
because
they
are
(and
should
be)
extremely
centralized.
In
part,
it
is
also
because
the
pub-
lic
in
most
countries
(India
probably
being
an
exception)
does
not
care
that
much
any
more
about
bombs
and
deterrence,
and
proliferation
or
nonproliferation.
Francesco
Calogero’s
short
chapter
in
the
SIPRI
volume
brings
this
out
very
well
for
the
Italian
case,
as
does
Mr.
Imai’s
chapter
for
Japan.
Has
the
general
public
thus
been
repressing
some
unpleasant
reality,
in
not
paying
more
attention
to
the
risks
of
proliferation?
Or
does
it
subtly
perceive
something
that
arms
control-
lers
may
not
have
noticed,
that
nuclear
weapons
are
not
that
important
anymore,
that
peace
and
civilization
will
not
disappear
when
the
sixth
or
seventh
nuclear-weapons
state
emerges,
any
more
than
when
the
fifth
emerged
in
China?
If
the
former
is
true,
we
are
due
for
a
great
amount
of
trouble.
If
the
latter.
we
are
due
for
less
trouble,
and
the
proliferation
issue
may
be
left
more
to
the
’specialists’.
But
how
little
trouble
can
there
be,
if
nation
after
nation
acquires
nuclear
explosives,
or
even
if
there
are
only
rumors
of
such
explosives,
based
on
the
large
amounts
of
plutonium
that
will
be
in
circulation?
Both
the
books
here
are
plagued
slightly
by
the
tendency
to
assign
chapters
about
particular
countries
to
nationals
of
that
country,
which
induces
a
less
critical
and
skeptical
overall
tone
than
might
have
been
achieved
if
sus-
picious
outsiders
had
been
assigned
the
task.
Thus,
while
The
Jvew
York
Times
regularly
reports
rumors
of
Israeli
i
clandestine
bomb
manufacture.
the
chapter
by
S.
Flapan
in
the
SIPRI
book
comes
out
perhaps
excessively
reassuring.
Alan
Dowty’s
chapter
on
Israel
in
the
Holst
book
by
contrast
is
a
trifle
more
interesting.
However
suspicious
we
may
wish
to
be
about
various
national
nuclear
policies,
even
more
suspicion
may
be
in
order
on
the
various
national
expressions
of
policy.
How
many
of the
governmental
statements
on
nu-
clear
proliferation
should
be
taken
at
face
value,
and
how
many
should
instead
be
cross-
examined
for
the
political
gamesmanship
in-
volved ?
Effective
diplomacy
has
never
quite
amounted
to
saying
exactly
what
one
thinks.
K.
Subrahmanyam’s
chapters
in
the
two
books
are
quite
fascinating
now
when
reread
against
the
fact
of the
Indian
detonation;
as
always
he
is
quite
provocative
and
stimulating,
and
(one
senses)
quite
privy
to
the
decision-
process
that
mattered.
Subrahmanyam
misleads
us
a
little
with
a
prediction
that
India
will
not
soon
detonate
a
’peaceful’
device
underground.
Yet
his
broader
arguments
in
both
books
show
very
well
some
of
the
sense
of
inequality
and
injustice
that
has
fostered
public
resistance
to
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