Bringing the EU up to speed in the protection of living standards through fundamental social rights: Drawing positive lessons from the experience of the Council of Europe
| DOI | 10.1177/1023263X211021765 |
| Author | Ane Aranguiz |
| Published date | 01 October 2021 |
| Date | 01 October 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Bringing the EU up to speed
in the protection of living
standards through
fundamental social rights:
Drawing positive lessons from
the experience of the Council
of Europe
Ane Aranguiz*
Abstract
Ever since the adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the EU seems committed to explore
and expand its social dimension to deliver a decent standard of living to the European society. This
new endeavour gives rise to a number of questions, not least regarding how the notion of a
standard of living that is compatible with a life in dignity ought to be interpreted and what the
obligations of Member States are in this quest. The aim of this contribution is precisely to shed
some light on these questions. To this end, the article looks into how different (quasi)judicial
bodies have interpreted fundamental rights that entitle individuals to minimum subsistence
resources that are deemed to achieve a standard of living that is compatible with the right to
human dignity. In particular, it analyses how the ECJ, the ECtHR and the ECSR have interpreted
(minimum) living standards through different fundamental rights. It then suggests a number of
‘learning points’ for the ECJ to draw from the experience of the other two bodies and emphasizes
the need for building solid bridges between the three.
Keywords
Living standards, human dignity, social protection, social rights, European Court of Justice,
European Court of Human Rights, European Committee of Social Rights
* Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands; University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Corresponding author:
Tilburg University, M209, Professor Cobbenhagenlaan 221, 5037 DE Tilburg, The Netherlands.
E-mail: a.aranguiz@tilburguniversity.edu
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
ªThe Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/1023263X211021765
maastrichtjournal.sagepub.com
MJ
MJ
2021, Vol. 28(5) 601–625
1. Introduction
For the last couple of years, the EU has regained consciousness of the importance of boosting its
social dimension beyond its macroeconomic and fiscal interest. Partly as a way to make amends for
the poor choices taken in the context of the 2007 financial crisis, in 2017 the Commission launched
the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), which was later interinstitutionally proclaimed by the
Council and the Parliament. Ever since, the EU has taken numerous steps towards an active stance
in ensuring a decent standard of living, the last of them being the Action Plan on the implemen-
tation of the EPSR.
1
Recent discussions on protecting social rights in Europe have focused, inter
alia, on ensuring fair minimum wages,
2
access to social protection
3
and more recently, minimum
income protection,
4
all of which relate one way or another to adequate living standards in the form
of income or income replacement.
Far from discontinuing these efforts after the latest hit to the European society, the EU appears
to have reinforced its social standpoint in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. At the time where the
EU seems more committed than ever to deliver a decent standard of living for its population, the
question of how a ‘decent’ or ‘adequate’ standard of living should be interpreted becomes more
relevant than ever.
In order to shed some light onto this interpretation, this article studies how different European
(quasi)judicial bodies have interpreted the idea of living standards through the lens of fundamental
rights. Not only does this article aim at bringing some clarity to the otherwise abstract idea of living
standards, but it hints at a number of discrepancies between the different bodies. Such discrepan-
cies, it is argued, could hide a problematic interplay between the different bodies.
This contribution compares how different authoritative bodies have interpreted the living stan-
dards that are sufficient to achieve a certain standard of living compatible with the right to human
dignity. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, it aims at substantiating a number of social
rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) that have so far been used rather marginally.
Secondly, it has the ambition to flesh out, or at least serve as an interpretative aid for, the provisions
regarding ‘adequacy’ on the new (and future) social initiatives of the EU. To this end, this article
looks into how the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) have interpreted living standards
through fundamental rights.
In what follows, I first discuss the link between the right to human dignity, social rights and the
protection of living standards. The foll owing three sections analyse the case- law of the ECJ,
ECtHR, and ECSR respectively on how living standards have so far been interpreted. In section
6, I argue that the ECJ has some catching up to do and that this is possible by creating better
synergies. This section puts forward a number of reasons for better synergies and suggests a
number of unambiguous learning points for the EU judiciary and legislator. The last section
concludes.
1. Commission, European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, 2021.
2. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on adequate minimum wages in the European
Union, 28 October 2020, COM(2020) 682 final.
3. Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, [2019]
OJ C 387.
4. Council Conclusions on Strengthening Minimum Income Protection to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion in the
COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond, 25 September 2020.
602 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 28(5)
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