BY VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INSTRUMENT SELECTION
| Published date | 01 March 1986 |
| Date | 01 March 1986 |
| Author | ROB BAGGOTT |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1986.tb00603.x |
BY
VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT: THE POLITICS
OF
INSTRUMENT SELECTION
ROB
BAGGOTT
There are many ways in which policies can be sanctioned, and legislation is only one of
a number of alternatives. This article examines one such alternative: voluntary agreements.
After outlining the major characteristics
of
this policy instrument there is an examination
of
the various factors which appear to influence their selection in favour of legislation.
This
is
followed by an attempt to trace a pattern
of
policy succession by examining three
particular cases where there has been a change in the principal policy instrument. Finally,
the discussion as a whole is set in the context of the executive domination of Parliament.
The implications of the use of non-statutory instruments, such as voluntary agreements,
for this relationship are noted.
INTRODUCTION
The capacity of the executive to make decisions which effectively bypass Parliament
has been a major topic in British politics for many years. Recent evidence suggests
that this capacity is still growing. Indeed, few would dissent from Richardson and
Jordan's view that 'increasingly, modern governments make decisions that do not
go through the normal legislative process and are not subject to effective scrutiny
and control' (1979, p. 118). This apparent trend has been thrown into sharper relief
by a growing interest in the study of the range of policy instruments which govern-
ments have at their disposal (see,
for
example, Hood 1983). Studies of this kind
have been useful not only because they have illustrated the fact that 'there are
more ways than one of skinning a cat', but also because the instruments which
are described vary
in
their potential to circumvent legislative scrutiny. Of particular
interest in this respect
is
the variety
of
ways in which policy can be sanctioned.
Delegated legislation has been the most commonly cited example of how
government can avoid or limit legislative scrutiny of its decisions. Walkland (1968,
p.
44),
for example, has claimed that political control of the legislative process
by the executive is a better explanation for the predominance of delegated legisla-
tion than technical reasons
or
the lack of parliamentary time. Consequently much
of the debate has centred around the
use
and abuse of statutory instruments. But
this focus has led to a neglect of other policy instruments which are, strictly
Rob Baggott is
a
Research Fellow at the Department of Social Policy and Professional Studies, University
of
Hull.
~ ~~
Public Administration
Vol.
64
Spring
1986
0
1986
Royal
Institute of Public Administration
ISSN
0033-3298 $3.00
52
ROB BAGGOTT
speaking, non-statutory, and which appear to lie largely outside the scope of
Parliament. Yet as Miers and Page have recently reminded
us,
’alternative
mechanisms (are) available.
.
.policies need not be sanctioned by legislation’
(1981,
p.
17).
Such alternatives include departmental circulars, for example, which are
often used to sanction policies of considerable importance to the government of
the day. The current policy of privatizing ancillary services in the national health
service has been promoted mainly in this manner.
But the main
focus
of this article is upon another type
of
non-statutory instrument
which has attracted relatively little academic interest, despite its fairly widespread
and varied use. This is the voluntary agreement
-
where government exercises
policy by way of a non-statutory negotiated agreement.
It
has been used in policy
areas as diverse as health, safety, agriculture, trading standards and economic
policy. The basic aim which underlies the following analysis is to outline and
illustrate the use
of
this instrument. This subsumes three other purposes which
can be briefly stated. First
of
all, to clarify the nature of the voluntary agreement
and distinguish it from other instruments. Second, to identify those factors which
favour its selection. And third, to search for any patterns of policy succession
involving this instrument.
THE NATURE
OF
THE BEAST
What precisely is a voluntary agreement? How can this instrument be distinguished
from other policy instruments?
Is
there any degree of differentiation amongst
voluntary agreements themselves? One can move a long way towards answering
these fundamental questions by attempting to state clearly what we mean by the
term ‘voluntary agreement’. In this article we shall understand a voluntary agree-
ment
to
be any agreement between the government
(or
one of its agencies) and
a section of the community
(or
its representatives) whose main purpose is to
establish a degree of regulation over the specific activities of the latter, and which
involves a non-statutory regulatory procedure
or
code of practice,
or
both, which
the latter is committed to follow under the terms
of
the agreement. This working
definition serves as a useful basis for discussion. But further explanation is needed
both in order to convey some appreciation of the heterogeneous nature of this
instrument and, at the same time,
to
distinguish it from other policy instruments.
Regulatory
processes
The main purpose of a voluntary agreement
as
defined is to establish a degree
of
regulation over the activities of a certain section of the community. The
regulatory process which arises out of this approach is, however, invariably formal.
This formality distinguishes voluntary agreements from the vague and informal
‘understandings‘ which exist between government and outside interests, which
would be better termed ’consensus‘. This is not to say that such consensus does
not play a part in the generation of voluntary agreements: on the contrary, a high
degree of consensus is a necessary prelude
for
any voluntary agreement to emerge.
A
voluntary agreement, though, is a formalization of consensus.
It
is a concrete
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