BZP-‘Party pills’, populism and prohibition: Exploring global debates in a New Zealand context
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Author | Fiona Hutton |
| DOI | 10.1177/0004865816638906 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Australian & New Zealand
Journal of Criminology
2017, Vol. 50(2) 282–306
BZP-‘Party pills’, populism
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and prohibition: Exploring
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DOI: 10.1177/0004865816638906
global debates in a
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New Zealand context
Fiona Hutton
Institute of Criminology, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract
In New Zealand, the debates surrounding legal highs have been developing for approximately
a decade. New Zealand’s historical grappling with the problem of legal highs reflects a global
problem in addressing the issues related to new psychoactive substances. The focus of this
article is the prohibition of BZP-based party pills under the Misuse of Drugs (Classification of
BZP) Amendment Act, 2008 (hereafter the 2008 Act). This article reports on a qualitative
study of the banning of BZP-based party pills in New Zealand, using thematic analysis of the
discourses contained in the 2007 Parliamentary Bill readings of the 2008 Act. Six key themes
were identified from the bill readings: prohibition is not an effective way to deal with drug
use; BZP has a ‘gateway effect’; availability and accessibility means young people can access
BZP-PPs too readily; young people are at risk; BZP has contributed to establishing a pill
popping culture in New Zealand; and BZP has the potential for harm/has a moderate risk of
harm. The thematic analysis revealed that evidence was often not fully represented in par-
liamentary debates, and that many of the concerns raised about BZPPs could have been dealt
with through regulation rather than prohibition. A punitive moral populism aimed at drug use
and drug users was also identified, driven by fears of drug using groups, and the symbolism
associated with drug use.
Keywords
BZP, drug policy, drugs, populism, prohibition
Introduction
In considering the debates surrounding drug use and drug policy, scholars have argued
that a culture of fear has developed around these issues, feeding into punitive policy and
regulation (Milhet, Moloney, Bergron, & Hunt, 2013), and that historically drug policy
has been driven by fears of particular social groups. Drug policy is also often influenced
Corresponding author:
Dr Fiona Hutton, Senior Lecturer, Victoria University, School of Social and Cultural Studies, Wellington 6021,
New Zealand.
Email: fiona.hutton@vuw.ac.nz
Hutton
283
by political values with decisions about prohibition, for example, being based on myths
and misconceptions rather than evidence, despite the rhetoric that drug policy is
informed by research based evidence (Coomber, 2013). It is further suggested that
‘drug control cannot be understood fully as a rational, scientific response to the preva-
lence and dangers of various substances’ (Stevens & Measham, 2014, p. 1226), indicating
that additional issues are also important in decisions about drug control and drug policy.
The ‘drug war’ it is argued is based on symbolism, with the symbols and images sur-
rounding drug use taking on an intense emotional significance, becoming the focus of
punitive policy (Manderson, 1995). Therefore, the ‘drug war’, based on such symbolism,
is positioned by Manderson (1995) as illogical, and as a consequence it is argued that
responses towards drug use should not be expected to unfold in a logical way. Similarly,
drug policy should not be analysed from this viewpoint: that drug legislation is a
rational, scientific response to drug use. Instead drug policy should be considered as a
reaction to the symbols related to drug use, and that the ‘failure to recognise that we are
dealing with the symbolic realm. . . bedevils both drug users and legislative policy’
(Manderson, 1995, p. 799).
Policy and law making surrounding drug use are complex processes, influenced and
affected by a diverse range of issues. However, acknowledging this can be both prob-
lematic and challenging, calling into question how the legitimacy of legislative and policy
decisions may be assessed (Lancaster, 2014, p. 949). In order to explore these issues, and
bearing these complexities in mind, this article will consider drug controls in New
Zealand surrounding BZP-based party pills (BZP-PPs). The aim being to explore the
decision to ban BZP-PPs, under the 2008 Misuse of Drugs (Classification of BZP) Act
(hereafter the 2008 Act) (a decision I was genuinely surprised by). Given the arguments
noted above, what is of interest here are the processes underlying the decision to ban
BZP-PPs instead of regulating them, given that an alternative to prohibition under the
2005 Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act1 (hereafter the 2005 Act) was readily available.
The focus for this discussion will be what are referred to as ‘legal highs’, ‘herbal highs’
or ‘party pills’.2 More specifically, it will concentrate on BZP-PPs3 and their prohibition
in New Zealand under the 2008 Act. New Zealand, the focus of this article, regulates
drug use through the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 with a scale of penalties for the sale,
supply and use of illegal drugs, based on the system of classifying drugs as A, B or C
depending on perceived harmfulness – a model similar to the UK system. BZP-PPs
became popular in New Zealand from about 2000 onwards, with approximately 120
different party pills available in New Zealand at this time (Gee, Richardson,
Woltersdorf, & Moore, 2005). They were marketed as a legal alternative to drugs
such as amphetamine and ecstasy and became popular among young dance club atten-
dees, with an estimated 8 million servings sold between 2000 and 2005 (Social Tonics
Association of New Zealand, 2005). In a country that has a population of approximately
4 million (Statistics New Zealand, 2013) this is a significant number of party pills. As
noted by Cohen and Butler (2011), the legal high market in New Zealand developed
particularly quickly, partly due to New Zealand’s small population and geographic iso-
lation. Consequently, it has an underdeveloped illicit drug market compared to
European counties (Cohen & Butler, 2011). Illicit drugs are often poor quality and
expensive, so legal alternatives that produce similar effects, more cheaply are highly
attractive. New Zealand research demonstrates that BZP-PPs are often used as a
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Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 50(2)
substitute for ecstasy and other dance drugs such as amphetamine, usually when ecstasy
or amphetamines are unavailable (Butler & Sheridan, 2007; Hutton, 2010), and that
BZP-PPs are used as one substance among a variety of illicit/licit drugs; they are another
substance on the menu for poly-drug users (Hammond, 2008).
In New Zealand, the debates surrounding legal highs have been developing for
approximately a decade, with various landmark legislative steps during this period
(from 2005 to 2014). However, concerns that the party pill market had developed
unregulated since approximately 2000 surfaced, as well as emergency department doc-
tors noting presentations related to party pill ingestion (Gee et al., 2005). In order to
impose some kind of regulation on this ‘new’ market, the 2005 Act created an innovative
‘restricted substances’ or Class D category for psychoactive substances. BZP-PPs were
placed in this category until research could be carried out into their toxicity and poten-
tial for harm. The 2008 Act then banned BZP-PPs, although after the ban party pills in
general remained popular, and new pills that did not contain BZP rapidly appeared on
the market.4 The struggle to contain the proliferation of new legal highs in New Zealand
was a key factor behind the review of the 1975 Misuse of Drugs Act by the New Zealand
Law Commission in 2010. ‘Kronic’ a legal cannabis substitute was also banned in New
Zealand in 2011 after intense media attention5 focussing on its accessibility and attract-
iveness to under 18s. However, as Wilkins and Sweetsur (2013) note, the continuing
popularity of legal highs in New Zealand6 demonstrates that there is a demand for these
products which the banning of both BZP-PPs and ‘Kronic’ has not diminished.
Consumers of legal highs such as BZP-PPs in studies such as Sheridan et al. (2007),
Butler & Sheridan (2007), Sheridan & Butler (2010) and Green (2008) noted the legal
status of BZP as a benefit of using ‘party pills’. This enabled users to engage with the
NTE and the club/dance scene without fear of criminalisation. As noted earlier, New
Zealand is a country where illegal drugs such as ecstasy are often expensive and poor
quality (Cohen & Butler, 2011), and BZP-PP users cited their availability, as well as the
fact that they offered the promise of a similar high to ecstasy or amphetamines as posi-
tive features. Additionally, BZP was cited in Sheridan and Butler (2007, 2010) as used
mainly for stimulant and social effects. Users in their studies reported using them to
experience the effects of intoxication and to enhance the way they felt on nights out.
BZP-PPs were also cited as having longer lasting effects than illicit drugs such as ecstasy
(Butler & Sheridan, 2007, p. 5). Several research studies were commissioned in New
Zealand to try to establish what kind of effects BZP-PPs had on consumers. Although
some serious side effects were highlighted it was also noted that ‘many users are currently
taking BZP-based pills without significant adverse effects’ (Gee et al., 2005, p. 8). A
study of the Auckland City Hospital overdose database in 2004 similarly noted that 21
people presented in 2004 with party pill ingestion but only...
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