Call for Papers – Special Issue 2018 Sustainable Corporate Governance
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12216 |
| Published date | 01 January 2017 |
| Date | 01 January 2017 |
British Journal of Management, Vol. 28, 154–156 (2017)
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12216
British Journal of Management
Call for Papers – Special Issue 2018
Sustainable Corporate Governance
Submission deadline: 1st April 2017
The financial crisis of 2008 has typically been blamed on weak corporate governance mechanisms and
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions (Walker, 2009; Turner, 2009). In the aftermath of the crisis,
there have been a number of piecemeal regulatory responses around the world, such as caps on bonuses,
that have attempted to patch up the perceived inadequacies of current governance structures. These re-
sponses have often focused on the banking sector (e.g. FCA Remuneration Code), with spill-over eects
onto other organisations through,for example the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting
Council, 2016). Say-on-paylegislation allowing a firm’s shareholders the right to vote on the remuneration
of executives has been enacted in some countries (e.g. Dodd-Frank Act 2010 in the USA).
There is increased scepticism of the role of bankers, traders and other high-paid individuals in the fi-
nancial services industry (Calhoun, 2013; Marti and Scherer,2016) and executive pay and behaviour more
generally (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Kaplan and Rauh, 2010). The frustration with the slow regulatory
response to the 2008 crisis can in part explain the “Shareholder Spring” investor activism and the growth
of the “Occupy Wall Street” protest movements around the globe in 2012. Initial work examining the
eects of these governance reforms have found that firm value increased in response to say-on-pay adop-
tion (Ferri and Maber, 2013; Cu˜
nat, Gin´
e, and Guadalupe, 2016). Kleymenova, and Tuna (2016) report
that, although the adoption of the UK Remuneration Code had a positive eect on firm value, the EU
bonus cap had a negativeeect. Murphy (2014) warns about perverse incentives of bonuscaps in terms of
increased incentives for excessive risk taking, and a significant increase in fixed remuneration. Interests of
executives and shareholders may bebetter aligned t hrough insider ownership, but Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2010) find no evidence that bank resilience to the crisis depended on this relationship. More generally,
Erkens, Hung and Matos (2012) show that financial institutions with greater board independence and in-
stitutional ownership performed worse during the financial crisis,thereby questioning the eectiveness of
two mechanisms typically associated with good corporategovernance. Iliev,Lins, Miller, and Roth (2015)
suggest that shareholder voting is an eectivemechanism for exercising governance around the world. On
a dierent note, Li, Leung, Young, Xin, Cai and Huang (2012) argue that the reaction to the financial
crisis and how well it was managed at a national level depend on a country’s culture and philosophical
approaches to crisis management. Hence, questions remain as to how eective various corporate gover-
nance mechanisms are in terms of preventing future crises and whether current regulatory approaches
create more harm than good.
The British Journal of Managementwill publish a special issue on “Sustainable Corporate Governance”
in 2018 with a short collection of research papers that assesses the state of corporate governance and
governance reforms in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Papers in the special issue will focus on how
firms haveresponded to the perceived weakness in their governance structures,how the regulatory regimes
have changed, and what has been the eect of these changes on firm structures and performance.
The Call for Papers welcomes theoretical, conceptual, review, comparative and empirically-based sub-
missions around the theme of “Sustainable Corporate Governance”, with an emphasis on changes to
practices and policies since the financial crisis of 2008. Empirical papers should be theoretically grounded
© 2017 British Academy of Management. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4
2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA.
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