Case Report
| DOI | 10.1177/000486587000300408 |
| Published date | 01 December 1970 |
| Date | 01 December 1970 |
| Subject Matter | Case Report |
242
CASE REPORT
AUST. &N.Z. JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY (Dec., 1970): 3, 4
Lucas
v. R
High
Court
of
Australia
(Barwick CJ,
Owen
and
Walsh
JJ),
Melbourne,
May
11-12; Brisbane,
June
2, 1970.
Reported
(1970) 44
AUR
193.
IN R v Weisel
the
late
Mr. Justice Barry noted
in
his
judgment
in relation
to
the
third
ground of
the
notice of appeal,
"that
the
learned
trial
judge
erred
in
not
informing
the
jury
of
the
consequences of a verdict of
'not
guilty on
the
ground of insanity' ",
that
the
trial
judge's refusal to comply with arequest
that
he should inform
the
jury
of
the
legal consequences of a verdict of
not
gUilty on
the
ground of insanity appears to me to be of some importance.
If
I were
permitted
to speculate, Ishould
think
that
it is highly probable
that
this
omission contributed substantially to
the
jury's
verdict of guilty · · .
There
is no legal reason to
abstain
from telling
the
jury
what
s.420 of
the
Crimes
Act
requires,
and
there
are sound practical reasons why
they
should be told
...
In
theory,
the
jury
are
not
concerned with
the
punitive consequences
resulting from
their
verdict,
but
it
is to disregard realities to believe
they
do
not
advert to those consequences, because,
after
all,
the
main
purpose of a criminal
trial
is to determine if
the
accused should be
convicted
and
thereby
made
liable to legal punishment.
Perhaps
to
frustrate
attempts
by counsel to distract juries from
the
duty of de-
termining
guilt dispassionately, judges commonly discourage
any
mention in counsel's address of
the
possible
fate
of
the
accused
if
he
Is convicted,
though
it requires little forensic ingenuity to evade
the
judicial
ban
by some oblique reference.
But
the
verdict of acquittal
in
a
trial
where
insanity
is
the
only defence is
rightly
described asaspecial
verdict because
the
legal consequences
that
follow
it
are
special. I
have
always informed
the
jury
what
those consequences are, usually by
reading s.420 to them. Since
the
creation of
the
Parole Board by
the
Penal
Reform
Act
1956,
which came
into
force on 1 JUly
1957,
I
have
told
the
jury
of
the
duty of
the
Parole Board,
under
the
provisions now
found in s.532 (2)
(a)
of
the
Crimes
Act
1958,
to
make
yearly reports to
the
Executive upon a person kept in safe custody
under
the
section,
and
have
mentioned
that
the
detention continues
until
the
Governor,
in
the
exercise of
the
powers conferred by s.498 of
the
Crimes
Act
1958,
makes
an
order for release
under
supervision (s.499),
after
the
Executive
has
received areport from
the
Parole Board
that
the
person
may
safely
be
permitted
to be
at
large. My purpose in doing so is to ensure
that
the
jury
will
be
able to deliberate upon
the
issue without being distracted
by a
fear
that
if
they
find averdict of
not
guilty on
the
ground of
insanity,
the
accused, who
they
may
consider should be kept in custody
1. R v
Weise
[1969J V.R. 953.
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