Chief Executive Organization and Advisory Arrangements for Foreign Affairs
| Author | Karl Magnus Johansson |
| Date | 01 September 2008 |
| Published date | 01 September 2008 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836708092837 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol.43(3): 267–287. © NISA 2008 www.nisanet.org
SAGE Publications,Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore
www.sagepublications.com
0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836708092837
Chief Executive Organization and Advisory
Arrangements for Foreign Affairs
The Case of Sweden
KARL MAGNUS JOHANSSON
ABSTRACT
As prime ministers are drawn into international relations and the for-
eign policy process, they are in need of advisory structures for foreign
affairs in their offices.This article examines the system and the role of
foreign affairs advisers to the Prime Minister (PM), the chief executive,
in Sweden. The article centres on the organization for foreign affairs,in
general terms of institutional and staffing arrangements, and on
leader–adviser relationships. As the right hand of the PM, inner circle
advisers in foreign affairs have a direct role in overseeing foreign pol-
icy on the key issues and do more than just serve in an advisory capacity
by being operative in diplomacy and in policy coordination. These
advisers can therefore wield influence on policy and the government
based on their own expertise and position at the centre of power and at
the frontier between the chief executive and the outside world.
Keywords: adviser; chief executive; foreign affairs; process
Introduction
Research Problem
A former Swedish ambassador to London, when asked in an interview with
the author who his principal was, testified that he clearly considered the
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) as ‘employer’ and that his personal experi-
ence was that he was working for them.1As ambassador he stayed in con-
tact with the PM’s state secretary for foreign and European Union (EU)
affairs and received ‘instructions’ directly from him and not from officials
in the line organization at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), with
which collaborators at the embassy communicated.2The state secretary
gave ‘feedback’ on reports and so, occasionally, did the PM. The direct
involvement of the PM was in clear ‘contrast’ to this ambassador’s previous
experiences before Sweden became a member of the EU.The ambassador
also had sporadic contacts with the political adviser at the PMO handling
foreign policy.3
This story serves to highlight the main research problem of this article,
which is the role and significance of chief executive organization and advis-
ory arrangements for foreign affairs generally, and specifically in the con-
text of Sweden and EU membership. Likewise, the testimony illustrates the
general research theme of principal–agent relationships. In foreign policy-
making, and for diplomats in the field, the government can be conceived of
as a collective principal. At the same time, for these diplomats the real prin-
cipal is not necessarily the foreign minister (Hill, 2003:53; Jönsson and Hall,
2005: 109).As our ambassador above testifies, the most immediate principal
for diplomats in the field, themselves acting in an advisory capacity, may be
the PM’s closest and trusted aides and, most notably, the chief foreign pol-
icy adviser. It is a common observation among the interviewees of the study
that the office of the chief executive has become more centrally involved in
the foreign policy process.EU membership is the key factor here, alongside
tendencies towards globalization more broadly.
Against this background, and given the sheer existence and numbers of
chief executive aides in foreign and EU affairs, it is worth raising questions
about the institutional and staffing arrangements in these areas at the
centre of executive power. Such arrangements can be seen as a threat to the
balance inside the foreign policy executive and can accentuate rather than
relieve the strains between ministers as well as between political appointees
and civil servants.
While PMs have to deal with many different issues, they can choose to
become engaged in any area in which they take a special interest. Whether
or not they intend to, however,heads of government ‘are invariably drawn
into foreign affairs, and a large proportion of their time is spent upon it’
(Hill, 2003: 53).And, as argued by Hill (2003: 56), ‘the international envir-
onment still presents a long and steep learning-curve for any politician
wishing to feel at home in it’. The PM — who must be a generalist even
though he or she may have specialized in an area such as foreign and secur-
ity policy — must rely on professional expertise and qualified advice from
civil servants, special advisers or political advisers. Time and again, there is
need for counsel from advisers.
Research Aims
The purpose of this article is to examine the institutionalization and role of
the evolving advisory system in foreign affairs, in broad terms, within the
context of the foreign policy process and the office of chief executive in
Sweden. I address this topic through a focus on institutional and staffing
arrangements for foreign affairs and on leader–adviser relations, accounting
for the contexts and institutions within which actors are embedded. The
article is guided by the overarching research question of what characterizes
the features of the organization and the advisory role, systems and
relationships in this vital field of policy-making at chief executive level in
the case of Sweden.
268 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(3)
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