Clientelism, capitalism, and democracy: The rise of programmatic politics in the United States and Britain Didi Kuo, Cambridge University Press, 2018, 163 pp., £75 (hb), ISBN: 978‐1108426084
| Author | Philip Rocco |
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12619 |
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
REVIEW
Clientelism, capitalism, and democracy: The rise of
programmatic politics in the United States and
Britain
Didi Kuo
Cambridge University Press, 2018, 163 pp., £75 (hb), ISBN: 978-1108426084
A streetlamp adorns the cover of Clientelism, Capitalism, and Democracy. This is a fitting image; electrification, like
other public goods, is a hallmark of programmatic politics—in which parties compete for votes by offering broad
packages of cohesive, general-interest reforms which they will commit to implementing if elected. Kuo investigates
why parties in the United States and Britain ultimately adopted such programmatic stances in the early twentieth
century, abandoning the clientelistic practices of trading votes for material benefits such as money, food, or patron-
age jobs. Especially since programmatic parties are seen as a key feature of democratic accountability and good gov-
ernance, the answer to this question is a significant one for scholars and policy-makers alike. Kuo marshals an
impressive array of quantitative and qualitative analysis, all of which suggests the need to revise the conventional
wisdom about the path out of clientelism.
As the title of the book suggests, Kuo traces the roots of programmatic parties to changes in the organization of
the capitalist class. This perspective contrasts sharply with both modernization theory, which views economic devel-
opment as a precursor to programmatic parties, and institutionalist explanations, which focus on the relative timing
of democratization and bureaucratization. Both of these approaches, Kuo suggests, leave out important elements of
the underlying social process. Who, for example, makes demands on parties to adopt programmatic politics?How do
parties translate these demands into governance strategies?
Kuo's larger theoretical contribution is to bring capitalism into focus as an engine of change in party politics. The
transition from personal to managerial capitalism in the late nineteenth century created a distinctive class of busi-
nessmen who organized through new trade associations to make demands on the state. In both the United States
and Britain, merchants and manufacturers sought help from the state to address the economic costs of clientelism,
such as unpredictable rules and ineffective administration. Specifically, these new associations demanded that politi-
cians adopt programmatic reforms that would secure effective administration of property rights, contract enforce-
ment, and enduring policy infrastructures.
Parties' response to capitalist pressure, however, depended on more than the creation of a professionalized civil
service and a robust administrative apparatus. Rather, as Kuo argues, it was shaped by the relative timing of party
and business organization. British parties built strong hierarchical organizations prior to the organization of manage-
rial capitalists. As such, they were able to integrate capitalist demands into the development of programmatic policy
without becoming beholden to business interests alone. By contrast, US parties in the late nineteenth century faced
a better-organized business class. As such, parties were more dependent on the resources and expertise of business
when campaigning and formulating policy.
The upshot of Kuo's analysis is that, under certain conditions, capitalists can help to pave the way between
clientelism and programmatic politics.Themostpersuasiveevidenceforthis argument identifies a direct link
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12619
960 © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Public Administration. 2019;97:960–961.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm
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