Coercion and the Trade Unions: a Reconsideration of Hayek
| Author | Ray Richardson |
| Published date | 01 June 1996 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1996.tb00649.x |
| Date | 01 June 1996 |
British
Journal
of
Industrial
Relations
342
June
19%
0007-1080
pp.
219-236
Coercion and the Trade Unions:
a
Reconsideration
of
Hayek
Ray Richardson
Abstract
Friedrich Hayek was an influential critic
of
trade unions, especially critical
of
their presumed ability to act ‘coercively’. Without coercive power unions
could be benign; with coercive power they were seen to be a force forprofound
loss
and danger. The paper examines Hayek’s understanding
of
the general
concept
of
coercion, and discusses how he applied it to the analysis
of
trade
unions.
It also
looks
at his more speculative treatment
of
trade
unions
in
a
‘non-coercive’ world to see what that suggests about his analysis of trade
unions. I conclude that Hayek’s
notion
of
coercion was unsatisfactory, that he
was seriously inconsistent
in
his use
of
the term, and that he was hopelessly
confused
in
his analysis
of
unions.
1.
Introduction
Friedrich Hayek is well
known
for being
an
influential and extremely
vigorous critic of trade unions, particularly
in
Britain. One of his harsher
judgements, made in the second edition
of
1980s
Unemployment and the
Unions,
was that British trade unions were:
the biggest obstacle to raising the living standards of the working class
as
a
whole..
.
the chief cause of the unnecessarily big differences between the best-
and worst-paid worke
rs...
the prime source of unemployment
...
[and]
...
the main reason for the decline
of
the British economy in general. (Hayek
1984:
52).
In other
writings,
Hayek was at pains to make it clear that he was not against
trade unions as such; in certain circumstances, he declared, they were
‘undoubtedly capable of rendering services which are not only unobjection-
able but definitely useful’ (Hayek
1960:
276).
His
stated opposition, con-
sistently expressed over the years, was directed instead towards what he saw
as their acquired ability to act ‘coercively’. In
The Constitution
of
Liberty,
published in
1960,
he claimed that the unions were ‘the only important
Ray
Richardson
is
in
the Department
of
Industrial
Relations
and
the
Centre
for
Economic
Performance, London School
of
Economics.
8
Blackwell
Publishers
Ltd/London
School
of
Economics 1996.
Published by
Blackwell
Publishers
Ltd,
108
Cowley
Road, Oxford,
OX4
lJF, and
238
Main
Street,
Cambridge,
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02141.
USA.
220
Britkh Journal
of
Industrial Relations
instance in which governments signally fail in their prime function
-
the
prevention of coercion and violence’ (1960:
267).
Nearly a quarter of a
century later, in
1980s
Unemployment and the Unions,
he claimed that ‘the
unions are destroying the free market through their legalised use of
coercion’ (1984:
55).
Coercion was therefore absolutely central to
his
con-
ception of the union problem. Without coercive power, unions could
be
a
benign institution; with coercive power, they were a force for profound
economic loss and political and social danger.
‘Coercion’ is one of those accusatory words which threatens to terminate
discussions. It has such negative overtones that, if the charge of coercion can
be
upheld, the object of the accusation generally loses our sympathy.
Hayek’s
own
choice of the exemplars of coercion is a good illustration of
this:
True coercion occurs when armed bands of conquerors make the subject people
toil for them, when organised gangsters extort a levy for ‘protection’, when the
knower of an evil secret blackmails
his
victim, and, of course, when the state
threatens to inflict punishment and to employ physical
force
to make
us
obey its
commands. (Hayek,
1960:
137-8).
Hayek’s inclusion of the state in this list is interesting. He conceded that
some state activity was necessary for society to
be
effective, which
sometimes required the state to have coercive powers. Modem states,
however, tended to use these powers much too freely, and the exploration
of
the appropriate, and relatively narrow, limits of defensible state coercion
became central to much of Hayek‘s analysis.
As
the above list implies, the
modem state could all too easily keep shady company. Exploitative
conquerors, gangsters and blackmailers have rarely had a good press, and
Hayek’s inclusion of the state as a member of
this
rogues’ gallery might in
part
be seen as a deliberate intellectual provocation.
My main concern in the first part of this essay is to consider whether the
charge that trade
unions
too were fundamentally coercive was similarly
provocative, a rhetorical trope rather than the product of scrupulous and
dispassionate scholarly analysis. I therefore begin by examining Hayek’s
general understanding of the concept of coercion, and then study how he
deployed it to analyse trade unions.
This
should allow us to see whether his
charge that unions were coercive was merely a forensic device, or had an
objective and illuminating basis.
I
then turn to his more speculative analysis
of the functions of unions in a non-coercive world.
I
conclude that Hayek
was
seriously inconsistent
in
his
use of the notion of coercion, and hopelessly
confused in
his
analysis of unions.
My focus is highly specific. I am not seeking to provide a full treatment of
whether, or in what ways, trade unions might be said to be ‘coercive’; still
less do I offer an assessment of their real-world effects. Nor
am
I attempting
to relate Hayek’s understanding of ‘coercion’ to his wider political,
economic, social and legal theories. Rather, I am concerned with his use,
and possible abuse,
of
language, with
his
application of a powerful word, full
0
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Publishers
Ltdbndon
School
of
Economics
1996.
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