Collective Action, Business Cleavages and the Politics of Control: Segmentalism in the Swiss Skill Formation System
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12426 |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12426
57:3 September 2019 0007–1080 pp. 576–598
Collective Action, Business Cleavages
and the Politics of Control:
Segmentalism in the Swiss Skill
Formation System
Patrick Emmenegger and Lina Seitzl
Abstract
Collective skill formation systems have come under sustained pressure in recent
years. Scholars observe a fragmentation process, which is the result of changing
power relations, putting large training firms in a dominant position. However, so
far the literature has examined neither the role of small firms and intermediary
associations nor the source of power of the various business actors. In this case
study, we ask: If business is pivotal, but divided, who prevails and why? We find
that the availability of credible exit options and the ability to act collectively
determines the degree of influence of the various business actors.
1. Introduction
Collective skill formation systems are prime examples of co-ordinated
capitalism and have thus attracted much scholarly interest (e.g. Busemeyer
2015; Crouch et al. 1999; Culpepper 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Streeck and
Yamamura 2001; Thelen 2014). Three characteristics distinguish them from
other training regimes and make them particularly relevant for scholars of
varieties of capitalism (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012: 14f): First, collective
systems are dual systems, where training takes place in both schools and
firms. Second, firms and their intermediary associations participate in the
financing and administration of training, which presupposes inter-firm co-
operation and the ability to act collectively. Third, collective systems provide
occupational skills that are portable, certified and standardized beyond the
firm level. Hence, collective skill formation systems are based on high levels
Patrick Emmenegger and Lina Seitzl are at the School of Economics and Political Science,
University of St. Gallen.
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2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Collective Action, Business Cleavages and the Politics of Control 577
of non-market co-ordination and private interest governance and are thus
possibly the best examples of co-ordinated capitalism.
Yet, these systems have come under sustained pressure in recent years
due to the deindustrialization, globalization and digitalization of economies.
These secular trends have major implications for the skill needs of the labour
market. In general, the demand forhigher and more general skills is increasing
(Baethge and Wolter 2015; Mayer and Solga 2008). Partly as a consequence,
the number of training firms has decreased considerably (Culpepper and
Thelen 2008). In addition, since firms are dierently aected by these trends,
the skill demands of firms have become increasingly fragmented.
Various scholars have observed that the content and governance of
training increasingly focuses on the needs of large firms in these systems,
resulting in a less encompassing and more segmented labour market with
limited occupational mobility for employees (Busemeyer 2012; Graf 2018;
Thelen 2009). Scholars call this ‘segmentalism’. It is argued that small firms
increasingly exit from collective skillformation because training becomes too
costly for them. In order to motivate the other (larger) firms to remain in
the system, the state agrees to their demands for a more fragmented skill
formation system. However, by doing so, the collective nature of these skill
formation systems is increasingly undermined.
The literature on segmentalism has greatly enhanced our understanding
of recent developments in collective skill formation systems, but several
questions remain. First, since most of this literature examines the German
case, we ask whether this fragmentation can also be observed in other
such systems. Second, the literature on collective skill formation systems
emphasizes the role of within-business cleavages, in particular with regard to
firm size. However, so far the literature on segmentalism has focused mainly
on large firms as the drivers of this development. What happens when small
firms do not exit from training? And whatrole, if any,do business intermediary
associations play? Finally, we turn to the politics of segmentalism and ask: If
business is pivotal, but divided, who prevails and why?
Empirically, we analyse the reform of commercial training in Switzerland,
tracing developments from the mid-1980s until today. Switzerland is a
prominent example of collective skill formation systems, not least because it
is the country with the highest share of youth entering dual apprenticeships
(Ryan 2012: 382). At the same time, commercial training is by far the most
popular type of apprenticeship in Switzerland (SBFI 2016: 14). Commercial
training prepares for administrative and custom-centred activities in diverse
fields such as bookkeeping, human resources and marketing. It takes place
in a wide range of industries, for example, in banks, in commerce and in the
public sector.
Yet, commercial training is a least-likely case for segmentalism. Unlike
most other types of training in Switzerland, vocational schools and their
association traditionally have had the most influence on the governance
of commercial training and not the large manufacturing firms that are
typically identified as the drivers of segmentalism. In addition, the firms
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2018 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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