Collective Bargaining Coverage under Trade Unionism: A Sociological Investigation
| Date | 01 March 1997 |
| Published date | 01 March 1997 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8543.00041 |
British Journal of IndustrialRelations
35:1 March 1997 0007–1080 pp. 65–86
Collective Bargaining Coverage under
Trade Unionism: A Sociological
Investigation
Steen Scheuer
Abstract
Does high union density lead to high collective bargaining coverage? Since
collective bargaining is seen as the raison d’eˆtre of trade unions, this is often
assumed to be the case; some observers think that union density is ‘a floor’
below which collective bargaining coverage is unlikely to fall. With its very
high union density, Denmark is a case in point. This article investigates the
collective bargaining coverage issue in the Danish case, based on an
individual-level employee survey with 1720 respondents. Collective bargain-
ing coverage is shown to be much lower than union density, and some
methodological issues in this connection are consi dered. In order to find some
possible explanations for this surprising finding, the question of variance of
collective bargaining coverage between groups of employees is discussed in
the light of theories of service society and recent research results and theories.
The impact of central variables is investigated through multivariate analysis,
and it turns out that by far the most important variable predicting an
employee’s collective bargaining coverage is a variable mostly neglected in
comparative analyses: occupational status. Salaried employees have a much
lower collective bargaining coverage than manual workers in Denmark, and
some possible reasons for this are given.
1. Introduction: from ‘self-evident’ to unknown
Collective bargaining is generally thought of as a central, if not the most
central, activity of trade unions (and employers’ associations). This is the
traditional view of trade unionism: unions find their raison d’eˆtre through
collective intervention into employers’ decisions and practices, and the
ability of unions to attract members is thought to reflect their ability to do
this. If unions are able to bargain collectively in an effective manner, their
membership will increase, and individual members’ motivationfor member-
ship is thought to lie in the collective bargaining agreement.
Steen Scheuer is at the Copenhagen Business School
¥ Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 1997. Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd,
108 Cowley Road,Oxford, OX4 1JF, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
66 British Journal of Industrial Relations
This basic assumption is shared by many industrial relations scholars. A
classical formulation is that by Hugh Clegg, who claims that variations
between countries in union membership, union structure, etc., are ex-
plained by explicit reference to the structures of collective ba rgaining (Clegg
1976: 27, 39). Unions exist to intervene in management’s prerogatives, and
they do this mostly through collective bargaining.
In recent years, however, industrial relations researchers (both in
economics and in related disciplines) have increasi ngly become interested in
the coverage of collective bargaining systems — in country and industry
variations, the dynamic aspects of collective bargaining coverage and the
possible consequences of increasing or declining coverage. Earlier research
into the roles of unions and other ‘collective actors’ in the labour market had
concentrated more upon union membership (union density) as a measur eof
union strength. This was understandable, since data for membership of
unions were much easier to obtain than data on collective bargaining
coverage. Union density was seen as a proxy for coverage, expressing union
strength in the labour market. In recent years it has become increasingly
clear that union membership and collective agreements are two different
things which do not always coincide. In particular, it has become clear that in
some countries collective bargaining coverage can be higher than union
density .
The most outstanding national research into these questions is probably
the British Workplace Industrial Relations surveys (WIRS), conducted in
1980, 1984 and 1990 (Millward et al. 1992; Millward 1994), and Milner’s
historical investigation (Milner 1995). Similar research has been conducted
in Australia (Callus et al. 1991), and in 1994 Franz Traxler published the first
comprehensive comparative investigation of collective bargaining coverage
levels in 17 OECD countries. In most of the cases, data on collective
bargaining coverage were based on workplace or enterprise surveys,
although there were of course wide variations in the methods applied in the
countries included in the analysis. The main conclusions of Traxler’s
analysis, when it comes to the general level of collective bargaining
coverage, are that:
1. there is a low correlation between union densit ya ndcoll ective bargaining
coverage;
2. high coverage seems connected with national or sectoral bargaining
contracts, whereas low coverage seems connected with enterprise-level
collective bargaining;
3. well-organized employers increase coverage levels, as well as extension
clauses (so-called erga omnes legislation), in the country’s legal system;
4. union density seems to act as a floor to collective bargaining coverage
(Traxler 1994: 172–4).
From these and similar analyses, it has become clear that there is no simple
and direct relationship between union membership and collective bargain-
ing coverage at the level of the individual employee. An employee can be
¥ Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 1997.
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