Competing principles of agency organization – the reorganization of a reform
| Date | 01 December 2012 |
| Published date | 01 December 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852312455306 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
78(4) 579–596
!The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020852312455306
ras.sagepub.com
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Article
Competing principles of agency
organization – the reorganization
of a reform
Tom Christensen
University of Oslo, Norway
Per Lægreid
University of Bergen, Norway
Abstract
This article analyses the changing principles of structural organization of the govern-
mental agencies in the welfare administration in Norway. Through the use of
instrumentally oriented organization theory and empirical data based in public docu-
ments and interviews, we analyse how welfare administration changes through the
implementation process when organizational principles are rebalanced based on chan-
ging actor patterns, negotiations and path dependencies. The study illustrates that
contradictions and complexities in organizational design are enduring features of
public sector organizations.
Points for practitioners
Administrative reforms may change during the implementation process and are often
multi-dimensional because interests and organizational principles are rebalanced when
bureaucrats implement what politicians have decided. It seems to be difficult to find
a stable balance between different principles of specialization, and specialization
increases the need for coordination. Administrative reforms are not only about internal
administration but are also a political process where political, administrative and
professional logics clash and are balanced and rebalanced. Organizational structures
are not only about efficiency but also tend to favour some processes, ideas, clients,
users and actors over others.
Keywords
administrative reform, coordination, implementation, Norway, partnership,
specialization, welfare administration
Corresponding author:
Per Lægreid, Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Email: per.lagreid@aorg.uib.no
Introduction
Administrative reforms are normally characterized by intrinsic constraints, dilem-
mas, limitations, trade-offs and paradoxes (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The prin-
ciples of organizational design tend to come in contradictory pairs (Hood and
Jackson, 1991; Peters, 1998; Simon, 1946) and administrative reforms often
happen in cycles and waves (Talbot and Johnson, 2007). Modernization of the
state implies both integration and specialization, and to achieve its intended effects
a reform needs to balance these partly competing reform measures (Margetts et al.,
2012). Bouckaert et al. (2010) argue that there seems to be a stimulus–response
pattern between specialization and coordination.
Thus public sector organizations are complex multi-functional entities trying to
balance partly contradictory goals and considerations (Perrow, 1972). This seems
to be a systemic feature of public sector organizations that needs to be taken
into consideration when reorganizing the administrative apparatus, rather than
regarding it as a disease that must be eliminated. Trying to find one best way of
organizing based on a ‘one size fits all’ approach is normally not a successful
reform strategy, partly because administrative reforms are often a political exercise
with rather ambiguous roots in organizational or management theory (Peters,
1998). We need to understand the competing principles, institutional complexity
and the coexistence and mixes of different organizational forms (Brunsson and
Olsen, 1998).
Modern reforms in the welfare administration often have rather general goals
such as increasing efficiency, increasing user attention, improving quality of ser-
vices, etc. Such goals seldom produce unambiguous guidelines for how to organize
or reorganize public services, and therefore corresponding reforms tend to result in
a rather varied design of public sector agencies. One reason for this is that there is a
layering process going on in public organizations (Streck and Thelen, 2005), where
traditional Weberian features are combined with elements from the NPM and post-
NPM reform waves, resulting in complexity and hybrids of the most important
principles of structural design. This may give the executive leadership more flexi-
bility in dealing with diverse interests and considerations, but may also potentially
further conflicts and ambiguity.
The focus in this article will be on the following research questions:
1. What are the principles of structural organization of governmental agencies
evident in the welfare administrative reform adopted by Norway in 2005?
2. How was this complex mix of organizational principles affected by the reorgan-
ization of the reform in 2008?
3. How can we explain the changes in or rebalancing of the competing principles in
the different phases of the welfare administrative reform?
The main argument in the article is that reorganization of the welfare adminis-
trative reform shows how through implementation bureaucratic leaders change the
balance of organization principles originally decided on by the politicians, making
580 International Review of Administrative Sciences 78(4)
To continue reading
Request your trial