COMPROMISE WITH THE MARKET: THE MEGAW REPORT ON CIVIL SERVICE PAY 1982
| Date | 01 March 1983 |
| Author | GEOFFREY K. FRY |
| Published date | 01 March 1983 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1983.tb00504.x |
90
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
a cash provision which has highly uncertain implications in terms of what can be
purchased, with little guidance from the Government on likely movements in
costs and prices. The one thing which they will usually be able to count on is a
growing squeeze on real expenditure, unless by chance the Government grossly
miscalculates future inflation. These circumstances
do
not
seem best suited to
encourage rational long-term planning. Indeed it is likely that spending
authorities will be increasingly reluctant to enter into long-term commitments
which they may not be able to fulfil when the time comes, and that they will attach
increasing importance to being able to adjust expenditure at short notice in order
to keep within their cash provision. The Government may choose to interpret this
kind
of
response as synonymous with improved efficiency. In reality
it
will be
surprising
if
services do not suffer as a result and if meaningful public expenditure
planning of the
PESC
variety survives for very long.
TERRY WARD
Department
of
Applied Economics, University
of
Cambridge
Specialist Adviser
to
the Treasury and Civil Service Committee
REFERENCES
Treasury. 1981.
Economic
progress
report.
London:
HMSO.
_.
1982a.
The
governnient's expenditure plans
1982-83
to
2984-85.
Cmnd. 8494. London:
HMSO.
_.
1982b.
Autumn
statement.
London:
HMSO.
Treasury and Civil Service Committee. 1982a.
The
government's expendifirre
pinns
2982-83
to
2984-85.
_.
1982b.
Budgetary
reform.
Session 1981-82, sixth report. London:
HMSO
Session 1981-82, fifth report. London:
HMSO.
COMPROMISE WITH THE MARKET:
THE
MEGAW REPORT
ON
CIVIL
SERVICE PAY
1982
The civil service pay system designed by the Priestley Royal Commission of
1953-55 was sentenced to death by the Thatcher Conservative Government in
October 1980, just before its twenty-fifth birthday. For the Government, if not the
main body of the civil service, it was a merciful release. The results of the
operations of the civil service Pay Research Unit
(PRU),
the heart of the Priestley
system, had not been to the liking of governments, Labour or Conservative, since
the end of the Macmillan-Home era. Despite the scale of public expenditure
involved in the pay
of
over half a million civil servants and the example that set,
the Priestley system had been designed to be 'outside politics', and ministers had
been excluded from the pay research cycle until near its end. It was at the point of
implementation that the trouble usually started, and what the civil service unions
called 'government interference' occurred.
B.
A.
Gillman, General Secretary
of
the
Society of Civil and Public Servants, complained in 1980:
Only once.. ..between 1964 and now have we been able to secure a
PRU
increase
that has not been interfered with by Government. In 1968 the
PRU
increase was
Public Administration
Vol.
61
Spring 1983 (90-96)
0
1983 Royal Institute
of
Public Administration
To continue reading
Request your trial