Constitutional Law (Third Edition)
| Published date | 01 June 1946 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1946.tb01952.x |
| Date | 01 June 1946 |
Reviews
Constitutional
Law
(Third
Edition).
By
E.
C.
S.
WADE
and
G.
GODFREY
PHILLIPS.
(Longmans.)
25s.
THE
third edition
of
this work will receive that general welcome which has been
shown to its predecessors. In one volume the main principles
of
British
Constitutional Law and Practice are,
on
the whole, clearly described and discussed.
In spite of
s
few blemishes it is the best book of its type on the subject.
In
writing on the British Constitution there is a danger
of
over-emphasising
its
legal aspects. The authors
on
the whole avoid
this
danger except possibly in
the chapter on Parliamentary supremacy. The legislative acts
of
one Parliament
may, by having created different conditions, make
it
difficult for a successor
to reverse those acts or make any fundamental changes. Again, Parliament will
in practice be limited in what it can do by whether a proposal can be effectively
administered. These are obvious limitations on its power, but they should never-
theless be stated, particularly
at
a time when
so
many people are inclined to
over-stress the practical power of Parliament.
In the evolution
of
modem policy consultation with interests which may be
affected is becoming more common.
The
authors stress that “no dictation to
Parliament must
be
tolerated.” But what constitutes dictation? Can it be said
that
the medical profession has
“
dictated
”
and thereby secured a modification
of
the original proposals for a national health service? Did the trade unions
“
dictate
”
to secure the repeal of the ‘Trades Disputes Act,
1927?
It
is felt that
the authors should have been a little more explicit
on
this
point and have avoided
an ambiguity
so
readily accepted in many quarters. The authors claim that the
practice of consultation has
been
one of the factors which have discouraged any
rival to Parliament in
the
form
of
functional devolution, but by introducing
this
point in its present context (page
43)
a wrong significance has been given
to
it.
The establishment of an economic parliament has not been prevented primarily
by the practice
of
consultation, but by the difficulty
of
evolving a workable separa-
tion of powers
between
a political pariiament and an economic parlianent.
With the extension of the functions
of
government
the
position of the
technical and professional staf€s
in
tbe Civil Service will need reconsideration.
At
present they occupy “a status inferior
to
their equivalent
in
rank in the
administrative grade.”
It
is doubtful “whether under modern conditions the
administrator is capable of sustaining the burden which
is
placed
upon
him by
the complexity
of
the issues, where specialised knowledge is required in the
formation of
a
judgment.”
To
take merely one example,
an
administrator
untrained
in
economics and statistics, would, to say the least, have difficulty in
forming a judgment on
the
matters involved in operating
the
proposals contained
in the White Paper
on
Employment Policy.
To
provide adequate economic and
statistical advice the services of economists and statisticians have been retained in
the Cabinet Offices, but it remains to be
seen
whether their
opinions,
when in
conflict with Treasury views, will
be
acted upon.
The nationalisation
of
public
utility
services and certain basic industries
emphasises the need to re-examine the relationship between Parliament and the
operating
bodies.
In
the past,
the
main
motives
for
entrusting functions
to
bodies
not directly responsible
to
Parliament have been, first the desire to keep a service,
particularly when it is concerned with the administration
of
State benefits,
out
of
politics and, secondly,
the
desire
to
avoid bureaucratic intervention
in
the
day to day
running
of a public utility service or nationalised industry.
In
general,
134
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