Contempt of Court, the Internet and Court Reporting
| Author | Matthew Richardson |
| Pages | 201-214 |
Chapter 7
Contempt of Court, the Internet and Court Reporting
7.1 CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT
Criminal contempt of court
[…] although criminal contempts of court may take a variety of forms they all share a common characteristic: they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of court, not the individual court or judge who is attempting to administer it.
Contempts of court fall into two categories, those that are committed ‘in the face of the court’ (e.g. disrupting proceedings in court) or those committed ‘constructively’ outside court (e.g. publishing information about ongoing proceedings which tends to pervert the course of justice). All courts exercising a judicial function of state are protected by the law of contempt of court, although the power to deal with contempts of court is limited to specific courts.
Contempts of court are either dealt with summarily
3132) (CPR).
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contempt of court on indictment is now defunct.
7.1.1 Elements of the offence
As stated in Attorney General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 400 (see para 7.1), the actus reus of contempt of court is extremely broad and can encompass such acts as the disruption of court proceedings, failure to pay court fines, publishing material likely to pervert the course of justice and insulting the tribunal. Whatever the act, it satisfies the actus reus of the offence if it involves interference with the due administration of justice.
Where the alleged contempt of court is contempt by publication, the statutory provisions of the CCA 1981 apply. Section 1 creates a strict liability rule with regard to contempts by publication, with subsequent sections 2–4 limiting the scope of the strict liability rule and providing the defence of fair and accurate contemporaneous reporting of proceedings.
There was previously some ambiguity about whether the strict liability rule under the statutory contempt of court extended to other, non-statutory forms of contempt of court. The elements of the offence of contempt of court at common law were defined categorically by the Administrative Division in Attorney General v Davey, Attorney General v Beard [2013] EWHC 2317 (Admin), a case regarding
alleged contempt of court by jurors. Prior to their judgment in the case, the court gave the following précis of the law in this area:
The law in relation to proof of contempt at common law is well settled. First the Attorney General must prove to the criminal standard of proof that the respondent had committed an act or omission calculated to interfere with or prejudice the due administration of justice; conduct is calculated to interfere with or prejudice the due administration of justice if there is a real risk, as opposed to a remote possibility, that interference or prejudice would result: see Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd. [1992] 1 AC 191; Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd. [1974] AC 273.
Second an intent to interfere with or prejudice the administration of justice must also be proved. In AG v Newspaper Publishing Ltd. [1988] Ch 333 Lord Donaldson MR at page 374 said of the requisite intent: ‘[…] the power of the court to commit for contempt where the conduct complained of is specifically intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice. Such an intent need not be expressly avowed or admitted, but can be inferred from all the circumstances, including the foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct. Nor need it be the sole intention of the contemnor. An intent is to be distinguished from motive or desire […]’ In the same case Lloyd LJ made clear that there was no room for a state of mind which fell short of intention. He continued at page 383 by saying: ‘[…] that intent may exist, even though there is no desire to interfere with the course of justice. Nor need it be the sole intent. It may be inferred, even though there is no overt proof. The more obvious the interference with the course of justice, the more readily will the requisite intent be inferred.’
More recently in Attorney General v Dallas [2012] 1 WLR 991, a case where a juror had conducted her own research on the internet, Lord Judge CJ set out at paragraph 38 four elements which would ordinarily establish the two elements of contempt in cases where there had been deliberate disobedience to a judge’s direction or order. i) The juror knew that the judge had directed that the jury should not do a certain act.
ii) The juror appreciated that that was an order. iii) The juror deliberately disobeyed the order. iv) By doing so the juror risked prejudicing the due administration of justice.
7.1.2 Sentencing of contempts of court
Given the wide array of potential acts which fall under common law and statutory contempts of court, there is no unified sentencing guideline which is applicable across the board. However, section 14 of the CCA 1981 provides the following:
(1) In any case where a court has power to commit a person to prison for contempt of court and (apart from this provision) no limitation applies to the period of
LJ at [2]–[4].
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committal, the committal shall (without prejudice to the power of the court to order his earlier discharge) be for a fixed term, and that term shall not on any occasion exceed two years in the case of committal by an inferior court.
(2) In any case where an inferior court has power to fine a person for contempt of court and (apart from this provision)...
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