Controlling the Madrinas: The Police Informer Management and Control System in Mexico
| Author | Gustavo Fondevila |
| Published date | 01 June 2013 |
| Date | 01 June 2013 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1350/pojo.2013.86.2.624 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
GUSTAVO FONDEVILA
CIDE, Mexico
CONTROLLING THE MADRINAS:
THE POLICE INFORMER
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
SYSTEM IN MEXICO
One of the most relevant issues concerning snitching in the
criminal information system of any police organisation is its
control. This article analyses the different ways in which the
Mexican Judicial Police exert control over their informants.
Utilising a mixed qualitative methodology of research, in-
depth interviews and ethnographic work, this article elaborates
a taxonomy of police informant control constructed from a
diverse array of particular tools, both informal (personal and
impersonal) and formal (impersonal), that are determined by
three variables: type of contact, personal characteristics of the
informant and criminal environment.
Keywords: police informant; criminal information system;
control
Introduction
Investigative police forces usually systematically receive in-
formation on criminal activities through some kind of informer
system (Oscapella, 1980; Hall, 1986). Any police or judicial
official knows it is impossible to carry out police intelligence
work in the absence of information (Schuberg, 1992), and people
do not always have that information, or are not willing to give it
to the police, because of implied risks (Mount, 1990) or simply
because of a lack of trust (Hogg, 1987; Manning & Redlinger,
1977; Temby, 1991). At the same time, it is almost impossible to
speak of ‘proactive law enforcement’ without having access to
confidential and inside information on crimes, and this informa-
tion can only be obtained from informers (Karchmer, 1977: 28;
Parker, 1986). To be able to obtain certain strategic information,
it is necessary either to have informers in the criminal under-
world itself or to have covert agents infiltrate the criminal world.
There are entire areas of police activity that basically operate on
the information supplied by informers who are involved in the
same criminal activities which they are informing the police
about. This especially occurs in the case of trafficking and
116 The Police Journal, Volume 86 (2013)
DOI: 10.1350/pojo.2013.86.2.624
illegally selling drugs (Skolnick, 1975: 121–4; Weinstein,
1999).
This implies many dangers, because: (a) the information may
be false; (b) the information may endanger the lives of the agents
involved in operations based on that information; (c) the
information might be biased, for example, informing only about
rival gangs, and the police would then take on the role of
mediator in the criminal market (Natapoff, 2004: 671–2;
Curriden, 1995); (d) said informers might also be passing on
information to criminals, which means that, to a certain degree,
they also infiltrate police activities; or (e) informers can pass on
the information to other public security agencies, which could
cause problems in the lines of communication between the
different police forces, and so on (there is also the possibility of
police officers passing on information to various criminal
groups, but this variant will not be analysed here). And how can
these risks be eliminated or reduced? The premise of this paper
is that police officers develop informal and discreet mechanisms
to manage and control their sources of information. In other
words, police informer systems are not self-regulated, nor do
they operate spontaneously; they are managed by relatively
complex organisational mechanisms that make it possible to
classify them and develop a taxonomy for them. It seems clear
that one of the core issues of the criminal information system is
how it is controlled. Within the sphere of police activity, it is
impossible to separate the matter of producing and generating
information from the problem of controlling it. There are
innumerable variations of each regulation for controlling
informers, ranging from strictly formal and legal ones (judicial
or police) to informal and personal ones.
This essay will analyse the different forms of unofficial
control over police informers in Mexico. The control over the
information provided by said informers, institutional police con-
trol over its own agents, as well as judicial and legislative control
in the matter, is not included (in Mexico, such controls are
almost non-existent). This work focuses on a specific case under
study: the judicial police that report to Ministerios Públicos
(Public Prosecutors) and are in charge of investigating all types
of crime (Mexican Constitution, 2009: Art 21). They do police
intelligence work and have a complex informer system. Mexico
has the largest police force in Latin America in terms of numbers
and funding. Because of its inadequate professionalisation (the
use of scientific investigation methods), the lack of a pro-
fessional police infiltration system (undercover agents) and
The Police Journal, Volume 86 (2013) 117
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