Convergent or divergent Europeanization? An analysis of higher education governance reforms in France and Italy
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852315580498 |
| Published date | 01 March 2017 |
| Date | 01 March 2017 |
| Author | Michael Dobbins |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Review of
Administrative
Article
Sciences
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
2017, Vol. 83(1) 177–199
Convergent or divergent
! The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
Europeanization? An analysis
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020852315580498
of higher education governance
journals.sagepub.com/home/ras
reforms in France and Italy
Michael Dobbins
Goethe University of Frankfurt, Germany
Abstract
This article comparatively examines the higher education reform pathways of France
and Italy. Using a scheme of empirical indicators, I focus on the divergent and conver-
gent developments in these two countries, which played a pioneering role in the
Europeanization of higher education. While France has consistently moved closer to
a market-oriented model, legacies of academic self-rule were initially strengthened in
Italy, before recent reforms aimed to crack down on academic power abuses. To explain
these policy pathways, I pursue a dual theoretical argument by linking institutional
isomorphism with historical institutionalism.
Points for practitioners
The article examines the changing structures of higher education management and
administration in France and Italy. It focuses on the new roles attributed to the state,
university leaders and external stakeholders, and addresses whether both systems have
converged on a market-oriented paradigm. I explain how and why various new com-
petitive steering instruments were introduced. The analysis should be of interest to
both scholars and practitioners due to its focus on new power arrangements in quality
assurance, university administration and research governance.
Keywords
Europeanization, France, higher education governance, internationalization, Italy,
marketization
Introduction
Research has increasingly addressed whether intense transnational interlinkages
have triggered changes in higher education (HE) policies (Martens et al., 2010;
Corresponding author:
Michael Dobbins, Goethe University of Frankfurt, Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz, Frankfurt am Main 60629, Germany.
Email: Dobbins@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
178
International Review of Administrative Sciences 83(1)
Vo¨gtle et al., 2011). In particular, since the Bologna Process was launched in 1999,
strategies to make European HE institutions more efficient and transparent have
spread throughout Europe. This article examines the HE reform pathways of two
initiators of the Bologna Process – France and Italy – both of which have under-
taken significant reforms driven by Europeanization, globalization and overarching
public sector reforms.
I first explore how Europeanization and internationalization may stimulate
policy change and present three HE ideal-types. The case studies show that
highly different governance models initially evolved in these two countries despite
their pioneering role in the Europeanization of HE, manifest internationalization
effects and a strong desire for policy change. While France consistently moved
closer to a ‘market-oriented model’, legacies of ‘academic self-rule’ were initially
strengthened in Italy. To explain these different pathways, I link institutional
isomorphism with historical institutionalism. Policy change is conceived as a tug
of war between international reform stimuli and historical legacies and actor con-
stellations. Against this background, I show how external isomorphic pressures
were channelled through historical institutions, leading to different outcomes,
before recent reforms partially chipped away at academic self-rule in Italy.
‘Soft governance’ and Europeanization: mechanisms of change
Faced with high drop-out rates, graduate unemployment, long study durations
and brain-drain, European governments seemed no longer capable of meeting
21st-century HE policy challenges. In 1998, the ministers responsible for education
in Italy, France, Germany and Great Britain agreed in the so-called Sorbonne
Declaration to harmonize the architecture of European HE systems. Initiated
one year later, the Bologna Process established a European platform for the
joint coordination of HE matters with the aim of harmonizing study structures,
promoting academic mobility, expanding quality assurance and increasing univer-
sity autonomy (Witte, 2006). Additional objectives such as broadening stakehol-
dership, enhancing the social dimension and promoting employability were
included later.
Unlike other Europeanization processes, the Bologna Process is based on ‘soft’
governance mechanisms as national policymakers voluntarily set common stand-
ards as benchmarks for national reforms. However, recent research has shown that
intense transnational communication can trigger significant national policy change
– even without binding sanction mechanisms (Vo¨gtle et al., 2011). As Bologna is
primarily concerned with study structures and quality assurance, the question
emerges as to how it may impact HE governance. First, it can be seen as the
European response to other change-promoting developments, such as the know-
ledge society, demographics, stagnating economies and globalization. Second,
national decision-makers are increasingly under external pressure to increase the
attractiveness of their HE systems. Subsequently, Bologna may be exploited
Dobbins
179
by policymakers to legitimize domestic reforms exceeding its original scope. Third,
the European Commission has become an important HE player (Batory and
Lindstrom, 2011) and explicitly advocates market-oriented instruments, such as
funding
diversification,
business–HE
linkages
and
university
autonomy
(European Commission, 2006). Particularly noteworthy are its efforts to link
Bologna with the Lisbon Process, which aimed to make the European Union
(EU) the world’s ‘most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy’
by 2010 (Martens et al., 2007: 9). Finally, Bologna has further institutionalized
‘governance by comparison’ (Martens et al., 2010) with its benchmarking activities
and prompted policymakers to focus on international rankings.
I argue that institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) is well-suited
to explain contemporary reform dynamics. Accordingly, the quest for legitimacy
(and not efficiency) is the main driver of domestic reforms. To secure their survival,
organizations align themselves with norms perceived as successful in their organ-
izational environment. Instead of developing their own solutions, they strive to
enhance their legitimacy through policy emulation. A tightly knit environment like
Bologna can promote the diffusion of policy models (e.g. market-oriented HE
instruments), while the transnationalization of HE has exerted isomorphic pres-
sures on policymakers to justify their HE systems amid international scrutiny and
competition.
However, domestic institutions are also decisive for national reactions to inter-
national stimuli. Historical institutionalism assumes that policy developments are
strongly conditioned by embedded legacies and structures (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
The historical-institutional context can substantially influence the direction and
speed of national reactions to international pressures. Global trends may be
‘digested’ differently in varying contexts, whereby interest constellations (e.g. the
role of the academic community, state steering capacity) and opportunity struc-
tures can be crucial.
From these differing angles, this article examines how transnational pressures
have influenced French and Italian HE governance. However, it is often difficult to
disentangle internationalization/Europeanization effects from domestic reforms.
As part of the public sector, HE has also been targeted by administrative reforms
aimed at decentralization and accountability. I therefore assume that internation-
alization/Europeanization effects may feed into parallel domestic reforms and dis-
tinguish between the pre-Bologna and post-Bologna phases in the empirical
analyses. This enables us to assess whether intensified transnational communica-
tion has added new reform dynamics. The analysis is based on process tracing
(George and Bennett, 2005) through the analysis of HE legislation, policy docu-
ments and national press articles. The findings were enriched by primary and sec-
ondary sources, including interviews with education unions and university
representatives. Policy developments were traced between two benchmark years –
1998 and 2013 – which enables us to cover all major HE legislation, including the
more recent reforms in Italy.
180
International Review of Administrative Sciences 83(1)
Ideal-types of HE governance
To comparatively trace policy changes, I distinguish three governance models
(Clark, 1983; Dobbins et al., 2011; Olsen, 2007). In the state-centred model, uni-
versities are state-regulated institutions with limited autonomy. As reflected in
Clark’s (1983) triangle, the role of the ‘academic oligarchy’ and markets is limited.
The state functions as a ‘guardian’ and actively influences internal matters, such as
curricula, admissions, funding, quality assurance and university–business relations
(Neave and Van Vught, 1991). The state engages in process control to ensure that
universities meet national priorities (Olsen, 2007). State-centred systems generally
take an input-based funding approach by linking funding to staff and student num-
bers. The state allocates itemized funds, while institutions have little monetary
discretion (Jongbloed, 2003: 122). Quality assurance is generally based on the
ex ante plausibility that...
To continue reading
Request your trial