Coopetition in a merger process: Regulators and management of coopetitive tensions
| Author | Anne-Sophie Thelisson |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00208523211034667 |
| Published date | 01 June 2023 |
| Date | 01 June 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Coopetition in a merger
process: Regulators and
management of
coopetitive tensions
Anne-Sophie Thelisson
Institute of Sustainable Business and Organizations, Sciences
and Humanities Confluence Research Center - UCLY, ESDES,
France
Abstract
Coopetitive tensions can arise as strategic decisions are imposed on firms that challenge
them to pursue competition and collaboration with other organizations. Regulators—
such as the state—can interfere in merger strategies. Using a longitudinal case study,
the objective of the study is: (1) to analyze which regulators influence coopetitive tensions
in a merger process (including negotiation and integration stages); and (2) to explore how
coopetitive tensions are coped with during the process. We found that the state and cus-
tomers have architectural roles as regulators during the process (negotiation period, deal,
and integration process). We explore coopetition paradox management at different levels
(interorganizational, organizational, and individual levels) over the merger process.
Points for practitioners
Our study sheds light on tensions experienced by managers with conflicting identities at
the beginning of the integration and on the way they coped with such tensions. Indeed,
our study shed lights on the integration principle as managers were able to transcend the
paradox in their decisions and actions implemented at the organizational level through
reorganizing the organization and favoring tandem teams and joint piloting.
Keywords
Coopetition, French state, integration process, longitudinal case study, merger
Corresponding author:
Anne-SophieThelisson, Institute ofSustainable Business and Organizations, Confluence: Scienceset Humanités—
Université Catholique de Lyon, ESDES, 10, Place des Archives, F-69288 Lyon, France.
Email: asthelisson@univ-catholyon.fr
Article
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
International Review of Administrative
Sciences
2023, Vol. 89(2) 381–397
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/00208523211034667
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Introduction
The paradoxical pursuit of coopetition and cooperation, termed “coopetition”(Nalebuff
and Brandenburg, 1996), includes interdependency and mutual enrichment from such
simultaneous strategies. Therefore, coopetition cannot exist without an interface between
the conflicting tensions of cooperation and competition (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Le Roy
and Czakon, 2016; Raza-Ullah, 2020). Paradox theory (Smith and Lewis, 2011) enables
coopetition to beunderstood as tensions combiningcompetition and/or cooperationat spe-
cific moments, withi n specific geographical or functional areas (Fernandez and
Chiambaretto,2016; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014).Regarding the managementof these tensions,
authors refer to separation—that is, the spatial, functional, or geographical separation of
competition and collaboration (Bengtsson and Kock, 1999;Herzog, 2010)—or integration
principles—based on the ability of actors to integrate collaboration and competition in their
decisions (Chen,2008; Das and Teng, 2000; Gnyawaliand Park, 2011)—or a combination
of both (e.g. Fernandez and Chiambaretto, 2016;Fernandez et al., 2014; Seranet al., 2016).
While previous studies opposed the separation principle and the integration principle
(Bengtsson and Kock, 1999; Chen, 2008; Das and Teng, 2000; Herzog, 2010),
Fernandez et al. (2014) and Fernandez and Chiambaretto (2016) reconcile these two
principles. Fernandez and Chiambaretto (2016) demonstrate that in the context of a
coopetitive project, the combination of these two principles can be achieved by
coping with tensions related to information through a combination of formal and infor-
mal control mechanisms. Fernandez et al. (2014) highlight how coopetitive tensions
interfere at three levels (i.e. inter-organizational, organizational, and inter-individual)
and demonstrate that their management is based on the combination of the separation
and the integration principles. Coopetition scholars encourage studies to gain deeper
insights into how the separation and integration principles can be combined at different
levels (Fernandez and Chiambaretto, 2016; Fernandez et al., 2014; Le Roy and
Fernandez, 2015) and over time (Chou and Zolkiewski, 2018).
Most of the studies on coopetition deal with coopetition between organizations
(Bengtsson and Kock, 1999; Bouncken et al., 2020). A few studies have focused on
coopetition within firms (e.g. Chiambaretto et al., 2019; Luo et al., 2006; Seran et al.,
2016; Tippmann et al., 2018). The issue of the interaction of external and internal coope-
tition has not been addressed, though they appear to be linked, especially in mergers and
acquisitions (M&As). As underlined by Mariani (2018), the unit of analysis of studies is
often focused on actors. However, external factors and stakeholders can influence coope-
titive strategies (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah, 2016). Coopetition can evolve over time
through triggers such as changes in the industry or the institutional environment
(Bengtsson and Kock, 1999; Dahl, 2014; Mariani, 2007). Few studies have focused on
coopetitive tensions in the M&A process; however, merger or acquisition negotiations
and the integration process cannot be summed up as inclusive of only competitive tensions
(Das and Teng, 2000). Especially when regulators interfere in M&A activities, coopetitive
tensions arise as strategic operations are imposed on firms (Mariani, 2018; Tidström, 2014).
Also, post-merger integration is recognized as a challenging period involving divergent
forces within the internal boundaries of the organization (Steigenberger, 2017). To our
382 International Review of Administrative Sciences 89(2)
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