Copyright in the networked world: orphaned copyrights
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/07378830510621838 |
| Published date | 01 September 2005 |
| Pages | 453-459 |
| Date | 01 September 2005 |
| Author | Michael Seadle |
| Subject Matter | Information & knowledge management,Library & information science |
ON COPYRIGHT
Copyright in the networked
world: orphaned copyrights
Michael Seadle
Systems and Digital Services, Michigan State University, East Lansing,
Michigan, USA
Abstract
Purpose – This column aims to look at the results of the US Copyright Office’s request for comments
about orphan copyrights.
Design/methodology/approach – It uses a form of Game Theory called the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game to analyze the comments that are available on the Copyright Office web site.
Findings – Some change seems likely, if only because the opponents of change may discover that
they can gain more for themselves when they stop defending the interests of those who have
abandoned their copyrights already.
Practical implications – If some form of cooperation between intellectual property consumers and
rights holders could be worked out for orphan copyrights, it might lead to further “tit-for-tat” reactions
that help to address other copyright issues.
Originality/value – Provides useful information on orphan copyrights.
Keywords Copyright law, Internet, Publishing
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
According to the copyright law in every country that signed the Berne Treaty, which
includes virtually every country in the world, the copyright holder has the exclusive
right to give permission for copies of a work to be made and distributed. But what
happens when the person wishing to make a copy cannot locate the rights holder to
request a permission? This is the essence of the “orphaned copyright” problem .
The causes vary. Some rights holders in effect abandon their copyrights when they
no longer have (or appear to have) any economic value. Other rights holders are hard to
find. Some rights holders merely appear to be hard to find when they do not respond to
requests because the probable cost in time and trouble of responding is greater than the
expected amount the requestor would likely pay. And some requestors lack the means
or skill to do a thorough search for the rights holders.
This column analyzes the orphaned copyright issue presented in the US Federal
Register of 2 January 2005 using a game theory technique called the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Game theory is widely used in economic research. As in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the orphaned copyright situation offers two competing parties: the rights
holder, and the person or institution wanting to use the work. Game theory helps to
understand when and where collaboration makes sense, and what the consequences of
non-cooperation are.
The Emerald Research Register for this journal is available at The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister www.emeraldinsight.com/0737-8831.htm
Copyright in the
networked world
453
Received 18 June 2005
Revised 19 June 2005
Accepted 19 June 2005
Library Hi Tech
Vol. 23 No. 3, 2005
pp. 453-459
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
0737-8831
DOI 10.1108/07378830510621838
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