Corruption in migration management: a network perspective
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852317753528 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Corruption in migration
management: a network
perspective
Daniela Pianezzi
Essex University, UK
Giuseppe Grossi
Nord University Business School, Norway
Abstract
This article explores the relation between networks as an emerging mode of public
governance and corruption. Adopting the theoretical lens of actor-network theory,
the article investigates an Italian episode of corruption related to the awarding of
government contracts for the management of Mineo’s CARA, Europe’s largest
reception centre for migrants. The analysis shows that a governance network may
turn corruption itself into a network where abuse of power can proliferate thanks
to the opacity resulting from the multiplicity of actors, interactions and fragmentation
characterizing the governance system.
Points for practitioners
The article develops an analysis useful to foster the effectiveness of anti-corruption
strategies by analysing the criticalities of the governance system implemented by the
Italian government to deal with migration inflows. In so doing, the article offers relevant
insights to policymakers and national and European institutions.
Keywords
actor-network theory, governance network, migration, translation
Corresponding author:
Daniela Pianezzi, Essex University, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK.
Email: dp17680@essex.ac.uk
International Review of Administrative
Sciences
2020, Vol. 86(1) 152–168
!The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852317753528
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Introduction
The last decades have witnessed the rise of horizontal networks of private, public
and non-profit organizations in charge of translating public policies into practice
(Kooiman, 2003). This ‘governance network’ (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004) is
expected to strengthen efficiency and democratic participation (Klijn and
Skelcher, 2007; Sarker, 2003), ultimately leading to solving complex social prob-
lems, such as corruption. Indeed, a growing number of authors share the same
faith in the public goodness of a ‘hollow state’ (Milward and Provan, 2000) and
indicate the downsizing of the economic role of the state as a potential anti-
corruption strategy (Khanal, 2000; Klitgaard, 1994; Rose-Ackerman and Stone,
1996; Schloss, 1998).
This article argues that rather than enabling democratic control, a governance
network might produce an unclear chain of responsibility and a diffused lack of
accountability (Argyriades, 2006; Farazmand, 2002; Haque, 2000; Jolley, 2008;
Von Maravic and Reichard, 2003), so increasing the opportunity for a corrupt
exercise of power. As a case in point for analysing the pitfalls of a governance
network, we focus on a corruption episode of the big Italian scandal ‘Mafia
Capitale’, which uncovered a network running back over many years involving
criminals, businesspeople and local politicians. The main protagonist of this
episode is Luca Odevaine, member of the National Table for Emergency on
Migration Policy, who was convicted for having illicitly influenced the tender-
awarding process for Europe’s largest reception centre for migrants (CARA) of
Mineo (Sicily) in exchange for money.
The article draws from the theoretical approach of actor-network theory (ANT)
(Callon and Latour, 1981; Latour, 2005) to describe the unfolding of the case,
thereby explaining the emergence of networks of corruption in terms of a transla-
tion process (Callon, 1986a, 1986b) where a variety of actors and power relations
come into play. The analysis investigates the relation between a governance net-
work and corruption, and the role of the resulting corrupt networks in distorting
administrative outcomes, with public money being allocated to serve the interests
of a few.
The article is organized as follows. The next section offers an overview of the
research topic. The third section describes the theoretical lens applied. The fourth
section describes the methods, and the final sections develop the case analysis and
present discussion and conclusions.
Corruption and a governance network
Corruption has been the focus of an extensive literature (Everett et al., 2006;
Graycar and Monaghan, 2015; Graycar and Villa, 2011; Rose-Ackerman
and Stone, 1996; Sikka and Lehman, 2015; Vannucci, 2012). Suggesting that a
calculative logic is at the roots of corruptive behaviour, Becker (1968) was
among the first to emphasize the economic dimension of corruption (see also
Pianezzi and Grossi 153
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