Criminal Law and Practice in Scotland

Published date01 October 1949
Date01 October 1949
DOI10.1177/0032258X4902200403
Subject MatterArticle
258
THE
POLICE
JOURNAL
get into
the
car there,
but
he need
not
do so.
If
a car is hired to
meet
someone at a railway station, it has to come to
the
station from
the
garage where it is kept.
If
it does so, it is supplied direct from the
garage.
Criminal Law and Practice in Scotland
"
LONGER
THAN
IS
NECESSARY"
Marr v. Turpie
SEC T ION 381, subsection 10, of
the
Burgh Police (Scotland) Act,
1892, penalises any person who causes any cart or carriage to
stand
in a street longer
than
is necessary for loading or unloading goods or
for taking up or setting down passengers or who by any means wilfully
causes an obstruction in a public thoroughfare.
These
provisions
had
already twice been
the
subject of judicial comment before they came
under
review in
the
case now reported. Some reference to
the
earlier
decisions is necessary for an appreciation of
the
import
of
the
case of
Marr v. Turpie.
In
the case of Watson v. Ross, 1920
J.e.
27, Sir Charles Watson,
K.B.E., was charged in
the
local police
court
that
between
the
hours
of 4
p.m.
and 5 p.m. on a Sunday he did allow a motor-car to
stand
in
the
street in James Square, Crieff, at a point opposite
the
Drummond
Arms Hotel, in contravention of
the
subsection above cited
and
was
found guilty.
He
sought to have his conviction
set
aside by a bill of
suspension presented to
the
High
Court of
Justiciary:
but
the
bill,
after a full argument, was refused.
In
dismissing
the
appeal,
the
judges held
that
the
complaint (which echoed
the
words of
the
sub-
section) was relevant
and
that
the
subsection applied to motor-cars.
They
rejected counsel's contention
that
the
subsection had, in its
application to motor vehicles, been displaced by
the
provisions of
the
Motor
Car Act, 1903.
On
one point,
however-whether
proof of obstruction was
essential to
conviction-the
court
left the
matter
somewhat " in
the
air"
and observations were made which were to raise difficulties in
the subsequent cases.
"We
were informed," said one of
the
judges,
" and I am glad to take notice of the fact,
that
obstruction was in point
of fact proved and it is
not
necessary here to express any view
upon
the question of
law-how
far it is necessary
that
obstruction should be
proved. Ishould
think
that
any wise magistrate would
think
twice
before he convicted,
under
such astatutory provision as this, unless
he saw good reason for convicting of an offence.
There
may be cir-
cumstances in which
the
exact literal wording of
the
statute might
be contravened although
the
circumstances plainly never would be

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