Dalton v Latham and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 16 April 2003 |
| Date | 16 April 2003 |
| Court | Chancery Division |
Court and Reference:High Court, Chancery Division ; HC 01C04389
Patten J
Appearances:J Holmes (instructed by Martin Cray & Co) for D; H Galley (instructed by Griffith Smith Conway) for several of the Defendants
Whether relief from forfeiture should be allowed when the killer suffered from a mental disorder.
D had lived in BM's house since 1987, apart from a period of 2-3 years in the 1990s. D's use of alcohol caused him to become aggressive and overbearing. However, 1996 BM was elderly and wanted to be able to continue to live in own home, which D made possible. There was significant expenditure of BM's funds on home improvements, expensive jewellery and foreign holidays, and his bank became sufficiently concerned that his account was frozen pending confirmation from a doctor that BM was capable of managing his own affairs. A letter was provided by a doctor, who concluded that she was not sure that his condition justified making him a patient under the control of the Court of Protection and had arranged for further tests. As a result, a joint power of attorney was executed, under which the account came to be controlled by D and BM's solicitor, though D was able to circumvent this to some extent. BM's growing confusion was exacerbated by a mild stroke.
D suffered from a predisposition to stress and anxiety. From September 1998, he had given up drinking and was prescribed anti-depressants, which he took until about 2 months before BM's death. In October 2000, D attempted suicide by taking 2 months' worth of tablets at once. Although he recovered without medical assistance, he decided not to obtain replacement pills until the prescription was due in mid-December. In the meantime he resumed drinking.
On 9 or 10 December 2000, D killed BM; he admitted manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility and was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment. The psychiatric evidence was that he suffered from an abnormality of mind, an adjustment disorder which produced a predisposition or inherent vulnerability to stress. The judge ruled that this was due to an inherent cause, as required under s. 2 Homicide Act 1957.
Apart from a small pecuniary legacy, D was the sole beneficiary of BM's estate (cash of 36,300 and a house given a probate value of 125,000), under a will made in 1996. He sought relief from the forfeiture rule, namely those who commit unlawful killings cannot benefit from the estates of their victims. Under the Forfeiture Act 1982, the court may grant relief against this rule if, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased, and to such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the case requires the rule of policy to be modified.
Introduction
1. Either very late on the evening of Saturday 9 December or in the early hours of Sunday 10 December 2000, the Claimant Dominic Dalton killed Bernard Murphy by strangling him. He was tried for murder at Lewes Crown Court, but on the 6thday of the trial, following psychiatric evidence, the trial Judge directed the jury to acquit him of murder on grounds of diminished responsibility. He was then convicted on his own plea of manslaughter and sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment.
2. Apart from a small pecuniary legacy, Mr Dalton was the sole beneficiary of the deceased's estate under a will made in 1996. Under the law as it currently stands, that interest was forfeited under the rule of public policy which precludes those who commit unlawful killings from benefiting from the estates of their victims. The consequences of that rule can, however, be displaced or modified under the provisions of the Forfeiture Act 1982by an order of the court. But such an order cannot be made unless the court is satisfied that, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased, and to such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the case requires the rule of policy to be modified.
3. The latest estate accounts show a cash balance of 36,300. To this must be added the single most valuable asset in the estate, which is Mr Murphy's former home at 15 Crown Street, Brighton. This was given a probate value of 125,000. Mr Dalton is likely to be released from prison at the end of this year. He wishes to resume occupation of 15 Crown Street, which he says has been his home since about 1987, apart from a break of about 2 to 3 years in the 1990's. His application for relief from forfeiture is opposed by members of Mr Murphy's family, only some of whom stand to benefit financially on an intestacy. Their evidence has been that they would feel affronted if the person who killed a well-loved brother and uncle were to benefit from his estate. At the end of the hearing, and with the agreement of both sides, I gave my decision and refused relief from forfeiture. I now give my reasons for that decision.
The Forfeiture Rule
4. The forfeiture rule is defined by s. 1(1) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 ("the 1982 Act") as "the rule of public policy which in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing". As those words indicate, the rule is of wide application in cases of unlawful killing. It is not limited to cases of murder, but applies also to manslaughter and to cases of assisted suicide. It is sometimes described as a rule which prevents the killer from profiting from his crime, but it is important to observe that it is not limited to cases in which the motive for, or purpose of, the killing was to obtain the benefit on death.
5. In Re Crippen [1911] P 108, Sir Samuel Evans P refused a grant of letters of administration in respect of Mrs Crippen's estate to the personal representatives of her husband, who by then had been tried and executed for her murder. The President stated that:
"It is clear that the law is, that no person can obtain, or enforce, any rights resulting to him from his own crime, neither can his representative, claiming under him, obtain or enforce any such rights. The human mind revolts at the very idea that any other doctrine could be possible in our system of jurisprudence."
In Re Hall [1914] P 1, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the rule applied equally to cases of involuntary manslaughter. Hamilton LJ expressed the view that to distinguish between murder and manslaughter in such cases would be:
"to encourage what, I am sure, would be very noxious - a sentimental speculation as to the motives and degree of moral guilt of a person who has been justly convicted and sent to prison."
6. This led Sir John Pennycuick V-C, in Re Giles[1972] Ch 544, to reject any attempt to limit the common law rule to cases involving real moral culpability. The case was one in which a wife had killed her husband with a single blow to the head and was convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. She was found to be suffering from a form of mental illness and was sent to Broadmoor under a hospital order made under s. 60 of the Mental Health Act 1959. At p552 of his judgment the Vice-Chancellor said this:
"In the present case, the widow was convicted pursuant to s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. It is contended, on her behalf, that such a conviction does not fall within the general principle laid down in the cases to which I have referred. On the face of it, it seems to me that such a conviction does plainly fall within the scope of that principle. The principle is, to use a summary expression of Lord Atkin in the Beresford case [1938] AC 586, 599 that the 'courts will not recognise a benefit accruing to a criminal from his crime'. It is accepted that a person convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility has indeed been convicted of a crime. Therefore, on the face of it, such a person in the present connection is in precisely the same position as anyone who was convicted of manslaughter under the law as it stood before the introduction of the Homicide Act 1957.And the cases have established beyond question that a person so convicted of manslaughter is disqualified from taking a benefit under the will or intestacy of the person whom he has killed.
Mr Whitehead for the widow, has sought to exclude these cases of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility from the scope of the principle. What he contends is that the principle, only applies to crime deserving of punishment or, to use another phrase, crime carrying a degree of moral culpability, and that where the crime does not deserve punishment and carries no degree of moral culpability, then the principle does not apply. It is true that sentence of detention for hospital treatment under s. 60 of the Mental Health Act 1959 is not in the nature of a punishment but is a remedial order. The answer, certainly in this court, is that neither the deserving of punishment nor carrying a degree of moral culpability has ever been a necessary ingredient of the crime the perpetrator of which is disqualified from benefiting under the will or intestacy of the person whom he has killed. That is an entirely new conception and it is actually contrary to the words used by Hamilton LJ in In re Hall [1914] P 1, 7."
7. A similar approach was taken by Vinelott J in Re K, decd [1985] Ch 85,where a wife had pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her husband. In that case relief was granted to the wife under s. 2(2) of the 1982 Act and upheld on appeal ([1986] Ch 180), but the learned Judge held that the forfeiture rule did apply, notwithstanding that the killing occurred when a shotgun was discharged during a quarrel in which the husband had used physical violence towards his wife. Both these decisions are consistent with the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554, where it was held that a...
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Paul Chadwick v Anthony Rickards Collinson and Others
...with Philips LJ. Thus the law on this issue is as stated by Philips LJ. This approach was followed by Patten J (as he then was) in Dalton v. Latham [2003] EWHC 796 (Ch.) [2003] WTLR 687 and HH Judge Norris QC (as he then was) sitting as a Judge of the Chancery Division in Re Land Deceased [......