Paul Chadwick v Anthony Rickards Collinson and Others

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeHh Judge Pelling
Judgment Date24 September 2014
Neutral Citation[2014] EWHC 3055 (Ch)
Docket NumberCase No: 3 PR 92335
CourtChancery Division
Date24 September 2014

[2014] EWHC 3055 (Ch)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CHANCERY DIVISION

MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY

Civil Justice Centre

Manchester M 60 9DJ

Before:

His Honour Judge PELLING QC SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Case No: 3 PR 92335

Between:
Paul Chadwick
Claimant
and
(1) Anthony Rickards Collinson
(2) Peter Jan Bujakowski (sued as the executors of Lisa Jane Clay Deceased)
(3) Greta Squires (representing herself and all those interested on the intestacy of Lisa Jane Clay Deceased)
Defendants

Mr Michael Whyatt (instructed by Clarkson Hirst) for the Claimantmr

N Gowling (instructed by JWK Solicitors) for the First and Second Defendants

Mr David Gilchrist (instructed by Slater & Gordon) for the Third Defendant

Hearing dates: 22 September 2014

Approved Judgment

Hh Judge Pelling QC: Introduction

1

The Claimant and Lisa Jane Clay Deceased ("the Deceased") lived together from about 2003. The relationship between the Claimant and the Deceased was an apparently stable and loving one. They had one child, a son called Joseph Michael ("Joseph") who was aged 6 in April 2013. By then the family lived together at 36 Lowlands Road, Bolton-le-Sands, Lancashire ("the property"). The Property was owned by the Claimant and the Deceased as joint tenants.

2

On 8 April 2013, the Claimant had been referred for a mental health assessment after attending his GP describing feelings of paranoia and of hearing voices. He was due to attend an appointment for that assessment on 9 April 2013. In the early morning of 9 April 2013, the Claimant unlawfully killed the Deceased and Joseph by stabbing them each repeatedly. The Claimant was arrested and charged with murder. On 20 September 2013, the Claimant pleaded guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility. That plea was accepted by the Crown and the Claimant was made the subject of a Hospital Order under Section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 with restrictions being imposed under Section 41. Since that date the Claimant has been detained in a medium secure facility pursuant to those Orders.

3

On 18 August 2008, the Deceased had made a will under which the Claimant was the residuary beneficiary. Aside from the Deceased's interest in the Property, she left various other assets including the proceeds of an employee's death benefit insurance policy and a lump sum payable under a pension scheme. The net value of the estate is£79,098.87 of which £60,000 is contributed by the interest of the Deceased in the Property.

4

The Deceased's interest in the Property would normally have passed to the Claimant on the death of the Deceased because the joint tenancy had not been severed prior to her death. However, it is a rule of the common law that (subject to the Court's power to modify the application of the Rule in individual cases by operation of the Forfeiture Act 1982) a person who has unlawfully killed another is precluded from acquiring a benefit as a result of the killing ("the Forfeiture Rule").

5

If the Forfeiture Rule applies, and the person unlawfully killed is a joint tenant of real property with the person responsible for that persons death, the effect of the Forfeiture Rule in relation to property held in this way is to sever the joint tenancy. Thus, in this case, if the Forfeiture Rule applies, in law the Deceased is treated as being entitled at the date of her death to an equal half share in the Property as a tenant in common with the Claimant – see Dunbar v. Plant [1998] Ch 412per Mummery LJ at 418A-B. The result is that the Claimant is entitled to retain his half share but is not entitled to the Deceased's half share which is treated as forming part of her estate. Further, if the Forfeiture Rule applies, then the Claimant is precluded from inheriting under the Deceased's will. In the result, if the Forfeiture Rule applies, there will be an intestacy and the estate will be distributed in accordance with the Intestacy Rules.

6

On 16 December 2013 the Claimant commenced these proceedings by which he seeks orders declaring that the Forfeiture Rule does not apply in the circumstances ofthis case or alternatively that the Forfeiture Rule should be disapplied pursuant to Section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982. This is the trial of those proceedings.

7

The trial took place on 22 September 2014. Although the executors of Lisa Jane Clay Deceased ("the Deceased") appeared by Counsel at the trial, they were neutral as to the outcome and thus did not play any active part in the proceedings. I heard oral evidence from the Claimant, his mother and father and from the Third Defendant. A statement filed on behalf of the Claimant from Ms Jane Gill (the Claimant's sister) was admitted under the Civil Evidence Act. A number of statements were filed on behalf of the Third Defendant under the Civil Evidence Act including statements from Mr John de Carpentier FRCS, a consultant ENT Surgeon who treated the Claimant on 9th April 2014, Ms Marlene Fullwood, the wife of the Deceased's cousin, Ms Janice Taylor, a cousin of the Deceased, Ms Marion Clay, an aunt of the Deceased, and Ms Betty Collins, an aunt of the Deceased. I have read each of these Civil Evidence Act statements. Finally, medical evidence was adduced in the form of a report by Dr Stephen Barlow MB., Ch.B., FRCPsych., a consultant forensic psychiatrist. Dr Barlow was originally instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to proceedings brought against the Claimant arising from the death of the Deceased to which I refer in more detail below. His initial report for the CPS is dated 2 September 2013.That report has been supplemented for these proceedings by a supplemental report dated 27 August 2014 and by a further report containing responses to questions raised on behalf of the Claimant and the Third Defendant dated 4 September 2014.

The Legal Principles

8

The Forfeiture Rule is as I have said a common law rule which for public policy reasons precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring a benefit as a result of the killing – see In the Estate of Crippen Deceased [1911] P 108per Sir Samuel Evans P at 112 (in relation to murder), In the Estate of Hall Deceased [1914] P 1 (in relation to manslaughter) and Dunbar v. Plant (ante) (in relation to suicide pacts).

9

There has been some degree of doubt as to whether the Forfeiture Rule applies to all cases of manslaughter. This debate was stimulated because, as Lord Denning observed in Gray v. Barr [1971] 2 QB 554 at 568, " manslaughter is a crime that varies infinitely in its seriousness. It may come very near to murder or amount to little more than inadvertence.". In my judgment however, the law on this issue was settled by Philips LJ (as he then was) in Dunbar v. Plant (ante) when he held that:

"So far as the [Forfeiture] rule is concerned, it is hard to see any logical basis for not applying it in all cases of manslaughter. … in the crime of manslaughter the actus reus is causing the death of another. That actus reus is rendered criminal if it occurs in one of the various circumstances that are prescribed by law. Anyone guilty of manslaughter has ex hypothesi, caused the death of another by criminal conduct. It is in such circumstances that the rule … applies."

In Re H Deceased [1990] 1 FLR 441, the Plaintiff had stabbed his wife to death while acting under a delusion induced by a reaction to a drug that he had been prescribed. The trial Judge had concluded that the Forfeiture Rule did not apply because it could not be said that the Plaintiff had acted deliberately or intentionally. In Dunbar v. Plant (ante) Philips LJ concluded that this approach was erroneous, because it could not be reconciled with the Plaintiff's guilty plea. As Philips LJ put it, " … the judge ought, on the facts of this case, to have held that the rule applied, but that in the circumstances the Plaintiff should be relieved of its effect under the Forfeiture Act 1982." Hirst LJ agreed with Philips LJ. Thus the law on this issue is as stated by Philips LJ. This approach was followed by Patten J (as he then was) in Dalton v. Latham [2003] EWHC 796 (Ch.) [2003] WTLR 687 and HH Judge Norris QC (as he then was) sitting as a Judge of the Chancery Division in Re Land Deceased [2007] 1 WLR 1009 (a case of manslaughter by gross negligence).

10

By Section 2(2) of Forfeiture Act 1982, where the Forfeiture Rule has been determined to apply, the court may modify the effect of the Rule but:

"The court shall not make an order under this section modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule in any case unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the Deceased and to such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the case requires the effect of the rule to be so modified in that case."

The effect of this provision was analysed by both Philips LJ and Mummery LJ in Dunbar v. Plant (ante). Philips LJ held that the " … first and paramount consideration must be whether the culpability attending the beneficiary's criminal conduct was such as to justify the application of the forfeiture rule at all. Philips LJ also noted in that case that a relevant consideration was that " … the assets with which this case is concerned were in no way derived from [the Deceased's] family …". Mummery LJ considered the Act to require the Court to:

"… look at the case in the round, pay regard to all the material circumstances, including the conduct of the offender and the deceased, and then ask whether "the justice of the case requires" a modification of the effect of the forfeiture rule. … The court is entitled to take into account a whole range of circumstances relevant to the discretion, quite apart from the conduct of the offender and the deceased: the relationship between them; the degree of moral culpability for what happened; the nature...

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2 cases
  • R Best v The Chief Land Registrar The Secretary of State for Justice (Interested Party)
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 21 January 2015
    ...through the commission of a crime: see for example section 29(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982, recently considered by HHJ Pelling QC in Chadwick v Collinson [2014] EWHC 3055 (Ch). Parliament has given the court power to make an order on an application tainted by an unlawful act in other cases......
  • Sandra Anna Amos v Beverly Mancini
    • United Kingdom
    • Chancery Division
    • 30 April 2020
    ...namely In re Land, decd [2006] EWHC 2069 (Ch); [2007] 1 WLR 1009, Dalton v Latham [2003] EWHC 796 (Ch) and Chadwick v Collinson [2014] EWHC 3055 (Ch). In the latter case Judge Pelling QC sitting as a High Court judge said this:“24. The claimant contends that the Forfeiture Rule is of no app......

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